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This thesis is about modals: words like ‘possible’ and ‘necessary’, ‘must’ and ‘can’. More 
specifically, it is about their roles in our lives. More specifically still, I want to approach, via the issue 
of modal function, the relationship between what I call ordinary and philosophical modalizing: the 
modalizing that we learn in the wild, and the modalizing that we learn in the philosophy classroom. 
What are the commonalities between these activities? What are their differences?  
 In order to focus and dramatize the issue, I begin by introducing a figure whom I call the 
Ascetic Modalizer. The Ascetic Modalizer insists against there being theoretically significant 
continuities between the modals that we ordinarily use to talk about powers and dispositions, and 
the modals that some philosophers have called absolute. After arguing that modal semantics, 
metaphysics, and epistemology may prove too slow a route towards progress in this debate, I 
suggest that we approach the matter via the neglected topic of modal function.  
 To get clear on modal function, however, one must first get clear on conditionals. I 
therefore argue for some novel assertability conditions for subjunctive conditionals, which are 
informed by the functions of these important constructions. In the process, I shed some light on 
the differences between kinds of supposition. This discussion of conditionals and suppositions 
then allows me to draw together two different research programmes in the theory of modal 
function.  
 With those resources in hand, I investigate the roles of some ordinary and philosophical 
modals in our practical and theoretical deliberations. I argue that in so far as those functions are 
concerned, the Ascetic Modalizer may be right to be sceptical of modal unification. Finally, I show 
how the preceding discussion intersects with two ancient ideas about modality: that deductive 
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This thesis is about modalizing, which I understand to be the deployment of modals. Modals 
are words like ‘possible’ and ‘impossible’ and ‘necessary’, which conventionally connote possibility 
and impossibility and necessity. Possibility and impossibility and necessity are kinds of modality, 
and so modality is the subject matter of modalizing.  
 I draw the distinction between ordinary and philosophical modalizing. Ordinary modalizing is 
the sort of modalizing that we inherit from everyday life. Philosophical modalizing is the sort of 
modalizing that we indulge in when we do philosophy. This thesis will be concerned with a few 
different kinds of ordinary and philosophical modalizing, and with the similarities and differences 
that exist between them. What is the relationship between ordinary and philosophical modalizing? 
When we scratch below the morphological similarities – below the fact that ‘necessary’ can receive 
ordinary and philosophical interpretations – what deep continuities exist between these different 
areas of discourse?  
I will not be approaching these matters via the theory of meaning. That is partly because 
I do not know what it is that the theory of meaning ought to be. In particular, I do not know how it 
is that the theory of meaning ought to relate to the ordinary notion of meaning. On the one hand, 
we have the likes of Wolfgang Schwarz (2018, p.2), who writes that:  
  
it is doubtful that anything of theoretical or practical importance hangs on what our words 
mean, in the ordinary sense of ‘mean’. Indeed, it is doubtful that there even is a sufficiently 
precise and unequivocal ordinary sense of ‘meaning’ that could be made a useful subject 
of inquiry. Even if there were, it is hard to see why a whole academic discipline should be 
devoted to studying that topic. The central terms of semantics – ‘meaning’, ‘reference’, 
‘semantic value’, etc. – are better understood as theoretical terms, more like ‘gene’ in 
biology or ‘rest mass’ in physics than ‘right’ and ‘wrong’ in ethics. Ordinary judgements 
about meaning are relevant because they point towards the phenomena that semantic 
theories are supposed to capture, not because they constitute the subject matter of 
semantics. 
 
On the other, we have Jerrold Katz’s (1982, p.174) later writings: 
 
On my conception of the subject, semantics is the study of meaning. This may seem an 
odd characterization—like a historian saying that history is a study of the past. But the 
conception of semantics as the study of meaning is far from an uninformative truism. In 
fact, the conception expresses a quite controversial view of semantics which is, moreover, 
unique among approaches to the subject in the philosophy of language, linguistics, and 
logic, in taking senses or meanings, as they present themselves in our ordinary linguistic 
experience, to be the proper objects of study in semantics. 
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Unlike Schwarz, I do not think that the ordinary notion of meaning is unimportant. After all, this 
is the notion of meaning that we appeal to whenever we are concerned with the accuracy of 
translation, and I doubt that the more technical notions of “meaning” could do this job as well. 
Unlike Katz, however, I am not convinced that meanings qua objects present themselves in our 
ordinary linguistic experience at all. Quite where to go from here is a difficult question that must 
presently be postponed. But then how to investigate modalizing?  
 When compared to the theory of meaning, the theory of function has received 
comparatively little attention in contemporary philosophical circles. As it applies to the production 
of linguistic expressions, the theory of function is about what our various linguistic practises 
are for: what needs or desires they are supposed to meet. It is with an eye for such matters that I 
propose to inquire into ordinary and philosophical modalizing. What are the functions 
of assertions that have modals embedded within them? What roles or purposes do they serve in our 
theoretical and practical lives? In what ways might we be worse off if we did not have this 
vocabulary? These are the sorts of questions that will drive this thesis.  
Some writers have expressed scepticism about the very idea that different regions of 
discourse could have interesting functions. Herman Cappelen (2018, p.187), for example, worries 
that linguistic expressions could not have anything more than what John Divers (2010, p.198) has 
called bluntly cognitive functions: the function of ‘water’ is to refer to water; the function of ‘x is 
water’ is to describe something as being water. Here is Cappelen (2018, p.187):  
 
However—and this is the key point —beyond these disquotationally specified functions, 
there’s variability. We can use ‘freedom’ in speech acts that have as their aim to undermine 
freedom or promote it or discuss it or disparage or make fun of it or ... There’s no limit to 
what we can go on to do with this term. These activities will vary wildly between contexts 
and over time. If the goal is to find functions that are more substantive and informative 
than the disquotationally specified functions, then it will be unsuccessful. For example, 
one of the things we can do with noun words for numbers is simplify our statements of 
laws, but communities can have a practice of using words like ‘one’ and ‘two’ just as we 
do (to denote one and two), without using them for that purpose. 
 
The problem seems to be that word usage is so varied that nothing more than the bluntly cognitive 
response is available to us. But I am not so sure that this is correct. To see this, consider the 
following functional proposal: ‘water’ functions to help us coordinate useful behaviours with 
respect to water. The idea is prima facie compelling, and at least has the potential to be 
illuminating. Thus, some examples of useful water-related behaviours include drinking water when 
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one is thirsty, and avoiding water when the hippos are bathing. I take it that there is a perfectly 
good sense in which coordinating those kinds of behaviour might be what ‘water’ is for.   
If this sort of picture is to become a respectable theory, then much work will have to be 
done: for example, on explicating the notion of useful behaviour. Some may express scepticism 
on that score, although that shall not concern us here. I think that the above considerations have 
bought us enough time to embark upon the functional project. But now a different worry presents 
itself. In the case of ‘water’, we have a reasonably good idea of what useful water-related 
behaviour looks like, because we have some idea of what water is. We know that it is the sort of 
thing that we have to drink, and the sort of thing that sometimes contains beasts best avoided. 
This is what explains why it is useful to drink water when thirsty, or to avoid water when it 
contains hippos. But it isn’t always the case that we have a solid grasp on the subject-matter 
of some area of discourse. What to do if we do not? 
 Modality is a puzzling subject matter. Indeed, a popular metaphysics of modality simply 
cannot account for the function of modalizing: a point, due to Simon Blackburn (1984, pp.214-
216), which we will soon have occasion to revisit. This is the possible worlds approach, which 
understands the subject matter of modalizing to be what goes on across possible worlds. But 
would we gain instant clarity about the modal domain, if we were to renounce these entities? An 
alternative modal metaphysics, endorsed by Barbara Vetter (2015) amongst others, says that the 
actual world is replete with objects that have brute modal properties. This neo-Aristotelian position 
is partly motivated by the prima facie dispositional character of the posits of best science: talk of 
magnetic attraction and solubility, for example, seem to connote modality. But if such talk is an 
ineliminable aspect of best science, then any scientifically respectable account of modalizing will 
have to use modal language. The neo-Aristotelian position therefore boasts a more handsome 
explanatory profile than the possible worlds account. 
However, it does not thereby provide a perspicuous conception of modality. To see why 
not, consider David Lewis (1994) on chance, or objective probability. Lewis has argued that 
whatever chance is, it must be the sort of thing that can constrain rational credence, or subjective 
probability. For example, if a rational agent knows that the chance of the coin’s landing heads is 
0.5, then their credence in the coin’s landing heads should be 0.5. But Lewis did not wish to posit 
any brute chances in the world, for these are incompatible with his Humean repudiation of modal 
properties. This combination of views makes for some uneasy theorising, and Lewis knows this. 
Should we not therefore forgo Humeanism, and admit brute chanciness into our picture of the 
actual world? Lewis’ (1994, p. 484) response is memorable: 
 
 4 
Be my guest—posit all the primitive unHumean whatnots you like. [...] But play fair in 
naming your whatnots. Don’t call any alleged feature of reality “chance” unless you’ve 
already shown that you have something, knowledge of which could constrain rational 
credence 
 
I think that the primitivist about ordinary modality is in much the same boat. Modality, like 
objective probability, may be essential to the statement of best science. If so, then a scientifically 
respectable account of modalizing must modalize, just like a scientifically respectable account of 
objective probabilizing must objectively probabilize. But positing brute objective probabilities 
doesn’t appear to explain how it is that objective probability could constrain rational credence: 
and, similarly, positing brute modalities doesn’t appear to explain how it is that modality could 
constrain rational deliberation (as I will later argue it does).  
 How do these brief reflections bare on this project? Well, it seems to me that there is a 
reasonably strong case for the indispensability of modalizing in best scientific theory. For this 
reason, I will not attempt to avoid modalizing, when accounting for the function of modalizing. 
But it also seems to me that we do not have a very solid grasp on what modality itself might be. 
For this reason, I do not think it helpful to theorise about the function of modalizing as we might 
theorise about the function of ‘water’: that is, by asking ourselves what sorts of behaviours are 
usefully coordinated with respect to the subject matter of the area of discourse. 
The stance that I adopt throughout this project is a little like that of Blackburn’s (1984, 
pp.145-217) quasi-realist. Thus, like the quasi-realist, I do not think that every area of discourse is 
best approached by reflecting upon the subject-matter that it might be presumed to have. But 
unlike the quasi-realist, I do not aspire –  in the present case at least – to begin my theorising as 
though I were an anti-realist about the subject matter. When I theorise about ordinary modalizing, 
I will use modals to elucidate their function. It seems doubtful to me that this could really be 
squared with a quasi-realist starting point. 
Because I will not attempt an analysis of modals or modality, there is no room for the 
objection that the explanatory appeal to modality is problematically circular. This point has been 
made by Divers (2010, pp.194-196). Perhaps, however, there is a way of re-telling this story without 
appealing to modal properties. That question must also be postponed, as an answer could only 
come with some heavy-duty metaphysics and philosophy of science. Until then, we must simply 





With all that said, what, exactly, do I hope to accomplish in this project? My principle aim is to 
shed light on the relationship between ordinary and philosophical modalizing. I want to do so via 
the theory of modal function, an interesting and important topic, though one that has not been 
discussed enough. Some, however, might think that this enterprise is entirely unnecessary. Don’t 
we already have a solid grasp on the relationship between ordinary and philosophical modalizing? 
It is the burden of Chapter 1 to argue that this cannot be assumed: that there is plenty of scope 
for disagreement about the extent to which the ordinary and philosophical cases form something 
like a “natural kind”.  
In order to dramatize the issue, I introduce the figure of the Ascetic Modalizer, who does 
not think that she ought to recognise philosophical “modalizing” as modalizing – philosophical 
“modality” as modality. The import of this figure stems from her uncompromising stance, which 
forces us to look for maximally convincing reasons for modal unification, and to counter those 
reasons that are prima facie against it. I begin this thesis by showing that some important positions 
in the semantics, metaphysics, and epistemology of modality do not offer any easy answers here. 
My suggestion is therefore that we approach the relationship between ordinary and philosophical 
modalizing via the theory of function. How much functional continuity is there between the 
everyday and rarefied cases? And to what extent do their functional profiles vindicate the Ascetic 
Modalizer’s no-thrills approach to modalizing? Those are the questions that I hope to treat in this 
thesis.  
With our agenda in place, I turn in Chapter 2 to the interconnected topics of conditionals 
and suppositions. I begin by arguing that there are good reasons for countenancing three species of 
conditionals: indicatives, weak subjunctives, and strong subjunctives (or counterfactuals). I defend a fairly 
intuitive – though somewhat controversial – account of the sorts of roles that these conditionals 
can play. I then use these functional distributions to develop an account of the subjunctive mood. 
The idea is that all conditionals have assertability conditions that involve suppositions, with 
different “kinds” of supposition simply corresponding to the different constraints on supposition 
that different conditionals encode.  
In Chapter 3, I aim to build on these results, putting into contact two important approaches 
to the theory of modal function. The first focuses on the roles of ordinary modals in determining 
what gets practically and theoretically deliberated. The second focuses on the roles of philosophical 
modals in determining what we can rely on when developing suppositions. I suggest that we 
investigate the roles that certain ordinary and philosophical modals have in determining what gets 
supposed, and in determining what is relied upon within the scope of suppositions, where the 
suppositions in question are directed towards the goals of practical and theoretical deliberation. 
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Although this is most certainly not presumed to exhaust the space of possible modal functions, it 
promises to be the most straightforward way of developing, in tandem, the two approaches to 
modal function.  
I turn to that task in Chapter 4. In order to structure inquiry, I propose that we focus on 
the question of how, exactly, assertions of necessity and impossibility differ, in the advertised 
deliberative roles, from mere assertion and denial. I then identify some important deliberative roles 
for two species of ordinary modals, but struggle to find any for an important class of philosophical 
modals. I conclude by discussing the implications of these results for the Ascetic Modalizer’s 
position, arguing that although the issue remains far from clear-cut, she does succeed in putting 
her interlocutor on the back foot. 
Finally, in Chapter 5, I develop these themes a little further, aiming to shed light on two 
ancient ideas about modality. The first is that a species of necessity is crucial to our circumscribing, 
and perhaps even to our describing, deductive validity. The second is that the necessary always 
obtains, and the actual is always possible. About this first idea, I argue that the Ascetic Modalizer 
can, without begging any questions against her interlocutor, and without compromising her 
outlook, accept a great deal of what has been said about the necessity that supposedly pertains to 
deductive validity. About this second idea, I argue that it sits somewhat uneasily with the 
deliberative functions of the ordinary modals surveyed in Chapter 4, though not (necessarily) in a 
way that is pernicious. In so doing, I hope to further display the philosophical importance of our 
















CHAPTER 1      






In our pre-philosophical days, words like ‘possible’ and ‘necessary’ received two broad kinds of 
interpretation. The first, subjective, which has to do with our cognitive access to the facts. The 
second, objective, which makes no essential reference to this cognitive access. But philosophy soon 
instructs us to augment our modal lexicon in certain ways: for example, to deploy notions such as 
those of the a priori, or of the absolutely necessary. What ties these different practises together? What 
tells them apart? I want to make some progress towards an answer to this question, taking the 
relationship between ordinary and absolute objective modalizing as my stalking horse. And I want 
to approach the issue via the theory of function.  
 In Section 1, I introduce our talk of ordinary subjective and objective modality, as well as 
our talk of a priority and absolute modality. In order to focus the discussion, I then state what I 
take to be the received view of the relationship between ordinary and absolute objective 
modalizing: that they form a theoretically significant kind, whose modals are commensurable in 
modal strength, where modal strength is intimately linked to counterfactual invariance. In Section 2, I 
turn to the work of Lewis (1986) and Robert Stalnaker (1984). I ask whether their possible worlds 
picture of modality and counterfactuality is strong enough to vindicate the received view, which it 
entails. I then draw on Lewis and Stalnaker’s work to formulate an argument, one which does not 
go via possible worlds. In both cases, however, I find that there is ample room to resist the received 
view. Then, in Section 3, I introduce the figure of the Ascetic Modalizer, who strips her objective 
modalizing right down to what she perceives to be its barest essentials: a single concept of ordinary 
objective modality. I argue that it is profitable to read Dorothy Edgington (2004) as an Ascetic 
Modalizer. Finally, in Section 4, I suggest that the issue of the relationship between ordinary and 
philosophical modalizing, and hence the matter of the received view, is perhaps best approached 
via the theory of modal function.  
 
1.1 Modal Unification? 
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1.1.1 Ordinary Subjective Modals  
 
Some ordinary modal assertions appear to be sensitive to subjects’ cognitive states. Accordingly, 
we will call them subjective modal assertions. Many ordinary English words can be used to make 
these assertions, like ‘might’, ‘may’, ‘cannot’, ‘must’, ‘possible’, ‘impossible’ and ‘necessary’. We are 
all familiar with doing so. Right now, I don’t know whether or not it will rain tonight. But I certainly 
think that it might.  
It is widely thought that a least one interesting subclass of subjective modals have meanings 
which can only be specified with reference to what a person knows. These subjective modals often 
go by the name ‘epistemic’. But if the evidence calls for it, we can imagine a theory which 
distinguishes between different kinds of subjective modals, ranging from those which refer to 
knowledge, all the way down to false and unjustified belief.1 
It is always possible to “de-modalize” a modal sentence, by removing the modal expression 
and re-structuring for grammaticality. We can de-modalize ‘the president might have COVID-19’ 
by dropping the ‘might’ and making minimal adjustments to the resultant sentence so that it sounds 
right: ‘the president has COVID-19’. We can call any sentence that can be obtained via de-
modalization the prejacent or complement of the modal sentence. And with that terminology in place, 
we can now say that attitudinal modal assertions are (somehow) related to subjects’ cognitive 
access to the truth-value of their prejacents, in the sense that their truth or assertibility conditions 
are sensitive to these facts about cognitive access. This looks like a distinguishing mark of 
subjective modalizing.  
For ease of discussion, I will sometimes regiment the language of subjective possibility a 
little. It is helpful to approach this regimentation by first considering the syntactical de re /de dicto 
distinction, as understood by W. V. Quine (1953, pp.158-159). Let us say that ‘M’ stands for some 
modal expression. With respect to ‘M’, syntactically de dicto modalizing occurs if ‘M’ is an expression 
of the object language that behaves as a sentential operator, one which takes closed, statement-
expressing sentences as its objects: ‘M(Fa)’. By contrast, syntactically de re modalizing occurs if ‘M’ 
 
1 Since knowledge is factive, then a subjective necessity modal that is analysed in terms of what someone 
knows – for instance, as stating that P is subjectively necessary for s IFF P is obtains in every possible world 
that is compatible with what s knows – will also be factive, or alethic: if it is necessary that P, then P. For 
now, we will bracket the issue of alethicity, noting only that I will assume that ordinary objective modals 
and absolute modals, to be introduced below, are alethic in the above sense. I make no assumptions either 
way about subjective modals, a matter to which we will return in Chapter 5. 
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is an object-language expression that operates on any predicate, ‘Fx’, in such a way as to produce 
a novel predicate: ‘MFx’. Thus, subjective modals can be syntactically de re or de dicto: 
 
(1)  The president might have COVID-19. 
(2) It is possible that the president has COVID-19. 
 
There are no doubt subtle and important differences between these forms. Throughout this thesis, 
however, I will represent the meanings of all subjective modals with bold, upper-case sentential 
operators: ‘POSS’ for ‘subjectively possible’, ‘IMPS’ for ‘subjectively impossible’, and ‘NECS’ for 
‘subjectively necessary’. Thus, I would represent the (unanalysed) meanings of (1) and (2) like so: 
<POSS the president has COVID-19>.
2 The subscript indicates that the modality is subjective.  
 
1.1.2 Ordinary Objective Modals 
 
But other ordinary modal assertions do not boast the above relation to subjects’ mental states: they 
are non-subjective, or objective. Many words can be used to make these assertions, like ‘can’, ‘could’, 
‘cannot’, ‘must’, ‘possible’, ‘impossible’ and ‘necessary’. Just as with subjective modalizing, we are 
all familiar with doing so. Right now, I very much doubt that it will rain tomorrow. But I certainly 
think that it can. 
Like their subjective counterparts, ordinary objective modals can be syntactically de re or de 
dicto:  
 
(3) I can pour salt in water. 
(4) It is possible for me to pour salt in the water. 
 
 
2 I am working with a minimalist conception of propositions, which I take to be: (i) true or false simpliciter; 
(ii) the meanings – in the ordinary sense of ‘meaning’ – of declarative sentences; (iii) the objects of 
propositional attitudes; (iv) the objects of illocutionary acts; (v) the objects of dis/agreement. This 
conception is almost identical to the Simplicity view of Herman Cappelen and John Hawthorne (2009, p.1), 
but it is minimal in a sense made familiar by Crispin Wright’s (1992, pp.33-36) minimalism about truth: I am 
only concerned, in the first instance, with platitudes. Moreover, when I describe propositions as above, I 
do so in the hope that one might acquiesce in this useful idiom without incurring a commitment to 
propositions qua objects. I treat propositions, then, as many treat the language of possible worlds: as what 
is (perhaps) nothing more than a convenient façons de parler. My primary intention is to expedite, without 
attracting any undue metaphysical commitments, the deployment of various, entirely platitudinous ways of 
describing language, meaning and mind. 
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Again, however, I will formalise the discourse with sentential operators: ‘it is necessary that’ 
(‘NECO’), ‘it is possible that’ (‘POSO’), ‘it is impossible that’ (‘IMPO’), ‘it is non-necessary that’ 
(‘NONO’), ‘it is contingent that’ (‘CONO’). Thus, I would represent the (unanalysed) meanings of 
(3) and (4) like so: <POSO I pour salt in the water>.
3 
 What is there to the ordinary idea of an objective modality? When Nelson Goodman (1955, 
p.40) introduced dispositions, he wrote the following: ‘Besides the observable properties it exhibits 
and the actual processes it undergoes, a thing is full of threats and promises.’ This metaphor applies 
equally to ordinary objective modality, to which dispositions and abilities are intimately linked. I am 
able to pour salt in water, and the salt is disposed to be dissolved by water; and from ‘I am able to 
pour salt in water’ and ‘the salt is disposed to be dissolved by water’ follow claims whose meanings 
are naturally expressed with the use of ‘possible’: ‘it is possible for me to pour salt in water’ and ‘it 
is possible for the salt to be dissolved by water’, respectively. If ‘possible’ is so-used, it connotes 
the idea of an objective possibility.  
 Ability and disposition imply ordinary objective possibility. Similarly, ordinary objective 
impossibility implies inability and non-dispositionality: if it is not possible for me to pour the salt, 
then I do not have this ability; and if it is not possible for the salt to be dissolved by water, then it 
has not the disposition to be so dissolved. Ordinary objective modality is necessary but not 
sufficient for both ability and disposition. This modal notion is conceptually closest to our 
judgments that some object has powers or potentialities of some sort.  
 
1.1.3 The Absolute Case 
 
In Naming and Necessity, Saul Kripke (1980) is supposed to have wedged apart two notions that had 
long been considered co-extensive: the a priori and the metaphysically necessary. Roughly speaking, a 
priori truths are propositions which we can become justified in believing merely by our entertaining 
or understanding them: paradigmatic cases include <2+2=4> and <blue is a colour>. The 
metaphysically necessary is somewhat harder to define, although if Kripke is correct, paradigmatic 
metaphysical necessities include not only a priori truths like <2+2=4> and <blue is a colour>, but 
also a posteriori truths like <water is H2O> and <Socrates is human>.  
 
3 Taking NECO as primitive, we can “define” the other objective operators thus: IMPOP IFF NECO¬P; 
POSO P IFF ¬NECO¬P; NONOP IFF ¬NECOP; CONOP IFF ¬NECO¬P & ¬NECOP. It follows form 
the above definitions that POSO P IFF ¬IMPO P. Notice, therefore, an interesting contrast with the 
subjective case. It sounds plain terrible to say that the president might have COVID-19 and that he must 
/can’t have it. This suggests the following equivalence: POSSP IFF ¬IMPSP and ¬NECSP. So, when 
‘possible’ receives an objective reading, it corresponds to the objectively non-impossible, whereas when it 
receives a subjective reading, it corresponds to the subjectively non-impossible and non-necessary. 
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 Just like ordinary subjective modals, the notion of a priority has something to do with the 
cognitive access that we have to certain facts. And just like ordinary objective modals, the notion 
of metaphysical modality is not supposed to be tied down to our cognitive access to the facts. But 
beyond these rather superficial similarities, what connects the ordinary subjective case to the a 
priori, and the ordinary objective case to the metaphysically modal? I want to focus my investigation 
on relationships of the latter sort: those that exist between the objective modalizing that occurs in 
the wild, and the objective modalizing that we learn in the philosophy classroom. In particular, I 
want to focus on the relationship between ordinary objective modalizing and absolute objective 
modalizing.4 
 Aside from the prefix, surface grammar does not distinguish these modals from their 
ordinary counterparts. Absolute modals – or A-modals for short –  can be syntactically de re or de 
dicto: 
 
(5) It is absolutely necessary that 2+2=4. 
(6) 2+2 is absolutely necessarily equal to 4. 
 
There may be important differences between syntactically de dicto and de re A-modalizing but, as 
before, I will often regiment this discourse with sentential operators: ‘it is A-necessary that’ (‘A-
NECO’), ‘it is A-possible that’ (‘A-POSO’), ‘it is A-impossible that’ (‘A-IMPO’), ‘it is A-non-
necessary that’ (‘A-NONO’), ‘it is A-contingent that’ (‘A-CONO’). Thus, I would represent the 
(unanalysed) meanings of (5) and (6) like so: <A-NECO 2+2=4>. Here, the subscript indicates 
objectivity, and the underlining indicates that we are dealing with a philosophical modal.  
 Absolute modalizing is closely tied to counterfactual thinking. We all think that many 
propositions are actually true: <some people do philosophy>, <the earth is round>, <two plus 
two is four>. Intuitively, however, not every proposition that is actually true had to have been true. 
For instance, although <some people do philosophy> is actually true, it would have been false if 
(say) no life had evolved on earth at all. Thus, some propositions which are actually true would 
 
4 We should note that, as Justin Clarke-Doane (2019, no pagination) points out, the philosophical literature 
is replete with statements to the effect that metaphysical necessity just is absolute, or strongest, objective 
necessity. Indeed, Kripke (1980, p.99) calls metaphysical necessity ‘necessity in the highest degree’. But even 
if this equivalence is faulty, it seems fair to suggest that metaphysical necessity is a kind of absolute necessity. 
So, by investigating the relationship between ordinary and absolute objective modalizing, we are ipso facto 
investigating the relationship between ordinary and metaphysical objective modalizing.  
I will also eventually have something to say about the relationship between a priority and ordinary 
subjective modalizing, in Chapter 5. This will occur in the context of a discussion about another 
extraordinary species of modalizing: broadly logical modalizing. But we proceed in a far more manageable way 
by initially focusing our inquiry on ordinary and absolute objective modalizing. (I will often refer to the 
former simply as ‘objective’ modalizing, and to the latter simply as ‘absolute’ modalizing). 
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have been false, if certain things had been different. But many of us also think that some 
propositions could not have failed to be true, no matter what had been the case. For example, 
many of us think that, no matter what might have happened, <2+2=4> would always have been 
true. Philosophers call these things A-necessary.5 
The A-necessary is supposed to correlate with an unrestrictedly invariant counterfactual status.6 
We can remain neutral about the precise nature of this basic and entrenched idea: about whether 
it concerns the logic of A-necessity, the content of the concept of <A-necessity>, the meaning of 
‘A-necessary’, the metaphysics of A-necessity, or our epistemic access to facts of A-necessity. Let 
us nonetheless dignify it with a name: 
 
Unrestricted Invariance – Q is absolutely necessary IFF Q is unrestrictedly 
counterfactually invariant.  
 
Throughout this thesis, I will sometimes paraphrase Unrestricted Invariance with the following 
biconditional: Q is A-necessary IFF P (P → Q). It is worth noting, however, that this introduces 
quantification over states of affairs, which could make some theorists uncomfortable. These 
theorists will stress that this is not unnecessary, if our goal is to capture the connection between 
A-necessity and unrestricted counterfactual invariance. Perhaps that is true. Nevertheless, the 
language of quantification is helpful in this respect, even if it is ultimately dispensable.7 
 
1.1.4 Three Credos 
 
 
5 Counterfactual and indicative conditionals are treated in detail in Chapter 2. For the time being, let us 
simply define counterfactuals as those conditionals which are of a kind with the following: ‘If Oswald hadn’t 
shot Kennedy, (then) someone else would have.’ Likewise, let us simply define indicatives as those 
conditionals that are of a kind with the following: ‘If Oswald didn’t shoot Kennedy, (then) someone else 
did’. I will represent the ‘will’ indicative conditional with the plain arrow, and the ‘would’ counterfactual 
conditional with the box-arrow: ‘P → Q’ and ‘P → Q’, respectively.  
6 There are several ways of expressing this central precept. Echoing Divers (2018, p.17) we might put the 
thought thus: Q is A-necessary IFF Q would have obtained no matter what had been the case. Or, with 
Timothy Williamson (2007, p.159), we might put the matter like so: Q is A-necessary IFF whatever were 
the case, it would still be the case that Q. Or, with Lewis (1973, p.23) in mind: Q is A-necessary IFF it would 
be the case, no matter what, that Q. 
7 Taking A-NECO as primitive, we can “define” the other A- modal operators, in the following way: A-
IMPOQ IFF A-NECO¬Q; A-POSO Q IFF ¬A-NECO¬Q; A-NONOQ IFF ¬A-NECOQ; A-CONOQ IFF 
¬A-NECO¬Q & ¬A-NECOQ. Given Unrestricted Invariance, this gets us the follow equivalences: A-IMPO 
Q IFF P (P → Q); A-POSO Q IFF P (P → Q); A-NONO Q IFF P (P → Q); A-CONO Q 
IFF ((P (P → Q)) & (S (S → Q))). Notice how the existential quantifier runs rampant 
throughout: that is why some might have been concerned about the above rendition of Unrestricted 
Invariance. But I trust that their fears have been temporally assuaged. 
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I have just outlined two species of objective modalizing. The first is an everyday sort of modalizing, 
which is closely related to the ideas of disposition and of ability, to notions of power. The second 
is philosophical, although it is closely related to counterfactual thinking, which we are all familiar 
with. We are inquiring into their interrelationships: into what connects the two species of 
modalizing together. And we are doing so with the intention of illuminating the relationship 
between ordinary and philosophical modalizing more broadly. To focus our discussion, I now 
want to codify what is, I think, a popular view of this connection.  
 We can begin by bringing to the fore what is often merely presupposed: that the 
morphological similarities between ordinary and philosophical modals are suggestive of 
theoretically significant similarities. When we are studying A-modalizing, we are not supposed to 
be dealing with (something like) a metaphorical extension of ordinary modalizing. No. In one way or 
another, the activities or semantics or subject-matters of ordinary objective modalizing and A-
modalizing are supposed to form (something like) a “natural kind”. Here is one way of expressing 
that idea:  
 
Credo in Rarefication – There are objective modalities beyond those countenanced 
by our ordinary objective modal concepts; these ordinary objective modal concepts 
do not exhaust the space of objective modal concepts.8 
 
A-necessity is also supposed to be the strongest form of objective necessity: for any objective 
modality, X, and for any P, if P is A-necessary, then P is X-necessary. Conversely, A-possibility is 
supposed to be the weakest form of objective possibility: for any objective modality, X, and for any 
P, if P is X-possible, then P is A-possible. And all that implies the following:  
 
Credo in Commensurability – Objective modalizing admits of different modal notions 
that are commensurable in strength.  
 
It would then follow that A-necessity is stronger than ordinary objective necessity, and A-
possibility weaker than ordinary objective possibility. Moreover, Unrestricted Invariance can add 
substance to these claims about comparative modal strength. For upon noticing that objective 
modals can vary in strength, then since the strongest objective necessity is unrestrictedly 
 
8 Non-normative modalities, that is. Clearly, there are normative modalities, such as those expressed by deontic 
modals: modals which are in some way sensitive to the good, the bad, the ugly. They will be touched upon 
in Chapter 3; until then, ‘modality’ is elliptical for ‘non-normative modality’.  
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counterfactually invariant, one might suggest that the weaker necessities are restrictedly 
counterfactually invariant. Thus, perhaps the strength of the objective necessity of Q is measurable 
by Q’s degree of counterfactual invariance:  
 
Credo in Invariance – (A) For any objective necessity, X, if Q is X-necessary, then for 
all P that meets some condition X, (P → Q); and (B) for any condition, X, if (P 
→ Q) for all P that meets X, then Q is objectively X-necessary.  
 
Notice that for any conditions X and Y, we can ask whether the set of P that meets Y is a proper 
subset of the set of P that meets X. We can therefore ask about whether (P(X) (P → Q)) implies 
(P(Y) (P → Q)), but not vice vera. So, we can ask about whether X-necessity is stronger than Y-
necessity.  
At this stage, something must be said about what it is for a state of affairs to ‘meet’ some 
condition X. Consider, for example, nomological necessity. Remaining agonistic about whether 
the Credo in Invariance expresses a logical, semantico-conceptual, epistemological, or metaphysical 
connection between modality and counterfactuality, it is reasonably clear that, in the case of 
nomological necessity, if a state of affairs meets the relevant condition X, then that state of affairs 
must be related, in some way or other, to the laws of nature. But when it comes to our describing 
this relation, various difficulties begin to emerge.  
 A natural thought is that Q is nomologically necessary IFF for all P that is consistent with 
the laws of nature, (P → Q) – where representational contents, or contentful things, are 
consistent when neither entails the negation of the other. But this cannot be quite right. As 
indicated, consistency is a relationship that holds between representations, and not between states of 
affairs and laws of nature. And this means that the natural thought must, instead, be rendered in 
the following sort of way: Q is nomologically necessary IFF for all P whose representations are 
consistent with the representation of the laws of nature, (P → Q).  
Now some may object to any such “account” of nomological modality. Why not simply 
say that Q is nomologically possible when its representation is consistent with the representation 
of the laws of nature? And why not define nomological necessity accordingly? But this response 
may be misguided, for at least two reasons. Firstly, one might endorse the Credo in Invariance as a 
logical principle, and not as an analysis or “account”. But secondly, and perhaps more importantly, 
this proposed simple “account” would make nomological modality a wholly semantic phenomenon. 
Intuitively, however, this seems mistaken: when we speak of what must and may happen, according 
to the laws of nature, we seem to direct our thoughts towards non-semantic facts.   
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It is true, of course, that the above credo-friendly biconditional – Q is nomologically 
necessary IFF for all P whose representations are consistent with the representation of the laws 
of nature, (P → Q) – appeals to representations. In this biconditional, the phrase ‘P whose 
representations are consistent with the representation of the laws of nature’ is a schematised 
version of the following modified noun: ‘states of affairs whose representations are consistent with 
the representation of the laws of nature’. And that noun acts to modify – in this case, to restrict – 
the natural language quantifier ‘all’.9 And on the typical treatment of restricted universal 
quantification, the right-hand side of the biconditional is therefore rendered as follows: For all x 
(x is a state of affairs whose representation is consistent with the representation of the laws of 
nature > (x → Q)).10 This means that the phrase ‘is a state of affairs whose representation is 
consistent with the representation of the laws of nature’ behaves predicatively. So-understood, the 
biconditional, when advanced as an analysis, therefore partially characterises nomological necessity 
in representational terms.  
But note the following. Firstly, this characterisation is only partial: there is still room for 
the intuitive thought that something non-representational characterises this modality. And secondly, 
sophisticated and well-motivated alternatives to the usual treatment of restricted quantification are 
available. One particularly interesting proposal has been developed in great detail by Hanoch Ben-
Yami.11 On Ben-Yami’s account – and simplifying somewhat – the modified noun ‘states of affairs 
whose representations are consistent with the representation of the laws of nature’ would work as 
a device of plural reference, and the quantifier ‘all’ specifies that all those referents are predicated 
by ‘(x → Q)’. The modified noun therefore works referentially, not predicatively. And this may 
complicate the thought that our biconditional, when advanced as an analysis, partially characterises 
nomological necessity in representational terms. For what matters is simply that those states of 
affairs are all such that, had they obtained, Q would also have obtained. That we refer to those 
states of affairs by relating them to their representations may now be seen as a fact about us. 12 
 
9 The biconditional, fully stated, therefore reads in something like the following manner: Q is nomologically 
necessary IFF all states of affairs whose representations are consistent with the representation of the laws 
of nature are such that, had they obtained, Q would still have obtained. But that is rather cumbersome, 
hence the schematisation. 
10 Here ‘>’ stands in for a conditional construction of some variety. 
11 For instance, in Ben-Yami (2004, 2009, 2014). 
12 Indeed, perhaps the only reason that we call these modalities ‘nomological’ at all is that, when it comes 
to the states of affairs that partly constitute the phenomenon itself, our epistemic access goes via the laws 
of nature and their representations. What is essential to the phenomenon of nomological necessity, 
however, is simply that it is all those states of affairs, rather than all these other ones, which work as the 
counterfactual antecedents. But this more radical suggestion needn’t be automatically endorsed. Perhaps 
there is a way of specifying the relevant states of affairs without appealing to representations, and whilst 
making the relationship to laws of nature explicit (which is not to say that I can think of a way of doing so). 
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 Much more could be said about all this. But despite all these complications, it nonetheless 
seems correct to credit the Credo in Invariance as playing an important role in much contemporary 
modal theorising. And if any position about the relationship between ordinary and absolute 
objective modalizing deserves to be called the “received view”, it is surely well approximated by 
the credos above: a theoretically significant continuum ties these species of modalizing together, 
activities whose concepts are commensurable in modal strength, where modal strength is measured 
by a proposition’s distribution across counterfactual space. This elegant picture unifies ordinary 
and philosophical modals, and it weds them – logically, semantico-conceptually, metaphysically, 
or epistemologically – to counterfactual conditionals.  
But what motivates this unified image? What reasons are there for thinking that any of these 
credos are true? If an alien anthropologist were to observe our ordinary and philosophical 
modalizing, would they agree with the received view? And if they gave us a voice in their inquiry, 
what could be said in its favour? What could be said against it?  
 
1.2 For Unification: Lewis and Stalnaker  
 
1.2.1 Possible Worlds  
 
Two philosophical giants, Lewis (1986) and Stalnaker (1984), have argued that modals and 
counterfactuals have truth conditions which concern what goes on across possible worlds. And 
although they disagree about what these worlds are, and about the semantics of counterfactuals, 
their possible worlds accounts both imply the unifying credos.  
On the possible worlds framework, modal declaratives have truth-conditions that quantify 
over possible worlds. Necessity claims are interpreted as universally quantifying over possible 
worlds, and possibility claims are interpreted as existentially quantifying over possible worlds. 
Absolute necessity and possibility is interpreted as quantification over all possible worlds: A-
NECOQ IFF Q obtains across all possible worlds, and A-POSOQ IFF there is some world in 
which Q obtains. Restricted necessities and possibilities are interpreted as quantifications over 
restricted domains of possible worlds. These restrictions, which can be explicitly or contextually 
determined, are what account for the differences between different species of modals.  
For instance, Q might be said to be subjectively possible for s IFF there is a world which 
is consistent with what s knows in which Q. Likewise, Q might be said to be nomologically possible 
IFF there is a world which is governed by our laws of nature in which Q. But why stop there? Any 
 17 
condition that we can think of could be used to restrict the domain of quantification, allowing for 
a truly mind-boggling array of possibilities and necessities. As Lewis (1986, p.8) puts it:   
 
Sometimes one hears a short list of the restricted modalities: nomological, historical, 
epistemic, deontic, maybe one or two more. And sometimes one is expected to take a 
position, once and for all, about what is and isn’t possible de re for an individual. I would 
suggest instead that the restricting of the modalities [...] like the restricting of quantifiers 
generally, is a very fluid sort of affair: inconstant, somewhat indeterminate, and subject to 
instant change in contextual pressure. 
 
The possible worlds account generates commitment to the credos in Rarefication and 
Commensurability: for ordinary modalizing surely does not countenance every species of modality so-
defined; and so-defined, the strength of the necessity of P would be measurable by the extent to 
which P obtains across possible worlds.  
Lewis and Stalnaker also accept the Credo in Invariance. The connection between modals 
and counterfactuals is secured via a semantics for counterfactuals that quantifies over possible 
worlds. Very roughly, for Lewis (1973), <P → Q> is true IFF every P world that is most similar 
to the actual world is also a Q world. Lewis therefore analyses <Q is A-necessary IFF P (P → 
Q)> as <Q obtains at all possible worlds IFF for all P, every P world that is most similar to the 
actual world is also a Q world>. For Stalnaker (1968), and again very roughly, <P → Q> is true 
IFF either no world is a P world, or the most similar P world to the actual world is also a Q world. 
Stalnaker therefore analyses <Q is A-necessary IFF P (P → Q)> as <Q obtains at all possible 
worlds IFF for all P, either no world is a P world, or the most similar P world to the actual world 
is also a Q world>. 
The Lewis-Stalnaker view supports the credos. But what supports the Lewis-Stalnaker 
view? In a sense, the best argument for this position is the hardest to assess. This is an argument 
from theoretical utility, which states that we should accept this position because its theoretical 
virtues outweigh its explanatory costs. Given the sheer volume of work that has been done about 
both the pros and cons of the possible worlds picture, a full-scale analysis of this argument is far 
beyond the scope of this thesis. I will instead provide two prima facie reasons for scepticism.   
 In the first instance, modal semantics has recently become rather diverse, if not splintered. 
Consider, for instance, debates about the adequacy of the possible worlds approaches to deontic 
modals, which can be found in Nate Charlow and Matthew Chrisman’s (2016) edited volume on 
deontic modality. Consider also the powerful case that Emanuel Viebahn & Barbara Vetter (2016) 
have made for modal polysemy: the claim that ordinary modals are ambiguous between closely 
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related, but wholly different, subjective, objective and deontic meanings. All this work suggests 
some theoretical difficulties for the received view.  
 But here is another reason for scepticism, one that brings us closer to this thesis’ focus on 
the activity of modal judgment. Divers (2002) has argued that if a possible worlds modal realism is 
correct, then it is Lewis’ (1986) genuine modal realism. On this view, possible worlds are 
spatiotemporally isolated concreta. But this makes them causally inert, which means that they cannot 
enter into accounts and explanations of modal function. It was Simon Blackburn (1984, p.214) 
who first made this point about Lewis’ modal realism: 
 
We certainly do not explain [our modalizing] by thinking that we are made sensitive to 
possibilities because of some quasi-sensory capacity which responds to the presence or 
absence of possible worlds. [...] If the possible worlds, like the moral properties, represent 
a new realm of fact, why should we be interested in it? Talking of possibilities would be as 
optional to us, interested in the actual world, as talk of neighbouring countries or different 
times would be to us, if we are interested in the here and now. But it is not. We want to 
know whether to allow possibilities or insist upon necessities because we want to know how 
to conduct our thinking about the actual world.   
 
Lewis’ concreta are utterly intangible to us. Suppose that there is a tiger behind the bush. Then 
why should it matter to us whether this was necessary, as opposed to merely contingent? There 
must be some point to our making such distinctions, or else modalizing wouldn’t be so widespread 
and entrenched. But concrete possible worlds cannot help us here, and this is a point against 
theories that evoke such possibillia. 
Indeed, no causally inert phenomena can figure in a functional account of any concept or 
linguistic practise. Edward Craig (1990, pp.89-90), whist arguing for a function-driven genealogy 
of knowledge-ascriptions, writes the following:  
 
We are attempting a ‘state of nature’ explanation of a number of facts of conceptual or 
linguistic practice. Such explanations work by identifying certain human needs and arguing 
that the practices are a necessary (or at the least a highly appropriate) response to them 
[...] This sets limits to what a ‘state of nature’ explanation can be good for. The less visible 
the practical significance, for us, of forming a certain conception or operating a certain 
linguistic usage, the weaker the explanation. [...] And if the visible practical significance 
sinks to zero, as one might think it had when we form the conception of a state of affairs which we are 
totally incapable of detecting, the force of a ‘state of nature’ explanation will sink to zero too, 
unless it takes the liberty of helping itself to additional explanatory principles. [Emphasis 
my own.] 
 
When we focus on why it is that modals matter to us, the Lewis-Stalnaker picture loses a good deal 
of its charm. Of course, one could try to supplement the account in some way, and argue that, in the 
modal domain, the semantics and metaphysics come apart from the theory of function. But then 
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we are owed an explanation as to why this pattern is found in modals but not, for instance, in our 
knowledge-ascriptions. Thus, it was certainly Craig’s (1990, pp.1-3) aspiration that his functional 
account would shed some light on the murky matter of the analysis of knowledge:  
 
We take some prima facie plausible hypothesis about what the concept of knowledge does 
for us, what its role in our life might be, and then ask what a concept having that role 
would be like, what conditions would govern its application. [...]should our intuitions 
[about the concept’s extension] prove indeterminate or elastic, this type of investigation 
might reveal constructive ways of stretching them, and the rationale behind the stretch. 
With luck it might also reveal the sources of the indeterminacy or elasticity which dogged 
the attempts to [analyse the concept].  
 
So, there are reasons to be unhappy with the possible worlds view, especially if one is preoccupied 
with the place of modalizing in our lives. And although they are not decisive objections to the Lewis-
Stalnaker picture, it would be nice for there to be a more direct route to the credos.  
 
1.2.2 A Direct Argument  
 
Possible world’s aside, we can find in Lewis’s work some motivation for the Credo in 
Commensurability. Moreover, we can find in Stalnaker’s work a logical principle which, given the 
Lewisian considerations, could make someone warm to the Credo in Invariance. Their writings 
therefore suggest an argument for the unifying credos which, though consonant with the possible 
worlds picture, bypasses it entirely.  
We begin with Lewis (1976, p.150), marshalling support for the Credo in Commensurability: 
 
To say that something can happen means that its happening is compossible with certain 
facts. Which facts? That is determined [...] by context. An ape can't speak a human 
language—say, Finnish—but I can. Facts about the anatomy and operation of the ape's 
larynx and nervous system are not compossible with his speaking Finnish. The 
corresponding facts about my larynx and nervous system are compossible with my 
speaking Finnish. But don't take me along to Helsinki as your interpreter: I can't speak 
Finnish. My speaking Finnish is compossible with the facts considered so far, but not with 
further facts about my lack of training. What I can do, relative to one set of facts, I cannot 
do, relative to another, more inclusive, set. Whenever the context leaves it open which 
facts are to count as relevant, it is possible to equivocate about whether I can speak 
Finnish. It is likewise possible to equivocate about whether it is possible for me to speak 
Finnish, or whether I am able to, or whether I have the ability or capacity or power or 
potentiality to. 
 
Facts are compossible if their co-obtaining is objectively possible. On Lewis’ account, it is 
objectively possible for Lewis to speak Finnish because it is objectively possible for the facts of 
his anatomy and his speaking Finnish to co-obtain. But it is also objectively impossible for Lewis 
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to speak Finnish, because it isn’t objectively possible for the facts of his lack of training and his 
speaking Finnish to co-obtain. Thus, the possibility for some s to F is a relative matter. Relative to 
one set of facts, X, it is possible for s to F. Relative to a different set of facts, Y, it is impossible 
for s to F. But then since we can ask whether Y is a proper subset of X, we can ask whether the 
species of possibility that is sanctioned by X is stronger than the species of possibility that is 
sanctioned by Y. 
 Lewis’s defence of the Credo in Commensurability is the first of three positions which would 
jointly support the Credo in Invariance if they were true. The second is that a conditional analysis of 
objective possibility is true. We may take this position to be equivalent to the following: Q is 
objectively possible IFF P(X) (P → Q). This position is suggested by two considerations. The 
first is that conditional analyses of dispositions and abilities have been quite popular. Indeed, Lewis 
(1997) defends a conditional analysis of the former (although he is sceptical about a successful 
conditional analysis of the latter (2020)). The second is that that there is an intimate relationship 
between dispositions and ordinary objective possibility. Thus, someone who is tempted by a 
conditional analysis of dispositions or abilities may also be tempted by a conditional analysis of 
ordinary objective possibility.  
It is Stalnaker (1968, pp. 106-107) who supplies us with the third and final position, which 
is the following equivalence: (P → Q) IFF (P → Q). When this equivalence is wedded to 
Double Negation Introduction and Double Negation Elimination, it follows that (P → Q) IFF (P → 
Q). This equivalence is natural, though controversial. Ignoring that for now, let us instead 
formulate a Lewis-Stalnaker argument for the Credo in Invariance.  
We begin with the Lewisian view that ordinary objective modalizing already countenances 
at least two different species of objective possibility, X-possibility and Y-possibility. Given a 
conditional analysis of ordinary objective possibility, it follows that ordinary modalizing 
countenances a concept of objective possibility which satisfies (i) Q is X-possible IFF P(X) (P 
→ Q), and a concept of objective possibility which satisfies (ii) Q is Y-possible IFF P(Y) (P → 
Q). But then given the Stalnaker equivalence, Double Negation Introduction, and Double Negation 
Elimination, it follows that ordinary modalizing allows at least this much: that (i) Q is X-possible 
IFF P(X) (P → Q), and that (ii) Q is Y-possible IFF P(Y) (P → Q).  
 Now suppose that Bill is an ordinary objective modalizer who accepts the above. Someone 
suggests to Bill that, for some condition, Z, Q is Z-possible IFF P(Z) (P → Q). For Bill to 
deny that this biconditional circumscribes a real objective possibility concept, Bill would 
presumably have to show there is something special about conditions X and Y. But this special 
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quality cannot simply be that Bill does not presently recognise Z-possibility as an objective 
possibility. Bill can easily imagine an agent, Anne, whom only countenances X-possibility. From 
Bill’s perspective, Anne is mistakenly disallowing condition Y from restrict the modally relevant 
domain of quantification. But then perhaps Bill is making the same mistake with respect to 
condition Z. And then unless there is something special about Z in this respect, the same thought 
could occur to Bill about any condition whatever. This is the line of thought which moves Bill 
towards the Credo in Invariance. Absent a good reason for thinking that X and Y are special, Bill’s 
rejection of that credo seems unmotivated.  
 
1.2.3 Is the Argument Sound?  
 
The above argument supports the Credo in Invariance. But should it be accepted? I think that each 
of its key premises can be resisted.  
Lewis’ Contextualism. Although Lewis intended his observations to cover ascriptions of 
ability, capacity, power, and ordinary objective possibility, it is important to notice that Lewis 
focuses on the word ‘can’. We might therefore suspect that even if ‘can’ statements are relativized 
to different facts, this does not hold of every modal expression in the vicinity. A picture of exactly 
this sort has been defended by Vetter (2015, pp.217-224), who holds that whilst ‘can’ is a context-
sensitive expression, the modal facts which are determined by ‘can’ in a context are not themselves 
relativized. For Vetter, ‘x can F’ is true in a context IFF x has a potentiality to F which is relevant 
in that context. But equally for Vetter, x’s potentiality to F is non-relativized: something either has 
the potentiality to F at some time, or it does not.  
Moreover – and irrespective of whether our focus is exclusively on ‘can’ – Lewis’s putative 
data can be resisted. Is there really a sense in which Lewis can speak Finnish, but an ape cannot? 
I myself believe that neither Lewis nor the ape can do so. However, whilst I believe that it is 
objectively possible that Lewis will be able to speak Finnish at some point, I do not think this 
about the ape. So, by deploying the natural, operable, and important distinction between having a 
potentiality to F, and having a potentiality to have a potentiality to F, we can recover the modal 
contrast that exists between would-be Finnish speakers. 
 Of course, it need not be denied that there are many contexts in which we happily gloss 
over this distinction. In situations where Lewis’ speaking Finnish doesn’t matter to us, we might 
say that Lewis can do what the ape cannot. But if we are looking for an interpreter, the distinction 
between the possible and the merely possibly possible matters: we insist that Lewis cannot speak 
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Finnish. Thus, where Lewis saw context-sensitive truth, we see loose talk in some places, and 
accurate talk in others.  
Conditional Analyses. It is barely worth noting that conditional analyses of abilities and 
dispositions are controversial. The case against conditional analyses of dispositions has been 
persuasively made by Vetter (2015, p.33-61) and E. J. Lowe (2011). The case against conditional 
analyses of abilities goes back at least to J. L. Austin (1956). But perhaps it is worth noting that 
even if one were to accept these analyses, support for conditional analyses of ordinary objective 
possibility is not immediate. After all, there are important differences between these concepts, 
which someone may wish to articulate with the suggestion that objective possibilities are not apt 
for conditional analysis.  
Stalnaker’s Equivalence. Stalnaker endorses a controversial equivalence: (P → Q) IFF (P 
→ (Q). Lewis (1973, pp.80-83) does not. This is partly because Lewis defines the ‘might’ 
counterfactual as the dual of the corresponding ‘would’ counterfactual: (Q ♢→ P) IFF (Q → 
P). However, Stalnaker (1984, pp.142-146) understands the ‘might’ counterfactual as a subjective 
possibility modal that has the corresponding ‘would’ within its scope: (Q ♢→ P) IFF POSS(Q → 
P). But even if Lewis is wrong about ‘might’ counterfactuals, should Stalnaker be allowing that (P 
→ Q) IFF (P → (Q)? Timothy Williamson (1988) has argued no, on the grounds that this 
equivalence commits us to strange principles. J. R. G. Williams (2010) has argued yes, on the 
grounds that the equivalence allows us to explain the behaviour of counterfactuals under the scope 
of quantifiers. But Williams does not directly address Williamsons’ arguments, and Williamson’s 
arguments do not speak to Williams’ concerns. And yet something has to give.  
Without entering into the subtleties of each position, I will present one reason for siding 
with Williamson. Duality aside, we can analyse ‘might’ counterfactuals in two ways. The first takes 
the ‘might’ to scope over the consequent of the corresponding ‘would’ conditional: (Q → POSSP). 
The second takes the ‘might’ to scope over the entire corresponding ‘would’ conditional: POSS(Q 
→ P). Stalnaker accepts the latter treatment. But if it could be shown that Stalnaker’s analysis of 
the ‘might’ counterfactual is false, then not every sentential operator, O, is such that O(P → Q) 
IFF (P → OQ). Thus, there would be logical precedent to Williamson’s concerns about 
Stalnaker’s equivalence. 
There are grounds for thinking that Stalnaker’s analysis of the ‘might’ counterfactual is 
false. Consider the following counterfactual: ‘If there had been nothing but a gold or silver sphere, 
it might have been gold’. That seems correct. However, consider: ‘It is subjectively possible that, if 
there had been nothing but a gold or silver sphere, it would have been gold’. That just seems 
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wrong, because we appear to know with certainty that this particular ‘would’ counterfactual is false. 
This tells us that either Lewis’ duality analysis of ‘might’ counterfactuals is correct, or that ‘might’ 
counterfactuals are equivalent to the corresponding ‘would’ counterfactuals, but with a subjective 
modal scoping over their consequents.13  
With all that being said, what should our alien anthropologist think? Should they accept 
the unifying credos? No doubt many good moves could be made in response to the above 
arguments. But some may at this point protest: Mightn’t the difficulties that we have encountered 
so far suggest a weakness in the unifying credos? Mightn’t we have been led astray by the 
suggestion of modal unification? I will now introduce a figure who stands in stark opposition to 
the received view. 
 
1.3 Against Unification: Modal Asceticism  
 
1.3.1 A Manifesto  
 
The Ascetic Modalizer is a no-thrills modalizer. She is quite content with the objective modalities 
that she countenances with her ordinary objective modalizing. Beyond that, the Ascetic Modalizer 
believes that she is to be moved into adopting a lexicon that accommodates further objective 
modalities, and that nobody has yet demonstrated the need to do so. The Ascetic Modalizer 
therefore rejects the Credo in Rarefication. The Ascetic Modalizer also believes that ordinary objective 
modalizing does not countenance modalities of different strengths. She believes, for example, that 
something is either (ordinarily) objectively necessary, or that it is not: that there is no sense in 
which P is (ordinarily) objectively necessary in one way, but not in another. She therefore rejects 
the Credo in Commensurability. And the Ascetic Modalizer also sees no reason to believe that 
objective necessities are correlated – logically, semantico-conceptually, metaphysically, or 
epistemologically – with some degree of counterfactual invariance. She is inclined to view the 
suggestion of such correlation as gratuitous. She therefore rejects the Credo in Invariance.  
 
13 Williamson (1988, p.405) claims that we have no reason to think that, ‘unbeknownst to us’, the following 
is true: ‘If there had been nothing but a gold or silver sphere, it would have been gold’. He uses this 
conditional to argue directly against Stalnaker’s equivalence. Moreover, Williamson (1988, p.406) suggests 
that this conditional might be equivalent to the following: ‘If there had been nothing but a gold or silver 
sphere, it might not have been gold’. That would imply Lewis’ duality reading, although Williamson choose 
not to develop this (or indeed any) argument against Stalnaker’s theory of ‘might’ counterfactuals. But as 
the above shows, it is possible to use Williamson’s conditional and ‘might’ counterfactuals to argue against 
Stalnaker’s theory, whilst remaining agnostic about Lewis’ duality reading.  
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To be clear, the Ascetic Modalizer is not (necessarily) a sceptic about degrees of 
counterfactual invariance. Indeed, the Ascetic Modalizer is not (necessarily) a sceptic about 
unrestricted counterfactual invariance. And she would not (necessarily) be opposed to our 
introducing a concept to mark counterfactual invariance: a concept which could then be used to 
define other concepts, in the same sort of way that necessity can be used to define possibility, 
impossibility, non-necessity, and contingency. The Ascetic Modalizer simply resents the 
presumption that she ought to view these different counterfactual statuses as (tracking) necessities, 
possibilities, impossibilities, non-necessities, and contingencies.  
 The Ascetic Modalizer rejects the suggestion that her disagreement with the received view 
amounts to little more than a terminological squabble. She points out that her position is significant 
in at least two respects. The first is pedagogical. If the Ascetic Modalizer is right that A-necessity 
is not the same sort of thing as that which we ordinarily call necessity, then adopting the same 
terminology for both is bound to confuse the student of philosophy. The second is theoretical. 
The Ascetic Modalizer will point to the widespread belief that a theory of modality ought to 
accommodate ordinary and philosophical “modalities”. This is most obvious when we consider 
Neo-Aristotelian theories of modality. Barbara Vetter (2015, pp.197-300), for instance, works very 
hard to accommodate A-modality within her framework, and views it as a point against her theory 
that she cannot countenance all prima facie A-possibilities. But the Ascetic Modalizer will urge that 
Vetter has been working under the influence of a false desideratum.  
 Finally, the Ascetic Modalizer rejects the assertion that the strength of an objective 
necessity is measured by counterfactual invariance, both with regards to its content and to its 
presupposition. She rejects its content, because she rejects the Credo in Invariance. But just as 
importantly, she rejects its presupposition: that the strength of objective necessity is an issue worth 
commenting about. For given her rejection of the Credo in Commensurability, there are no two species 
of ordinary objective necessity whose strengths we might like to compare; and given her rejection 
of the Credo in Rarefication, this unique species of ordinary objective necessity is the only species of 
objective necessity there is. For the Ascetic Modalizer, then, ordinary objective necessity is trivially 
the strongest species of objective necessity.   
 
1.3.2 Edgington 2004 
 
With this schematic presentation of the Ascetic Modalizer’s position in hand, we can turn to 
Edgington (2004) for a concrete rendition. Edgington places her view within the context of Saul 
Kripke’s (1980). Edgington’s (2004, pp.5-6) goal is to: 
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take as basic our pre-philosophical use of modal concepts, and to derive the more rarefied 
philosophical use from these. The novice at philosophy has some catching on to do in 
coming to understand the philosopher's favourite sense, according to which e.g. 'It is 
possible that the Conservative Party won the last election' is true, and 'It is possible that a 
man lives for years unaided under water' is true. And I think there are two primitive modal 
notions, both context dependent, in terms of which we can define two more abstract 
notions. A primitive epistemic possibility is what you are considering when you are 
wondering whether something is the case. It is relative to an individual and a time. The 
other pre-philosophical notion is that certain things can happen, certain things can’t; 
people and other objects can do certain things and can’t do others. What can and can’t 
happen, in this sense, is a matter of empirical discovery.  
 
It is obvious that Edgington’s pre-theoretical modals are our ordinary subjective and objective 
modals. Edgington wants to build up to a priority and A-necessity using only these humble 
resources. And in motivating this project, Edgington (2004, p.2) seemingly rejects the Credo in 
Rarefication:  
 
it is not uncommon, in explaining the allegedly important, philosophers’ sense of the 
modal notions, to do so by contrast with ‘mere’ epistemic possibility, or with ‘mere’ 
physical possibility (or impossibility). I try to show, on the contrary, that we can get by 
with just these two families of modal notions  
 
In order to carry out this project, Edgington (2004, pp. 6-7) introduces non-relativized versions of 
ordinary objective and subjective modalizing. In the case of ordinary objective modalizing, lost is 
relativisation to particular moments in time. Edgington will understand the A-necessity of P to 
consist in P’s being ordinarily objectively necessary at all times, where the temporal invariance of 
NECOP is explained by the laws of nature. In the case of ordinary subjective modalizing, lost is 
the relativisation to the states of information of particular subjects at particular moments in time. 
Edgington will understand the a priori impossibility of P to consist in P’s being such that, for any 
subject s, and for any state of information i, it is objectively possible for s to recognise that IMPSP 
when in i.14 
 Reading Edgington as denying the Credo in Rarefication requires some care. Is there not quite 
clearly a sense in which Edgington countenances modalities “beyond” those recognised by 
ordinary modalizing? We do not ordinarily talk about a priority and A-necessity, after all. However, 
it isn’t always clear that Edgington does (wholeheartedly) countenance the a priori and the A-
necessary. Thus, consider the following passage, in which Edgington (2004, p.7) appears to be 
putting some distance between herself and “the philosopher”: 
 
 
14 I will discuss Edgington’s view of the a priori in Chapter 5, as well as her thoughts about logical necessity.  
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Philosophers take a professional interest in timeless, eternal, in some sense necessary truth. 
I have tried to explain these notions in terms of ordinary tensed modal talk. When a 
philosopher says ‘It is possible that ...’ or ‘There is a possible situation (or world) in which 
...’ she means ‘There is or will be or was a possible situation in which ...’ No great harm in 
that, but we are in danger of losing the very significant difference between a past and a 
present possibility, the difference between what may be true and what might have been 
true but no longer may be true, whether that is read epistemically or [objectively]. 
 
Edgington is saying that relativisation is an important aspect of ordinary modalizing. This might 
suggest that Edgington should not view her non-relativized constructions as countenancing 
ordinary modalities. But Edgington has also stated that we do not need to introduce any 
extraordinary modal notions. How then should Edgington understand her own constructions? 
I think that we can make better sense of Edgington’s position by first reckoning with 
another interesting aspect of the above passage, which is that Edgington’s claim about what 
philosophers mean by absolute possibility appears to be quite obviously false. Indeed, Edgington 
(2004, p.1) is fully aware that her reading of Kripke is non-standard. Moreover, Edgington (2004, 
p.18) writes that Lewis’ ‘fundamental notion [of possibility] is, at least extensionally, much closer 
to what I called (absolute) epistemic possibility than to what I call metaphysical possibility’. But 
then how could Edgington propose that her concepts of a priori necessity and A-necessity are also 
the philosophers’?  
 In my view, when Edgington is talking about what the philosopher means by ‘possible’, 
she is best understood as offering her assistance to an ordinary modalizer, who is trying to 
understand philosophical modalizing. Edgington therefore provides the ordinary modalizer with 
a charitable interpretation of the philosophical discourse: charitable, because she rejects the Credo in 
Rarefication, and therefore thinks that the philosopher is mistaken in thinking that he has identified 
any special modality. Her aim is to make as much sense of philosophical modalizing as she can, all 
whilst respecting Kripke’s insight. Edgington therefore doesn’t see herself as bound to the typical 
standards of intensional and extensional adequacy, and this manifests in her de facto denial of 
Unrestricted Invariance.  
In this way, Edgington can view her constructions as forming a bridge between the 
philosophical and the ordinary. From the perspective of someone who denies the Credo in 
Rarefication, Edgington attempts to discern what it is that philosophical modalizers might have tried 
to mean by (say) ‘A-necessary’. Her suggestion is that the philosopher was aiming for ordinary 
objective necessity at all times. Is this a further kind of necessity, over and above the relativized? 
If Edgington thinks that temporal relativisation is essential to the ordinary notion, then no. If she 
doesn’t, then: perhaps. After all, there is no obvious need to mark the ever-necessary as its own kind 
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of necessity, just like there would be no obvious need to mark (say) the ever-moving as its own 
kind of moving: as absolutely moving.  
 
1.3.3 Reasons for Asceticism  
 
Reading Edgington as denying the Credo in Rarefication, we thereby have some reason to suppose 
that Edgington would also deny the Credo in Commensurability. She must therefore also deny clause 
(B) of the Credo in Invariance.15 But more importantly still, Edgington has shown us that the Ascetic 
Modalizer’s position, like the possible worlds picture, has its own theoretical attractions. Sticking 
with our ordinary objective modals keeps the conceptual and metaphysical primitives to a 
minimum, whilst respecting an important feature of ordinary modalities, which is that they are 
relativized to times. But Edgington also mentions two further motivations for her view.  
Firstly, Edgington’s position affords a nice rapprochement between modal and probabilistic 
notions. It is widely thought that there are two species of probability: one subjective and related 
to agent’s cognitive access to the facts, another objective and discoverable through empirical 
means. As Edgington notes, these notions seem to correspond nicely to ordinary subjective and 
objective possibility. (Indeed, for Edgington, probability is ‘weighted possibility – a measure on 
the space of possibility’.) A modal theory that countenances only ordinary objective and subjective 
possibility therefore seems to sit most comfortably with this bifurcated view of probability.  
 Secondly, Edgington’s position allows for a simple account of the laws of nature. Certain 
universal generalisations seem less accidental and more theoretically significant than others. We 
are inclined to describe those generalisations as laws of nature. But what is the crucial difference 
between laws and non-laws? What lies behind our intuition that the laws are less accidental and 
more theoretically significant? According to Edgington, the Neo-Humean proposal, which denies 
that there are modal connections in nature, is unsatisfactory. The most natural counter-proposal 
is to appeal to modalities which, like the laws of nature, are empirically discoverable: the ordinary 
objective modalities. The laws don’t just state that such-and-such never happens. They state that 
such-and-such cannot ever happen.  
 We can at this stage add another reason in favour of Edgington’s position. As Edgington 
rightly points out, we often seem to acquire ordinary objective modal knowledge empirically: our 
sense experience gives us evidence that such-and-such is possible. However, our knowledge of 
 
15 Whether she also denies (A) is a delicate question, one which demands a careful study of Edgington’s 
theory of counterfactuals (for instance, in Edgington (2008)). But since our goal is to locate Edgington’s 
position with respect to the Ascetic Modalizer, and since the Ascetic Modalizer is most concerned to 
discourage belief in (B), we may sidestep this (important) issue for the time being.   
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philosophical modality is not often rooted in this kind of experiential evidence. For example, 
Williamson (2007) has argued that A-modal knowledge goes via our knowledge of counterfactual 
conditionals. And as Williamson (2007, pp. 165-177) argues, the role of sense experience in our 
counterfactual knowledge is rather difficult to pin down. Many cases of counterfactual knowledge 
are not obviously rooted in experiential evidence. But more importantly for our purposes, some 
counterfactual knowledge is quite obviously not rooted in experiential evidence: for example, our 
knowledge that if two twos had been five, then two twos would have been five. So there seems to 
be an important epistemological difference between our ordinary subjective and objective modalizing. 
That is a prima facie difference in favour of disunity.   
  
1.4 Functional Considerations  
 
Now it goes without saying that we have just strayed into controversial territory: the laws of nature, 
the connection between modality and probability, the epistemology of modality. And, of course, 
the same is true of the reasons that we gave in favour of modal unification. But then given the 
sheer volume of high-calibre philosophy that has been written on the semantics, metaphysics, and 
epistemology of modality – the arguments for and against the enormous variety of plausible 
positions that concern these complex, interwoven topics – it is easy to feel that an impasse has 
been reached. What is our alien anthropologist to do? What is the status of the received view, of 
the unifying credos?  
The Ascetic Modalizer does not view philosophical modalizing as modalizing. There are 
several reasons why this might be. One is metaphysical: she does not see how ordinary and 
philosophical modals could have the same kind of subject-matter. Another is semantico-
conceptual: she does not see how the meanings or concepts expressed by ordinary and 
philosophical modals could have the same content. But yet another is functional: she is convinced 
that ordinary and philosophical modals play very different roles. The Ascetic Modalizer could think 
that treating something as an ordinary modality is not the same kind of thing as treating something 
as a philosophical “modality”.  
 Now whatever we may think about the connection between the functional, metaphysical, 
and semantico-conceptual, the Ascetic Modalizer that I am imagining is concerned with function. 
Moreover, she is willing to grant that if she is wrong about ordinary and philosophical modalizing, 
then metaphysical and semantico-conceptual similarity follow suit. The most efficient and direct 
challenge to the Ascetic Modalizer would therefore be to leverage functional considerations in 
favour of the unifying credos. But there is a further incentive to go down this route: it is the road 
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least travelled by. Optimistically, we might suggest that the much-neglected topic of modal 
function promises to offer a fresh perspective on the received view.  
 Now functional considerations would support the Credo in Rarefication, if it could be shown 
that that at least one species of objective philosophical modalizing – say, A-modalizing – has the 
same kind of function as ordinary objective modalizing. How much functional similarity is enough 
functional similarity? That will presumably depend, in part, upon the degree of functional similarity 
that we find in our ordinary modalizing more broadly: for instance, in the degree of functional 
similarity that we find between ordinary objective and subjective modals. The more these functions 
approach something like a natural kind, the harder it will be to motivate the Credo in Rarefication. 
But if the functional profile of ordinary modalizing is heterogeneous enough, then the functional 
case for the Credo in Rarefication will be easier.  
Functional considerations would also support the Credo in Commensurability, if it could be 
shown that objective modalizing would benefit from admitting different modals of 
commensurable strength – or, at the very least, that it could tolerate these different modals. It might 
be argued, for instance, that our ordinary objective modalizing would best function if it 
countenanced several different commensurable ordinary modal concepts. And if the Credo in 
Rarefication is true, then perhaps it is functionally advantageous, or at least tolerable, for our 
ordinary and philosophical objective modalizing to admit concepts that are commensurable in 
strength.  
Finally, functional considerations would support the Credo in Invariance, if it could be shown 
that the concept of something’s being objectively necessary functions identically to the concept of 
something’s having an invariant counterfactual status. But partial vindication of this credo could 
also come from functional considerations. Thus, one might think that only clause (A) of the Credo 
in Invariance would be supported, if (say) it could be shown that the concept of something’s being 
objectively necessary would benefit from entailing the concept of something’s being 




In this chapter, I have set this thesis’s agenda: to approach the relationship between ordinary and 
philosophical modalizing via the theory of function. My primary goal is to investigate the degree 
of functional similarity between ordinary objective and A-modalizing. My secondary goal is to do 
so with an eye towards assessing the Ascetic Modalizer’s rejection of the unifying credos. And my 
tertiary goal is to draw, from those reflections, some further consequences for the theory of 
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modality. In the next chapter, I will investigate two interrelated phenomena that are of importance 

































CHAPTER 2      





In the previous chapter, I set the agenda for this thesis: to investigate the relationship between 
ordinary and philosophical modals with a function-first methodology. In this chapter, I will lay the 
groundwork for this investigation, by getting clear about two interrelated phenomena, both 
intimately connected to modalizing: conditionals and suppositions.  
 In Section 1, I will argue that there are three species of conditionals: indicatives, weak 
subjunctives, and strong subjunctives (counterfactuals). These conditionals are marked by important 
morphological differences. But what do these morphological differences communicate? And why 
do we have three kinds of conditional, anyway? This chapter will propose harmonious answers to 
these questions: that which the morphological differences communicate is correlated, to a perhaps 
surprising degree, with the functional differences between conditionals.   
In Section 2, I will suggest some hypotheses about the roles of these different conditionals. 
From these functional hypotheses, I derive some hypotheses about what the conditionals 
presuppose. I argue that indicatives presuppose antecedent uncertainty, that strong subjunctives 
presuppose certainty of antecedent falsity, and that weak subjunctives presuppose neither. These 
presuppositional hypotheses will make it easier to test the functional hypotheses against putative 
counterexamples: I do this in Section 3 for indicatives, and Section 4 for strong subjunctives.  
With that discussion in hand, I turn to the morphological differences. In Section 5, I argue 
against Inés Crespo, Hadil Karawani, and Frank Veltman’s (2018) theory of indicatives and weak 
subjunctives. Finally, in Section 6, I propose my own theory. The basic idea is that the 
morphological differences between the three conditionals communicate different assertability 
conditions. These are all versions of the Ramsey Test, which I explicate using the notion of a 
supposition. These assertability conditions become more demanding, as we move from indicative 
to weak subjunctive and to strong subjunctive. I then show how these assertability conditions align 




2.1 Indicatives and Subjunctives         
  
2.1.1 How Many Conditionals?   
 
There are at least two kinds of conditional. Consider this famous duo:  
 
(1) If Oswald didn’t shoot Kennedy, (then) someone else did. 
(2) If Oswald hadn’t shot Kennedy, (then) someone else would have. 
 
Sentences like (1) are often called indicative conditionals, and sentences like (2) counterfactual conditionals. 
Indeed, (1) and (2) are supposed to be paradigmatic indicatives and counterfactuals. Both are past-
directed, and the former is in the indicative mood, the latter in the subjunctive. Are we therefore 
to conclude that the only indicatives are past-directed and in the indicative mood, and that the only 
counterfactuals are past-directed and in the subjunctive mood? That seems far too hasty. Consider, 
for instance, the following future-directed conditionals: 
 
(3) If he goes to the party tomorrow, nobody will have fun. 
(4) If he had gone to the party tomorrow, nobody would have had fun. 
 
My intuition tells me to group (1) with (3) and (2) with (4). If that is correct, then indicatives and 
counterfactuals can be future-directed too. So, perhaps the difference between indicatives and 
counterfactuals is merely that the latter are in the subjunctive mood? But that doesn’t seem right 
either, for there are subjunctively stated conditionals which, at least superficially, look rather 
different from conditionals like (2) and (4): 
 
(5) If he were going to the party tomorrow, nobody would have fun. 
 
Keith DeRose (2010) calls conditionals like (5) ‘were’ed-up conditionals, and Sabine Iatridou (2000) 
calls them future less perfect conditionals. I will adopt the nomenclature of Crespo, Karawani, and 
Veltman (2018) throughout this chapter, calling sentences like (2) and (4) strong subjunctive 
conditionals, and sentences like (5) weak subjunctive conditionals. Strong subjunctives have two layers of 
past tense morphology, whereas weak subjunctives only have one.16 
 
16 How many of these layers of past tense morphology encode temporal information? I will argue in Section 
6 that the layer of past tense that weak and strong subjunctives have in common does not encode temporal 
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 How should we classify these conditionals? Nobody would be contradicting themselves if 
they accepted (1) but rejected (2), and Lewis (1973, p.3) takes this datum to suggest a difference in 
meaning. Where does that place conditionals like (5)? Supposing that Lewis is right, then a natural 
method for classifying conditionals would begin with semantic theorising: for with a proposal 
about the meaning of indicatives and strong subjunctives in hand, we could ascertain their degree 
of semantic similarity to weak subjunctives. But as DeRose (2010, p.2) points out, far too much is 
contentious in the semantics of conditionals for this general strategy to work. Indeed, it is even 
debated that conditionals are truth-apt! But then how to approach their classification?  
In response to this difficulty, DeRose (2010, p.3) suggests that we should aim to uncover 
differences in the semantically relevant behaviours of paradigmatic indicatives and strong 
subjunctives. DeRose then suggests two tests for indicativity and, applying them to certain weak 
subjunctives, DeRose’s verdict is that there is only a minimal difference between indicatives and 
weak subjunctives: that these are just “souped up” indicatives. But I think that Crespo, Karawani 
and Veltman (2018) are more likely to be correct, when they say that there are three basic species 
of conditional: indicatives, weak subjunctives, and strong subjunctives (counterfactuals).  
 
2.1.2 DeRose on the Conditionals of Practical Deliberation  
 
Let us first review DeRose’s (2010) argument. It should be noted from the outset that DeRose 
was not concerned to capture weak subjunctives in their full glory. Rather, DeRose was aiming to 
attack an entrenched belief: that the conditionals of practical deliberation are strong subjunctives. 
Here are Allan Gibbard and William L. Harper (1978, p.153): 
 
We begin with a rough theory of rational decision-making. In the first place, rational 
decision-making involves conditional propositions: when a person weighs a major 
decision, it is rational for him to ask, for each act he considers, what would happen if he 
performed that act. It is rational, then, for him to consider propositions of the form 'If I 
were to do a, c would happen'. Such a proposition we shall call a counterfactual.  
 
Much condensed, DeRose’s argument goes as follows. Letting ‘A > C’ represent any future directed 
conditional (FDC), we say that ‘A > C’ is deliberationally useful for an agent s IFF, to the extent that s 
has reason to believe that A > C, and to the extent that s wants C (not) to obtain, s has reason try 
to make A (not) obtain. (DeRose, 2010, pp.6-7) DeRose then uses his tests to show us that, for 
any deliberationally useful ‘A > C’, its indicative and weak subjunctive versions behave in very 
 
information, but that the strong subjunctive’s extra layer does. However, unlike some other “fake past” 
theorists, such as Iatridou (2000), I do not interpret the non-temporal layer “modally”.   
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similar ways. But I think that although DeRose is right about their behaviours, he is wrong to 
conclude from this that weak subjunctives are simply indicative with panache.  
Now DeRose claims to have isolated two important differences between indicatives and 
strong subjunctives. The first is that paradigmatic indicatives, but not paradigmatic strong 
subjunctives, have ‘certain remarkable assertibility conditions’ (DeRose, 2010, p.12). DeRose’s 
starting point here is William Lycan’s (2001, p.48) version of the Ramsey Test (Frank P. Ramsey, 
1931):  
 
To evaluate A > C, add A hypothetically to your current belief set, make such revisions in 
your new total belief set as would be rationally required to preserve coherence while 
retaining A, and see whether C would be a member of the revised set. If it would, the 
conditional may be asserted; if not, not.  
 
DeRose (2010, pp.14-15) modifies this test by adding a constraint: C must be assertable, and not 
merely believed, given the hypothetical addition of P.17 On the basis of DeRose’s modification of 
Lycan’s reading of the Ramsey Test, one might therefore propose the following assertability 
condition for indicatives: ‘A → C’ is assertable by s IFF s has (i) hypothetically added <A> to 
their prior belief set, Γ, before (ii) checking Γ&A for incoherence, and removing any incoherence 
by altering Γ, whereupon (iii) s’s newest belief set puts them in a position to assert <S>.18  
This assertability condition looks plausible for (1). Upon hypothetically believing that 
Oswald didn’t shoot Kenney, we are indeed in a position to assert that someone else did. The 
Ramsey Test therefore gives the right results for indicatives. And since (2) seems to be unassertible, 
DeRose concludes that the Ramsey Test does not apply to strong subjunctives. But this seems too 
quick. In the first instance, if we hypothetically believe that Oswald hadn’t shot Kennedy, then it doesn’t 
look like we can assert that someone else would have. Deploying a strong subjunctive morphology as 
we apply the Ramsey Test therefore gives the right results for strong subjunctives, too. Moreover, 
 
17 DeRose (2010, p.15) leaves undetermined the exact nature of <C>’s being assertable in this context, on 
the grounds that this is likely parasitic upon the assertability of <C> quite generally. If one believes that 
assertability ordinarily goes by sufficiently high probability, then <A → C> is assertible if the probability 
of C is sufficiently high, given the addition of <A> to one’s belief set. If one believes that the assertion of 
<C> would normally require knowing that C, then <A → C> is assertible if the <C> is known, given the 
addition of <A> to one’s belief set. We can follow DeRose in feigning neutrality about this matter. 
18 Without qualification, this biconditional is too strong, because it makes unassertible some paradigmatic 
indicatives which constitute (say) knowledge by testimony. In response to this difficulty, we can mirror a 
move that has been made by Divers and José Edgar González-Varela (2013, p.366), in the context of 
theorising about the acquisition of belief in A-necessity: we are to say that the biconditional only concerns 
the canonical assertability conditions of paradigmatic indicatives, where these are assertability conditions that 
are only sensitive to the best possible and most direct kind of evidence that one might have for belief in 
paradigmatic indicatives. Henceforth, talk of assertability conditions for conditionals will be understood to 
be implicitly restricted to the canonical case.  
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we should note that Stalnaker’s (1968) point of departure is that all conditionals have Ramsey-like 
assertability conditions. For these reasons, I am sceptical of DeRose’s first test for indicativity. 
We could, it is true, try to run the Ramsey Test using a strong subjunctive morphology, 
and then an indicative morphology. We could then attempt to ascertain which version of the 
Ramsey Test best aligns with our intuitions about the corresponding weak subjunctive’s 
assertability. But this seems too unreliable, for we might become misled by superficial or incidental 
morphological differences: perhaps running the Ramsey Test for weak subjunctives would just 
sound better with one or the other morphology, even though neither actually matches the weak 
subjunctive’s assertability conditions. 
We do better to focus on DeRose’s (2010, pp.16-20) second test for indicativity. It is based 
on the fact that paradigmatic indicatives appear to elicit intuitions about the validity of certain 
inferences which, together with other prima facie valid inferences, generate a paradox. Thus, 
intuitively, <¬P → Q> is entailed by <PORQ>. Equally intuitively, <¬P → Q> is not entailed by 
<P>. However, if <P> entails <PORQ>, then by the transitivity of entailment, <P> does entail 
<¬P → Q> after all. Trusting all these intuitions would force us to say that <P> entails <¬P → 
Q> and that it does not. Something has got to go, but it isn’t clear what. This is the “Paradox of 
Indicative Conditionals.” 19 DeRose’s innovation is to use the Paradox for classificatory purposes. 
Paradigmatic indicatives are subject to the Paradox. Paradigmatic strong subjunctives are 
not. From <Oswald shot Kennedy>, neither (1) nor (2) intuitively follows. However, from 
<Oswald shot Kennedy or someone else did>, (1) intuitively follows, but not (2). So (1) is subject 
to the Paradox, and (2) is not. Conditionals which are subject to the Paradox of Indicatives are 
therefore similar to paradigmatic indicatives, in at least one important respect.20 The question, then, 
is that of whether deliberationally useful weak subjunctives are subject to Paradox. And it seems 
reasonably clear to me that they are. Consider the following examples, from DeRose (2010): 
 
(6) If the house is not painted, it will soon look quite shabby. 
(7)  If the house were not to be painted, it would soon look quite shabby. 
 
19 The paradox dates back to Stalnaker (1975). The name is due to Frank Jackson (1987, pp.4-8). 
20 There is complication: even with paradigmatic indicatives, the clear intuition of entailment almost entirely 
disappears when the disjunction contains a negative proposition, and the conditional has that proposition 
as antecedent: <(¬P)ORQ> does not intuitively entail <P→Q>. DeRose (2010, p.17) tentatively responds 
to the problem like so. When we consider a conditional that has a positive antecedent, and we wish to test 
its inferential properties in the manner above, we must first negate its antecedent: ‘P → Q’ becomes ‘¬P → 
Q’. We can then apply the test as normal. But since this is a little awkward, DeRose is happy to take his 
second test as indicating indicativity if passed, but not necessarily as indicating non-indicativity if failed.   
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Both seem to boast the crucial Paradox-generating entailment, from <PORQ> to <A > C>:  
 
(8) Either the house is painted, or it will soon look quite shabby. 
 a.  So, if the house is not painted, it will soon look quite shabby. 
b.  So, if the house were not to be painted, it would soon look quite shabby.21 
 
Moreover, DeRose notes that there is something marked, and perhaps even incoherent, about 
asserting (6) but denying or questioning (7): 
 
(9)        a. ?? If the house is not painted, it will soon look quite shabby. But if the 
house were not to be painted, it wouldn’t soon look quite shabby.  
b.  ?? If the house is not painted, it will soon look quite shabby. But if the 
house were not to be painted, would it soon look quite shabby? 
 
This data alone suggests that any semantically relevant differences between deliberationally useful 
indicatives and weak subjunctives are in no way as significant as those that exist between indicatives 
and strong subjunctives. And if we add to this our intuitions about the Paradox of Indicatives, 
then it is easy to see why DeRose felt happy to group weak subjunctives with the indicatives. But 
I think that this was too hasty.22 
 
2.1.3 Three Conditionals! 
 
As Crespo, Karawani and Veltman (2018) have shown, weak subjunctives can sometimes look just 
like strong subjunctives. DeRose’s classificatory mistake was to ignore examples like the following: 
 
 
21 DeRose (2010, pp. 36-37) actually reports that intuitions are split and indecisive about these weak 
subjunctives. Although I myself have the (rather strong!) intuition that these conditionals are subject to the 
Paradox of Indicatives, it may nonetheless be premature to classifying weak subjunctives as “souped up” 
indicatives on the basis of this test alone. But that this is not an argument for grouping it with the 
corresponding strong subjunctive. 
22 We should note in passing, and on behalf of DeRose’s agenda, that strong subjunctives are completely 
infelicitous when we are practically deliberating. Compare (Aa) and (Ab):  
 
(A) [Let’s make a decision: either we paint the house, or we redo the garden.] 
a. If the house were not to be painted this summer, it would soon look quite shabby. 
b. ?? If the house had not been painted this summer, it would have soon looked 
quite shabby.  
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(10) If he were alive today, he would be happy to see that. 
(11) I know he’s not coming. If he were coming, mommy wouldn’t be crying.   
 
Example (10) is drawn from Michela Ippolito (2006), and example (11) from Crespo, Karawani, 
and Veltman (2018). Notice how neither is (obviously) subject to Paradox, in that the crucial 
Paradox-generating inference is of questionable felicity: 
 
(12)      a. ? Either he’s alive today, or he’s happy to see that. So, if he were not alive 
today, he would be happy to see that. 
            b. ? Either he’s coming, or mommy isn’t crying. So, if he were not coming, 
mommy wouldn’t be crying.  
  
Moreover, asserting (10) or (11) whilst denying or questioning their strong subjunctive 
counterparts sounds just terrible:  
 
(13)      a. ?? If he were alive today, he would be happy to see that. But if he had been 
alive today, would he have been happy to see that? 
            b. ?? If he were coming, mommy wouldn’t be crying. But if he had been 
coming, mommy would have been crying. 
 
It therefore looks as though weak subjunctives can sometimes pattern like indicatives, and 
sometimes like strong subjunctives. This suggests that weak subjunctives are their own species of 
conditional. Indeed Crespo, Karawani, and Veltman (2018, pp.9-12) point out that these 
conditionals have a unique pattern of temporal distribution in English and Dutch, where 
indicative-patterning weak subjunctives can sound awkward when present- or past-directed.23 
Although this does not generalise robustly – for instance, these constructions sound fine in 
Palestinian Arabic – their observation adds weight to the idea that there are three classes of 
conditional.  
Now there are many questions that one could ask at this stage, but I will focus on just two. 
The first question is that of what these different conditionals are for: what roles do they play in our 
lives? We have already seen that indicatives and weak subjunctives can assist in our practical 
 
23 Crespo, Karawani, and Veltman (2018) do not put the point in terms of “indicative patterning” weak 
subjunctives, but it is clear that they are talking about assertions of weak subjunctives which are not 
supposed to be getting a “counterfactual” reading.  
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deliberations. Do they have any other roles? And what about strong subjunctives? What do we 
need them for? The second question is that of the significance of the subjunctive mood (in 
conditionals). Does it contribute the same thing to weak and strong subjunctives? And what does 
it contribute? In what follows, I will attempt an answer to the question of mood by first defending 
an answer to the question of function.  
 
2.2 Function, Presupposition, and Settledness  
 
2.2.1 Functional Hypotheses    
 
We often reason from propositions which are settled for us: we move form an old settled belief to 
a new settled belief, by reflecting upon the prior belief. As Robert Fogelin (1967, p.15) notes, the 
paradigmatic device that marks reasoning from settled propositions is ‘so’. Devices like ‘therefore’ 
and ‘since’ can also be used.  
But reasoning from settled propositions is not the only reasoning we do. Sometimes, 
required is a device that functions to non-assertorically “put forth” the negation of a settled 
proposition, so that we may reason from that. A reasonable suggestion is that strong subjunctives 
play this role. And at other times, required is a device that functions to non-assertorically “put 
forth” a proposition or its negation, so that we may reason from either, even though we consider 
that proposition unsettled. A reasonable suggestion is that indicatives play this role. I am interested 
in defending these functional hypotheses in their strongest forms: 
 
Indicative Function – Indicatives, but not strong subjunctives, function to help us 
reason from unsettled propositions and their negations: ‘P → Q’ and ‘¬P→ Q’ are 
for when <P> is unsettled; neither ‘P → Q’ nor ‘¬P→ Q’ play this role. 
 
Strong Subjunctive Function – Strong subjunctives, but not indicatives, function to 
help us reason from the negations of settled propositions: ‘P → Q’ is for when 
<¬P> is settled; ‘P → Q’ does not play this role. 
 
Several writers have suggested that something like these functions hypotheses are on the right 
tracks. Often, the point is put in terms of knowledge. For example, here is Fogelin (1967, pp.17-18), 
discussing G. E. Moore:  
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We can get a clue about the function of “if-then” sentences from a passage in G. E. 
Moore’s Commonplace Book [...] Moore seems to be saying the following: in using an “if-
then” sentence we are neither affirming nor denying the component propositions; instead, 
we are assigning a problematic status to them. The standard reason, but not the only 
reason, for such an ascription is that we simply do not know the truth status of the 
component propositions; thus the use of this construction when we do know the truth 
status of the component propositions would normally be misleading. 
 
We can read Fogelin has offering qualified support to the positive claim in Indicative Function, where 
the unsettledness of <P> for an agent, s, just amounts to s’s not knowing whether P. Fogelin (1968, 
p. 18) also appears to endorse the positive claim in Strong Subjunctive Function, and the negative claim 
in Indicative Function, when he writes that the strong subjunctive ‘commits us to the falsity of the 
antecedent’. And Ben Holguín (2020, no pagination), once again appealing to knowledge, has come 
close to endorsing the positive claims in Indicative Function and Strong Subjunctive Function: 
    
the idea that the main purpose of the indicative conditional is for reasoning and talking 
about propositions whose truth-value is unknown [...] really is an intuitive one. If you’ve 
settled whether p, you shouldn’t be asserting things like ‘If p, q’. Instead, you either should 
be asserting q (when you know that p), or—if determined to assert a conditional—you 
should be asserting a strong subjunctive ‘If it were that p, it would be that...’ (when you 
know that ¬p). 
 
Now the functional hypotheses must be construed sensibly. I have no doubt that people 
sometimes end up reasoning from <P> to <Q>, when <P> is unsettled for them, as a result of 
asserting or evaluating the strong subjunctive ‘P → Q’. Likewise, it is not uncommon for ‘since’ 
to be neglected in favour of ‘if’. But these cases should not refute our functional hypotheses.  
Indeed, consider a notion of language function that we inherit from Ruth Garrett Millikan 
(2005): roughly, that the function of a linguistic construction in a community is the effect that its 
utterance has on the members of that community which explains why the construction is 
reproduced. The naturalist in me is rather drawn to this thought, which, happily, insulates our 
functional hypotheses from facile criticism. Thus, the mere fact that ‘P → Q’ sometimes prompts 
people to reason from the unsettled <P> does not suggest that such effects explain the fact that 
we keep going in for the strong subjunctive. According to Strong Subjunctive Function, the crucial 
effects are those in which someone reasons from <¬P>, when <P> is settled.  
I will assume that the positive functional claims are obviously true. The negative claims are 
more controversial. Indeed, prominent counterexamples seem to abound. These are not 
considered to be marginal cases, or instances of loose speak: there are supposedly entire classes of 
indicatives that prompt reasoning from settled propositions, and whole families of strong 
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subjunctives that prompt reasoning from unsettled propositions. Not so in my view: when we look 
at the different cases more closely, most if not all of these putative counterexamples turn out to 
be false. Indeed, I think that many putative counterexamples to Strong Subjunctive Function turn out 
to be weak subjunctives (a misdiagnosis that was already corrected by DeRose (2010) with respect to 
the conditionals of practical deliberation). That is partly because Weak Subjunctives can function as 
indicatives or as strong subjunctives: 
 
Weak Subjunctive Function – Weak subjunctives function to help us reason from the 
negations of settled propositions, or from (the negations of) unsettled 
propositions: ‘P → Q’ is for when <¬P> is settled, or for when it is unsettled 
whether P.  
 
The weak subjunctive is therefore the least discriminating conditional, from a functional 
perspective. And as we have already seen, it can indeed sometimes act like an indicative, and 
sometimes like a strong subjunctive.  
 
2.2.2 Presuppositional Hypotheses    
 
But how are we to ascertain whether these functional hypotheses are correct? My approach will be 
to formulate hypotheses that we would expect to be true, if the functional hypotheses were 
themselves correct:  
 
Indicative Presupposition – If an indicative ‘P → Q’ is asserted in a context, c, the 
assertion presupposes that, in c, <P> is unsettled for speaker or audience. 
 
Strong Subjunctive Presupposition – If a strong subjunctive ‘P → Q’ is asserted in a 




Weak Subjunctive Presupposition – If a weak subjunctive ‘P []→ Q’ is asserted in a 
context, c, the assertion presupposes that, in c, <P> is not settled for speaker or 
audience.24 
 
Three things about the above. Firstly, we will not have anything to say about what presupposition 
amounts to: about whether, for instance, we are working within a broadly Stalnakerian (1973) 
system. The inference from our functional hypotheses to our presuppositional hypotheses is 
motivated by the thought that, if our functional hypotheses are true, then we would expect some 
kind of mechanism to arise, which would act to make (say) strong subjunctives infelicitous or 
inappropriate when their antecedents are unsettled by every conversational participant. 
Presupposition is one such mechanism, though there could be others: implicatures, for instance. 
However, since it is common to find data about (in)felicitous or (un)marked conditionals being 
leveraged in debates about what conditionals presuppose, then making contact with that literature 
is easiest if we focus on presuppositional hypotheses.  
Secondly, we leave open the question of what came first, function or presupposition. For 
just as these pre-suppositions could encourage the development of those functions, so these pre-
suppositions might arise to safeguard the functions. More plausibly still, these two mechanisms 
may have acted together: for example, a reasonable proportion of (proto-)indicatives were 
reproduced because they helped people reason from unsettled propositions; this made something 
like Indicative Presupposition true; and that made a higher proportion of (proto-)indicatives 
reproduced because they helped people reason from unsettled propositions.   
 Thirdly, we observe that the antecedent of the conditional must be in a state of 
(un)settledness for speaker or audience. This requirement is important, because reasoning from 
propositions often occurs in multi-agent scenarios, wherein, for instance, what is settled for the 
speaker is unsettled for the audience. In such cases, it can be immensely helpful for the speaker to 
assert ‘P → Q’, even though <P> is settled for them, because <P> is unsettled for their audience. 
This can occur in pedagogical contexts. For example, the teacher wants the student to conclude 
that ¬P via <P → Q> and <¬Q>. In order to do so, the teacher may tentatively put forward <P 
→ Q> as a hypothesis; the student reasons from the (supposed!) <P>, develops <Q> within its 
scope, and thereby believes <P → Q>; and upon noticing that ¬Q, concludes that ¬P.  
 
24 Note that <P>’s not being settled for s is compatible with <P>’s being unsettled for s, if <¬P> is also 
not settled for s, and with <¬P>’s being settled for s, if <P> is also not unsettled for s. For instance, if 
settledness is thought about in terms of knowledge: <P>’s not being known to be true by s is compatible 
with <P>’s truth-value being unknown to s, if <¬P> is also not known to be true by s, and with <¬P>’s 
being known to be true by s, if <P>’s truth-value is also not unknown to s. 
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2.2.3  Settledness  
 
But what is settledness? As I have already indicated, the writings of Holguín and Fogelin suggest 
that settledness might amount to knowledge: <P> is settledK for s IFF s knows that P; <P> is unsettledK 
for s IFF s does not know whether P. And although it is natural to think about the matter like so, 
this is not the only possibility on the market. Settledness, for instance, could also amount to 
certainty: <P> is settledC for s IFF s is certain that P; and <P> is unsettledC for s IFF it is uncertain 
for s that P. But then in terms of which species of settledness should we formulate our functional 
and presuppositional hypotheses?  
What is it for s to know that P? I leave that as an open question. Our familiarity with 
knowledge-ascriptions is enough to carry us through this discussion. The same goes for certainty 
and our certainty-ascriptions, although one difference emerges even at this pre-theoretical level: 
that between psychological and epistemic certainty. In ordinary language, epistemic certainty is often 
marked by the ‘it is a certainty that P’ locution, whereas psychological certainty is often marked by 
the ‘x is certain that P’. Bob Beddor (2020a, p.2), in an interesting discussion of certainty, glosses 
over the disctintion like so: 
 
Psychological certainty is a matter of strength of conviction. A belief can be certain in this 
sense even if it is held for no good reason. By contrast, if a belief is epistemically certain, 
the believer must stand in a strong epistemic relation to its content.  
 
We now have three species of settledness on the table: one that is couched in terms of knowledge, 
another that is couched in terms of epistemic certainty, and yet another that is couched in terms 
of psychological certainty. What are their interrelations?  
Epistemic and psychological certainty are linked by a plausible normative principle: P is 
epistemically certain for s IFF s ought to be psychologically certain that P. (Beddor, 2020a, pp. 2-
3) And I think that Beddor (2020a, pp.3-5) has convincingly argued that epistemic certainty 
requires a stronger epistemic position than does knowledge. So, given the normative link, it follows 
that epistemic certainty demands a higher degree of psychological certainty than does knowledge. 
But even if s has the degree of psychological certainty that P which is required for epistemic certainty 
in P (and hence for knowledge that P), it does not follow that s knows that P (and hence it does 
not follow that P is epistemically certain for s). This is because s’s degree of psychologically 
certainty might be too high, given the strength of their epistemic reasons.  
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I believe that the most likely functional relationship between conditionals and settledness 
is one that takes settledness to be a matter of certainty, and psychological certainty at that. This is 
partly because knowledge and epistemic certainty, but not psychological certainty, seem to have a 
normative component to them, such as justification. But it is plausible that psychological states can 
explain a wider range of phenomena than normatively laden states: they have a wider cosmological 
role, in Wright’s locution. Indeed, it seems to me that a functional explanation of our normative 
discourse will exist at the same “level” as the above functional hypotheses. Normative concepts 
would therefore be excluded from the current explanation.  
This is not a decisive reason to favour psychological certainty in our functional and 
presuppositional hypotheses, of course. But it is, I think, reason enough to proceed with 
psychological certainty at the forefront of our minds, as we move towards putative 
counterexamples. In what follows, ‘certainty’ is therefore elliptical for ‘psychological certainty’, 
unless otherwise stated.  
 
2.2.4  Specific Predictions  
 
Our general functional and presuppositional hypotheses suggest some more specific predictions 
about the roles of different kinds of conditionals. For instance, when we are practically deliberating 
P, where <P> describes our doing such-and-such, it follows that we are uncertain that P. So, given 
our hypotheses, we would only expect indicatives and weak subjunctives to be useful in practical 
deliberation. And that is indeed what we find.  
 Here are some further specific predictions. We predict that reasoning by Modus Ponens and 
Modus Tollens can be done with indicatives and weak subjunctives, but not with strong subjunctives. 
This is because when we reason by Modus Ponens or Modus Tollens, we are uncertain about the 
antecedents of the conditionals. In the former case, we move from being uncertain about its 
antecedent and consequent, to being certain that its consequent is true, via our becoming certain 
that its antecedent is true. In the latter, we move from being uncertain about its antecedent and 
consequent, to being certain that its antecedent is false, via our becoming certain that that its 
consequent is false.  
We also predict that reasoning by Inference to the Best Explanation can be done with indicatives 
and weak subjunctives, but not with strong subjunctives. This is because we can only infer the 
antecedent of a conditional, on the grounds that it best explains a known phenomenon, if we are 
initially uncertain that the antecedent is true. If we were already certain either way, there could be 
no inference.  
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This might seem to leave strong subjunctives functionally inert. But that is not correct: our 
hypotheses predict that a whole host of essential roles can be played by strong and weak 
subjunctives, but not by indicatives. Thomas Kroedel (2012) has noted that strong subjunctives 
can help us learn from mistakes. But they also help us to determine which actions were mistakes. 
As Daniel Nolan (2013) has argued, strong subjunctives are ‘relevant to assessments of 
responsibility, of the legitimacy of pride or regret, and of praise or blame.’ They are the conditionals 
with which we evaluate the past actions of ourselves and others. Edgington (2003, p.26) agrees: 
 
they also explain and justify our reactions of being glad and sorry, relieved or regretful, 
that such-and-such has happened. [...] These positive and negative reactions to what has 
happened are an important part of our lives [...] It is hard to believe that many of our 
desires, beyond the most basic hard-wired ones, would survive if we were always 
indifferent to what has happened.  
 
High praise indeed! And not something I would wish to dispute. The conditionals of evaluation 
are past-directed, and not subject to Paradox. Consistent with Strong Subjunctive Presupposition, they 
require us to be certain that the actions described in their antecedents did not occur. The 
conditionals of evaluation are strong subjunctives, through and through.  
 Now it would be far beyond the scope of this thesis to assess all these predictions in the 
level of detail that they deserve. My approach will therefore be piecemeal: I will argue against 
certain notable prima facie plausible counterexamples to our presuppositional and functional 
hypotheses. That will allow us to draw on these hypotheses with greater confidence, in our 
discussion of the subjunctive mood.  
 
2.3 Indicatives  
 
We are defending Indicative Presupposition: the claim that if an indicative ‘P → Q’ is asserted in a 
context, c, the assertion presupposes that, in c, <P> is uncertain for speaker or audience. In this 
section, I want to look at two kinds of conditionals that might be taken to provide counterexamples 
to Indicative Presupposition. I will not question their indicativity, but I will question their felicity.  
 Following Holguín (2020), I will call our first lot of putative counterexamples non-canonical 
uses of indicative conditionals. These are indicative conditional assertions that occur in the absence 
of the usual conversational pressure to assert the strongest of one’s relevant beliefs. Holguín (2020, 
no pagination) details three such non-canonical uses: echoing uses and their rhetorically inflected 
counterparts, Dutchman uses, as well as concessive uses. I will discuss these in Section 2.3.1. Then, in 
Section 2.3.2, I will look at a class of conditionals that Holguín calls conspiracy conditionals. That 
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discussion will culminate in a further argument for appealing to psychological uncertainty in our 
functional and presuppositional hypotheses.  
 
2.3.1 Non-Canonical Indicatives 
 
We begin with echoing uses, such as the following: 
 
(14) If Dave is here, Roger is home. Roger is not home. So, Dave is not here.   
(15) If Dave is here, then I’m a Dutchman. 
 
Holguín (2020, no pagination) states that echoing uses are felicitous when the conversational 
pressure it to display some evidence for believing a proposition. This is why echoing uses are most 
at home in “dialectical” situations, wherein one is aiming to rehearse one’s case for a believing a 
proposition, with the aim of presenting that case to someone else. For example, one could assert 
(14) in a dialectal situation, wherein the aim is to convince someone else that Dave is not here.  
 It was partly with echoing conditionals in mind that I introduced a disjunctive 
presupposition for indicatives: for a presupposition which only concerned what was uncertain for 
the speaker would erroneously predict echoing uses to be inappropriate. But then in order for 
echoing conditionals to generate counterexamples to Indicative Presupposition, we would need to find 
non-marginal and felicitous echoing assertions, which occur in spite of the fact that the speaker 
believes that neither speaker or audience is uncertain about their antecedents: 
 
(16)        a. ?? Look, we are all completely certain that Dave is not here. But/and if 
Dave is here, Roger is home.  
b.  ? Look, we are all completely certain that Dave is here. But/and if Dave is 
here, Roger is home. 
 
Both (16a) and (16b) seem marked to me, although (16a) to a much greater extent. What might 
explain the discrepancy? Well, the agents in (16b), who are certain that Dave is here, can reason 
by Modus Ponens to the conclusion that Roger is home, by coming to accept <If Dave is here, Roger 
is home>. Not so for those agents in (16a), who are certain that Dave is not here. This seems like 
an important clue. Thus, consider:  
 
(17)  a.  X: Look, we are all completely certain that Dave is here...  
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  Y: And that Roger is home! 
  X: ?? And that Roger is home. But/and if Dave is here, then Roger is home.  
 b. X: Look, we are all completely certain that Dave is here... 
  Y: But we’re not sure about whether Roger is home.  
  X: Right. But/and if Dave is here, then Roger is home.  
 
Now there are two things to note about the above. The first is that the conditional in (17a) sounds 
just awful. This was to be expected, given the fact that there is simply no need to reason by Modus 
Ponens in the (17a) scenario. The second concerns the intonation with which the conditional in (17b) 
can be felicitously uttered. A flat or descending intonation sits uneasily with the thought that we 
are uncertain about Roger’s being home. Contrastingly, an ascending intonation suggests that X is 
coming to the realisation that Roger is home, as she works through the conditional. This is 
consistent with the following patterns of felicity: 
 
(18) a. X: ? Right. But, obviously, if Dave is here, then Roger is home.  
 b. X: Right. But – hold on! – if Dave is here, then Roger is home! 
 
To my mind, (18a) seems odd in the present context, and (18b) perfectly natural. Indeed, (18a) 
seems to communicate that X is already certain that Roger is home, and (18b) suggests that X is 
just coming to realise this. But there is more.  
The felicitous ascending intonation in (17b), and the surprise-indicating nature of (18b), 
suggest that the crucial conditional here is being recalled. This can be seen in other, non-conditional 
contexts. For example, consider the following, which involves exclusive disjunction:  
 
(20) a. X: Look, we are all completely certain that Dave is here... 
  Y: But we’re not sure about whether Roger is home.  
  X: [Ascending] Right. But either Dave is here, or Roger is home! 
 b. X: Look, we are all completely certain that Dave is here... 
  Y: But we’re not sure about whether Roger is home.  
  X: Right. But – hold on! – either Dave is here, or Roger is home! 
 
The assertions of the disjunctions in (20a) and (20b) seem to communicate two things about the 
speaker. The first is that she is just coming to the realisation that Roger is not home. The second 
is that she is doing so on the basis of recalling or remembering the disjunction. The same goes, I 
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think, for ascending (17b) and (18b). 
 It is emerging that when one is certain that P, and uncertain that Q, it seems as though 
there is a special way in which one may felicitously assert ‘P→ Q’. These are situations in which 
one has just inferred <Q> from <P> and <If P, then Q>. But this involves recalling the prior 
belief that <If P, then Q>. Now, suppose that this belief is being recalled because one took it on 
testimony that if P, Q. Suppose also that this was asserted when the speaker was uncertain that P. 
Then in asserting this conditional, there is a sense in which one is quoting the speaker, who did not 
run afoul of Indicative Presupposition. Moreover, it looks like the same is true of when we reasoned 
to <If P, then Q> by ourselves. In asserting ‘P→ Q’, we may be thinking back to our former selves, 
at a point where we were uncertain that P. When we assert ‘P→ Q’, we are quoting our past self, 
who did not flout Indicative Presupposition. 
I believe that these brief reflections offer the germ of a solution to the apparent tension 
between Indicative Presupposition and the felicity of ascending (17b) and (18b). Again, I do not wish 
to dispute that people often seem to use ‘since’ and the indicative ‘if’ as though these were 
interchangeable. It seems to me, however, that those echoing uses which do not fit into the above 
pattern will be marginal cases. They should not prompt us to revise Indicative Presupposition nor, by 
extension, our functional hypotheses.  
 Let us move on to a different sort of non-canonical indicative assertion: the concessive 
use. Concessive uses may seem to threaten the claim that the indicative ‘¬P → Q’ cannot which 
helps us to reason from <¬P>, when we are certain that P. Here is an example:   
 
(21) Dave is here. But even if he isn’t, we should still tread carefully. 
 
Holguín (2020, no pagination) understands this kind of conditional assertion like so: 
 
Concessive uses of ‘If p, q’ tend to occur in circumstances in which the speaker has settled 
that ¬p and q, but knows that it is unlikely that her audience will take her to know whether 
¬p. In light of this the speaker must settle for a “backup” position, q. In these 
circumstances a speech like ‘¬p; but even if p, q’ can seem perfectly natural.  
 
Let us develop this thought in a way that is most relevant to our discussion, as it has unfolded. 
The idea is that the indicative conditional ‘¬P → Q’ can be concessively asserted by s when (i) s is 
certain that P and that Q, and (ii) when s is not certain that s’s audience will think that s should be 
certain that P. Thus, in our example, we are certain that Dave is here and that we should treat 
carefully. However, we are not certain that our audience will believe that we should be certain that 
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Dave is here. So, we concessively assert the conditional in (21). And we seemingly do so seemingly 
felicitously.  
 A concessive ‘¬P → Q’ is counterexample to Indicative Presupposition only if it can be 
felicitously asserted when the speaker believes that the audience is uncertain that P, or in the case 
in which the speaker is the audience. This second suggestion can be quickly dismissed: (21) just 
sounds crazy in a solo-reasoning situation. But what about the first suggestion? Let us set the 
scene. We are certain that Dave is here and that we should tread carefully. However, we are unsure 
that our audience will consider justified our certainty in Dave’s being here. Suppose now that 
believe that our audience is uncertain about the need to tread carefully. We then make the following 
speech: 
 
(22) Okay, I am completely certain that Dave is here – although you might think I’ve 
no right to be so sure about that. Indeed, I know that you are uncertain that Dave 
is here! But even if Dave is not here, we should still tread carefully.  
 
The conditional in (22) is perfectly felicitous, but does not run afoul of Indicative Presupposition. 
Compare this to: 
 
(23) ?? Okay, I am completely certain that Dave is here – although you might think I’ve 
no right to be so sure about that. Still, you are certain that Dave is here! But even 
if Dave is not here, we should still tread carefully.  
 
The conditional in (23) would be a counterexample to Indicative Presupposition, were it felicitous. But 
it is not. In a situation where (23) is said, the conversation calls for the assertion that we should 
tread carefully, and perhaps for a discussion about why our uncertainty is not considered justified. 
concessive uses are therefore not counterexamples to Indicative Presupposition.  
 
2.3.2 Conspiracy Conditionals   
 
I now want to look at an intriguing argument from Holguín, for a contextualist account of 
knowledge-ascriptions. For this argumentative purpose, Holguín (2020, no pagination) will 
introduce a class of conditionals called conspiracy conditionals. The label is a nod to their most famous 
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example, which, as Holguín notes, happens to be the philosopher’s paradigmatic indicative: ‘If 
Oswald didn’t shoot Kennedy, someone else did.’  
 Conspiracy conditionals are defined as indicatives whose antecedents express propositions, 
such as <Oswald shot Kennedy>, which the moderate invariantist about knowledge-ascriptions 
claims many people to know. Moderate invariantism is an invariantist position, in that if ‘s knows 
that P’ is true in one context, then it is true in all contexts. But it is moderate in holding that many 
humdrum beliefs are known to be true, such as those accessed by memory, perception, or 
testimony. The moderate invariantist will therefore want to say that if ‘Tim knows that Oswald 
shot Kennedy’ is true in one context, then it is true in every context – but also that it is not unlikely 
that ‘Tim knows that Oswald shot Kennedy’ is true.  
 Holguín’s argument for epistemic contextualism begins with the following principle:  
 
Ignorance – In every context c: if ‘s knows whether P’ is true in c, then ‘it is 
inappropriate for s to assert the indicative conditional ‘If P, Q’ in the canonical way’ 
is true in c. 
 
Holguín (2020) points out that Ignorance stands uneasily with moderate invariantism. The problem 
is that conspiracy conditionals, such as (1), seem to be canonically assertable by an arbitrary s in 
many, many contexts. Given Ignorance, it follows that in many contexts, ‘s knows whether Oswald 
shot Kennedy is false’ is false. But since conspiracy conditionals are defined as having antecedents 
which the moderate invariantist thinks we often know, something has got to give.  
After engineering this dialectal situation, Holguín (2020, no pagination) patiently argues 
against a number of alternatives: (i) accept Ignorance, but argue that conspiracy conditionals are 
invariably non-canonical assertions; (ii) reject Ignorance in favour of a different principle; (iii) accept 
Ignorance, but provide an error-theory that explains why we often think that conspiracy conditionals 
are felicitously assertable; (iv) remain an invariantist, but lose the moderate part, either by accepting 
sceptical invariantism, or by accepting sensitive invariantism, a position according to which knowledge 
is sensitive to (e.g.) pragmatic factors. Against these alternatives, Holguín suggest that we adopt 
epistemic contextualism: the view that expressions like ‘knows’ can receive different 
interpretations across contexts, yielding different application conditions across contexts, even 
when the epistemic facts are kept constant.  
 Now I am not a big fan of epistemic contextualism. Nor, for that matter, of rampant 
contextualism in general. As Herman Cappelen and Ernest Lepore (2005) have argued, words like 
‘knows’ do not look much like paradigmatically context-sensitive expressions, such ‘I’ and ‘now’: 
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they fail many tests that are passed by all the paradigmatic cases. Admitting ‘knows’ as a context-
sensitive expression therefore turns what initially looked like a natural kind concept into a family 
resemblance idea. What could make this worthwhile? Although the issue is complex, I do not share 
the intuition, which often motivates contextualism, that our semantics should make as many of 
our assertions as possible come out true. For this reason and others, contextualism is unattractive 
to me.  
Of course, not everyone is unhappy with contextualism about ‘knows’. But for those of us 
who are, something must be said about Holguín’s manoeuvre. In what follows, I want to take issue 
with Holguín’s argument against rejecting Ignorance in favour of a different principal. Let us begin 
by recalling Indicative Presupposition, which states that if an indicative ‘P → Q’ is asserted in a context, 
c, the assertion presupposes that, in c, <P> is uncertain for speaker or audience. This naturally 
suggests an alternative to Holguín’s Ignorance:  
 
Ignorance* – In every context c: if ‘s believes that either <P> is certain for everyone 
in the conversational context, or that <¬P> is certain for everyone in the 
conversational context’ is true in c, then ‘it is inappropriate for s to assert the 
indicative conditional ‘If P, Q’’ is true in c.25 
 
 
25 Indicative Presupposition generates Ignorance* because a context in which everyone is certain about <P> or 
everyone is certain about <¬P> is ipso facto a context in which neither speaker nor audience is uncertain 
about <P>. As it stands, however, Indicative Presupposition could also be used to arrive at a different version 
of Ignorance:  
 
Ignorance** – In every context c: if ‘s believes that, for everyone in the conversational 
context, either <P> is certain or <¬P> is certain’ is true in c, then ‘it is inappropriate for 
s to assert the indicative conditional ‘If P, Q’’ is true in c. 
 
This is because a context in which everyone is either certain about <P> or certain about <¬P> is also a 
context in which neither speaker nor audience is uncertain about <P>. However, I am not so sure that 
Ignorance** is true. It seems plausible to me that in contexts in which all conversational participants are 
certain about incompatible propositions, the indicative conditional is not inappropriate: or, at least, only 
weakly inappropriate. And perhaps this is because in situations such as these, the group treats these 
propositions as uncertain, or ought to do so.  
 The simplest way to build this idea into the existing framework is to add more information to 
Indicative Presupposition: if an indicative ‘P → Q’ is asserted in a context, c, the assertion presupposes that, in 
c, <P> is uncertain for speaker or audience, or is treated as such by speaker and audience. If the notion of treating 
a proposition as uncertain proves to be opaque, however, then we could opt for a more Spartan proposal: 
if an indicative ‘P → Q’ is asserted in a context, c, the assertion presupposes that, in c, <P> is uncertain for 
speaker or audience, or <P> is certain for some in c, and <¬P> is certain for others. More sophisticated 
proposals are no doubt possible, perhaps by building upon Stalnaker’s (1973) notion of the common 
ground. In any case, these complications, though interesting, can be ignored throughout this discussion for 
simplicity’s sake. 
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Unlike Ignorance, Ignorance* is not restricted to canonical uses. This is because Ignorance* is derived 
from Indicative Presupposition, which handles canonical and non-canonical indicatives equally well. 
Ignorance* therefore inherits the disjunctive element of Indicative Presupposition. 
 We should note at the outset that there is no obvious reason to expect that Ignorance* will 
generate Holguín’s dialectic. Conspiracy conditionals, after all, are supposed to be conditionals 
whose antecedents the moderate invariantist takes many people to often be in a position to know. 
But there is no a priori assurance that contexts in which most people are likely to be able to know 
that P are also contexts in which someone believes that <P> or <¬P> is uncertain for everyone in 
the conversational context. So, the fact that many conspiracy conditionals are assertable in many 
contexts is no guarantee that there is a tension between Ignorance* and moderate invariantism.  
 Indeed, Ignorance* seems to handle conspiracy conditionals very well. Consider first the 
paradigmatic conspiracy conditional, (1). When Ernest Adams (1970, p.90) first introduced this 
conditional, he did so off the back of (24), a conditional stated to be ‘closely related’ to (1): 
 
(24) If A didn’t murder V, then B didn’t either.  
  
In Adams paper, (24) is asserted in the context of an investigation into the murder of V. It is 
established that only A or B could have murdered V, and that A, but not B, had a motive and a 
weapon. Adams (1970, p.90) then writes that on the basis of this evidence, ‘it is tentatively 
concluded that A was the murdered’. Note the ‘tentative’: when Adams initially introduced (1), he 
compared it to a conditional whose antecedent is stipulated to be psychologically uncertain. And 
I maintain that (1) is infelicitous when asserted in a context in which no one is uncertain that 
Oswald shot Kennedy, as per the oddity of (25): 
 
(25) X: Did Oswald shoot Kennedy? 
 Y: ?? Oh, absolutely. But/and if Oswald didn’t shoot Kennedy, then someone else 
did. 
 
Not all conspiracy conditionals have conspiratorial antecedents. As Holguín (2020, no pagination) 
notes, conspiracy conditionals are frequently encountered in philosophical settings: 
 
(26) If the Evil Demon is real, then we hardly know a thing.  
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Again, however, I do not think that Ignorance* is threatened by these examples. When we assert 
conditionals like (26) in the appropriate philosophical context, the assertion is felicitous because it 
is likely that someone, even if it is not ourselves, will feel uncertain about the Evil Demon 
hypothesis. After all, this is partly why Cartesian scepticism is so troubling: even if we suspect that 
we shouldn’t or needn’t feel uncertain about such a matter, it can be difficult not to be. 
Psychological certainty is fickle like that.  
 Has nobody ever asserted (26) in a room full of people whom all believe that everyone is 
certain that the Evil Demon is not real? Possibly. Were those assertions felicitous? Once we take 
the precaution of distinguishing ordinary assertion from half-assertion half-quotation phenomena, 
or from assertions that are made on behalf of a non-present interlocutor, I would say that these 
assertions are infelicitous. But even if I am wrong, such cases would be so marginal that we needn’t, 
I don’t think, worry that our functional and presuppositional hypotheses are falsified by conspiracy 
conditionals.  
 In closing, we should note how the above can be leveraged into an argument for appealing 
to psychological certainty in our functional and presuppositional hypotheses. It seems correct that 
something in the vicinity of Ignorance is true. But if this is cashed out in terms of knowledge or 
epistemic certainty, then Holguín’s argument suggest that we must accept contextualist theses 
about ascriptions of such states. To the extent that this is undesirable, we have reason to accept 
Ignorance*. And Ignorance* is exactly what we would expect to find, if the functions and 
presuppositions of conditionals were understood in terms of psychological certainty.   
 
2.4 Strong Subjunctives  
 
We now turn to a defence of Strong Subjunctive Presupposition: the claim that if a strong subjunctive 
‘P → Q’ is asserted in a context, c, the assertion presupposes that, in c, <¬P> is certain for speaker 
or audience. This aligns nicely with the positive claim in Strong Subjunctive Function – that ‘P → Q’ 
functions to help people reason from certain <P>, when they are certain that ¬P – and with the 
negative claims in Indicative Function, that ‘P → Q’ does not function to help people reason from 
<P> when they are uncertain that it is true. In this section, I want to look at some important 
putative counterexamples to these functional and presuppositional hypotheses.    
 When we are uncertain that P is the case, and we wish to resolve our uncertainty about 
<P>, we can forward <P> as the antecedent in a conditional, and draw inferences from there. 
This might result in our reasoning by Inference to the Best Explanation, or by Modus Tollens. In either 
case, we move from being uncertain about the antecedent to being certain that it is, respectively, 
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true or false. Given the above hypotheses, we would therefore expect that strong subjunctives 
could not play these roles. I want to see how far it is possible to maintain that these predictions 
are indeed true, in spite of apparent counterexamples. I will discuss reasoning by Inference to the Best 
Explanation in Section 2.4.1, and reasoning by Modus Tollens in Section 2.4.2 
 
2.4.1 Inference to the Best Explanation 
 
Inference to the Best Explanation (IBE) is a species of inference wherein a number of candidate 
explanations for a given phenomenon are assessed for explanatory power, and the best is inferred. 
It has been claimed that strong subjunctives can function to assist in our reasoning by IBE, which 
may seem to threaten our presuppositional hypotheses. Perhaps that was to be expected: natural 
language is rarely nice and neat. Still, the relationship between strong subjunctives and IBE is rather 
more complicated than it might initially seem and, for this reason, our strong subjunctives are 
actually rather more disciplined than the counterexamples suggest. Or so I want to argue. 
Edgington (1995, p.240) takes strong subjunctives to be ‘ingredients in’ IBE. She considers 
arsenic conditionals, conditionals that are inspired by Alan Ross Anderson’s (1951) classic example:  
 
(27) If the patient had taken arsenic, he would have shown these very symptoms.  
 
In a later paper, Edgington (2003, p.23) formalises the role of arsenic conditionals like so:  
 
(28) A. Because, C. And if it had been the case that A, then it would have been the case 
that C. 
 
Someone begins by asserting that A and C. They then assert ‘A > C’, which appears to 
communicate that A is explained by C. This conditional is felicitously asserted, even though the 
assertion that A indicates that the speaker is certain that A.26 So, if conditionals like (27) are 
felicitously assertable when the speaker and the audience are certain that the patient took arsenic 
then (27) is a counterexample to Strong Subjunctive Presupposition.  
 Crespo, Karawani, and Veltman (2018, p.7) have already shown that arsenic strong 
subjunctives are felicitous when the speaker is certain that the antecedent is true, and the audience 
is certain that the antecedent is false. Their example, slightly readjusted:   
 
26 For arguments that assertion is governed by a norm of psychological certainty – assert only that which 
you are psychologically certain about – see Beddor (2020b)  
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(29) I am certain that the patient took arsenic. You are certain that he didn’t. But at 
least you should admit that if he had taken arsenic, he would have shown exactly 
those symptoms.  
 
These cases are not counterexamples to Strong Subjunctive Presupposition. However, the strong 
subjunctive becomes infelicitous when the speaker and audience are certain about antecedent truth: 
 
(30) ?? We know for certain that the patient took arsenic. And if he had taken arsenic, 
he would have shown exactly those symptoms. 
 
But what about cases in which speaker and audience are certain that the antecedent is true? 
Consider, for instance:  
 
(31) X: We have to find out whether the patient took arsenic. You seem to think so? 
Y: I do. If he had taken arsenic, he would have shown exactly those symptoms. 
 
It should indeed be granted that the arsenic conditional in (31) would not ordinarily cause anyone 
to bat an eyelid. Perhaps we can begin to discern that there is something a little awkward about it, 
if we squint and find the right angle. But (31) does nonetheless make our hypotheses look bad.  
 But things are about to get even stranger: I want to draw attention to the fact that strong 
subjunctives can also sound terrible when we reason by IBE. In a discussion about strong 
subjunctives, and whilst noting their relevance to IBE, Williamson (2007, p.137) approvingly 
quotes Edgington (2003). But Williamson (2016, p.266) would later write about the IBE reasoning 
process without once referring to strong subjunctives:  
 
We can rank theories (or hypotheses) as potential explanations of our evidence. The point 
of the qualifier “potential” is that a false theory is not the actual explanation of the data; in 
that sense, it does not really explain them. But we need to rank theories as potential 
explanations before knowing whether they are true, in order then to use the ranking to 
guide our judgments as to which theory is true. A potential explanation of the evidence is 
anything that would explain the evidence if it were true. A theory T is a better potential 
explanation of evidence E than a theory T* if and only if T would explain E if T were true 
better than T* would explain E if T* were true—in brief, T would explain E better than T* 
would.  
 
Of course, given Williamson’s (2007) prior endorsement of Edgington (2003), and his use of the 
subjunctive mood in the above, it seems reasonable to suppose that Williamson (2016) conceives 
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of strong subjunctives as assisting in our reasoning by IBE. For Williamson, this involves forming 
a conjunction of subjunctive conditionals, whose antecedents describe some state of affairs, and 
whose consequents state an explanatory relationship between that state of affairs and some known 
fact. The potential explanations are then graded from worst to best: 
 
(32) C. If it were that A, then A would explain C. If it were that A*, then A* would 
explain C. But A would explain C better than A* would. So, A.  
 
Let us call conditionals like the above explanation-stating conditionals. In the first instance, notice 
that Williamson’s explanation-sating conditionals are all weak subjunctives, not strong subjunctives. 
And notice that when we rewrite (31) with explanation-stating conditional, the strong subjunctive 
is infelicitous: 
 
(33)  X: We have to find out whether the patient took arsenic. You seem to think so? 
Y: ?? I do. If he had taken arsenic, then that would have explained why he is 
showing exactly these symptoms.  
 
This is bizarre. The conditionals in (31) and (33) are playing the exact same roles. However, when 
we use an explanation-stating conditional in (33), the conditional is infelicitous, even though this 
conditional is merely making explicit our explanatory agenda. Notice also that the indicative 
version of (31) sounds infelicitous, unlike the weak subjunctive version of (31), and the indicative 
and weak subjunctive versions of (33): 
 
(34)  X: We have to find out whether the patient took arsenic. You seem to think so? 
Y:  a. ?? I do. If he took arsenic, then he is showing exactly these symptoms.  
 b. I do. If he were to have taken arsenic, then he would be showing exactly 
these symptoms. 
 c. I do. If he took arsenic, then that explains why he is showing exactly 
these symptoms.   
 d. I do. If he were to have taken arsenic, then that would explain why he is 
showing exactly these symptoms.27 
 
27 We should at this point recall Crespo, Karawani, and Veltman’s (2018) observation that in certain 
languages, weak subjunctives can sound a bit awkward when past-direct. But it seems to me as though 




When we forward P as potential explanation for Q, the felicity data are therefore as follows: 
• P → Q     Infelicitous 
• P → P EXPLAINS Q   Felicitous 
• P []→ Q     Felicitous    
• P []→ P EXPLAINS Q   Felicitous    
• P → Q     Felicitous    
• P → P EXPLAINS Q   Infelicitous    
It emerges, in the first instance, that the least controversial conditional for reasoning by IBE is the 
weak subjunctive. However, since past-directed weak subjunctives can sound a bit awkward, then 
that is perhaps why conditionals like (31) are opted for, instead of their weak subjunctive variants. 
But this leaves unexplained why conditionals like (33) sound terrible. And we have not yet 
explained why conditionals like (34a) sound bad either.  
 The conditionals of IBE are therefore perplexing things. What is their relevance to our 
hypotheses? If we look at certain examples, like (31), Strong Subjunctive Presupposition looks false. If 
we look at others, like (33), there seems to be no problem with it at all. Should we therefore amend 
our hypothesis, leaving a loophole for conditionals like (31)? Perhaps, for instance, what 
conditionals presuppose is a function of what we intend to use them for. But then why is the 
explanation-stating conditional in (33) not subject to the same exemption? Perhaps, then, we 
should just abandon (those) presuppositional hypotheses? But that would also leave unexplained 
the discrepancy between (31) and (33).  
 Now there is a way of reading this discrepancy in a way that favours our hypotheses. When 
we use the explanation-stating strong subjunctive, we leave no room for doubt that an explanation 
of the patient’s symptoms is on our mind. And, indeed, that is as it should be, because we are 
trying to reason by IBE. But then given Strong Subjunctive Presupposition, (33) is incongruous because 
it suggests that we are certain that arsenic does not explain the symptoms. However, since the 
conditional in (31) does not make it obvious that we are thinking about an explanation of the 
patient’s symptoms, then we must rely on context to infer that explaining those symptoms is on 
the speaker’s mind. Perhaps, however, it is not, and so we are more inclined to cut the speaker 
some slack when they assert (31). 
 
(B) a. I do. If that were the case, then he would be showing exactly these symptoms. 
b. I do. If it were the case that took/had taken arsenic, then that would explain why he is showing 
exactly these symptoms. 
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 This explanation has the potential to account for why the explanation-stating conditional 
sounds worse than its plain counterpart. But it also predicts that we would view the assertion in 
(31) as somehow irrelevant in that context, which we do not. Still, the explanation could perhaps 
account for why there might be a loophole in our presuppositional hypotheses: why we have 
become prepared to overlook or ignore the presupposition in (31), but not in (33). However, if this 
is correct, then a minor amendment must be made to our functional hypothesis: for it certainly 
would appear that strong subjunctives can, in some instances, help us to reason from a proposition 
about which we are uncertain. Just how common this actually is, I do not know, although it cannot 
be all that rare, if it explains why we tend to ignore the strong subjunctive’s presupposition in the 
context of IBE.  
As to why we sometimes opt for the strong subjunctive, I again do not know. Perhaps this 
is only a quirk of English (and Dutch) which, for whatever reason, makes past-directed weak 
subjunctives sound awkward. If that were indeed true, then we would expect strong subjunctives 
to be less felicitous, within the context of IBE, in languages which better tolerate past-directed 
weak subjunctives, like Palestinian Arabic. I will not comment further on this possibility, closing 
with the platitudinous remark that language is messy (but perhaps, if the above is correct, not 
always as messy as we might think).  
 
2.4.2 Modus Tollens  
 
Strong subjunctives have also been claimed by Edgington (2003, p.23) to assist in our reasoning 
by Modus Tollens. If strong subjunctives are felicitous in these context, then we have a 
counterexample to Strong Subjunctive Presupposition. However, Edgington’s (2003) examples are all 
of cases in which a conditional is merely used to indicate that reasoning by Modus Tollens has 
occurred. Consider, for instance: 
 
(35) They are not at home. For the lights are off. And if they had been at home, the 
lights would have been on. 
 
Since the speaker in (35) is already certain that they are at home, then the strong subjunctive in 
(35) is no counterexample to Strong Subjunctive Presupposition. These examples can nonetheless be 
restructured so as to give the impression that someone is gearing up to the possibility of reasoning 




(36) ?? Since we’re in the area, let’s quickly see whether they’re at home. If they had 
been at home, the lights would have been on.  
 
The conditional in (36), in which a present-directed conditional is used, is plain bizarre. The 
speaker seems to go straight from suggesting an inquiry into whether their friends are at home, to 
using a conditional which implies or presupposes that they are not. Notice, however, that when 
we switch to the indicative, sanity is restored:  
 
(37) Since we’re in the area, let’s quickly see whether they’re at home. If they are at 
home, the lights will be on.  
  
This pattern is also observed when we look at past-directed conditionals: 
 
(38) a. ?? Oh, you’re neighbours with some other friends of ours! Were they at home 
yesterday? If they had been at home, then their lights would have been on. 
 b. Oh, you’re neighbours with some other friends of ours! Were they at home 
yesterday? If they were at home, then their lights were on.  
 
The same goes for future-directed conditionals: 
 
(39) a. ?? Oh, you’re neighbours with some other friends of ours! By any chance, will 
you tell us whether they are home tomorrow? If they had been at home, then their 
lights would have been on.   
 b. Oh, you’re neighbours with some other friends of ours! By any chance, will you 
tell us whether they are home tomorrow? If they are going to be at home, then 
their lights will be on. 
 
We should also note that weak subjunctives can sound quite awkward in these contexts, although 
no way near as bad as strong subjunctives:  
 
(40) a. ? Since we’re in the area, let’s quickly see whether they’re at home. If that were 
the case, their lights would be on.  
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b. ? Oh, you’re neighbours with some other friends of ours! Were they at home 
yesterday? If that were the case, then their lights were off. 
c. ? Oh, you’re neighbours with some other friends of ours! By any chance, will 
you tell us whether they are home tomorrow? If they were to be at home, their 
lights would be on.   
 
I therefore conclude that the uncontroversial conditionals of Modus Tollens are indicatives. Weak 
subjunctives sound somewhat marked in this context, and strong subjunctives even more so. But 
then our functional and presuppositional hypotheses remain unaffected by these data.  
 
2.5 Crespo, Karawani, and Veltman’s Theory 
 
2.5.1 The Theory  
 
Our functional and presuppositional hypotheses stand largely unscathed. In Section 6, I will 
propose a theory of the subjunctive mood that aligns nicely with the functions of different 
conditionals. But before that, I want to assess Crespo, Karawani, and Veltman’s (2018) account of 
what indicatives and subjunctives presuppose. For although they do not present their theory as an 
account of the subjunctive mood, it is interesting to read it in this way.  
 On Crespo, Karawani, and Veltman’s (2018, p.6) theory (henceforth, the CKV theory), 
indicatives, weak subjunctives, and strong subjunctives all presuppose something different about 
their antecedents. The presuppositional hypotheses, however, are rather different to our own:  
 
• The indicative ‘P → Q’ presupposes that P might be the case: that it is a subjective 
possibility that P.  
• The weak subjunctive ‘P []→ Q’ presupposes that P is unlikely to be the case.  
• The strong subjunctive ‘P → Q’ presupposes that P is not the case.28 
 
Now strong subjunctives have two layers of past tense morphology, whereas weak subjunctives 
only have one. On behalf of Crespo, Karawani, and Veltman (2018), we may therefore propose 
that the layer of past tense morphology that weak and strong subjunctives have in common 
 
28 We should perhaps note that the notion of presupposition being deployed here is that which applies to 
a form of dynamic semantics called update semantics. But I do not think that anything hangs on this, in the 
present context. 
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(somehow) signals antecedent improbability, and that the extra layer of past tense morphology in 
the strong subjunctive (somehow) signals antecedent falsity. Although I cannot assert that this 
extension to the CKV theory yields an elegant theory from the perspective of modern linguistics, 
it certain strikes me as nicely simple and unifying. Unfortunately, however, I do not think that it is 
correct. I will now present two problems for the CKV theory. 
 
2.5.2 First Problem: Indicatives Don’t Presuppose Antecedent Possibility  
 
It is a widespread assumption that indicatives presuppose that their antecedents are subjectively 
possible.29 But as natural as this thought may seem, I think that it is wrong. Although indicatives 
presuppose that their antecedents are uncertain, this does not map onto subjective possibility, 
because subjective necessity and impossibility modals are entirely consistent with psychological 
uncertainty. And, indeed, I think that some linguistic data does suggest that assertions of (say) 
subjective necessity do stand perfectly comfortably alongside an indicative conditional whose 
antecedent is (the negation of) the modal’s prejacent.  
 In the first instance, I want to defend the claim that assertions of subjective necessity are 
compatible with uncertainty about their prejacents. Although Daniel Lassiter (2016, pp.122-126) 
has found naturally occurring and felicitous juxtapositions of uncertainty claims and subjective 
necessity modals, Kai von Fintel and Anthony Gillies (2020) demur. As they point out, 
juxtapositions needn’t be conjunctions. Take any passage in which uncertainty of about <P> is 
expressed after/before assent to <NECSP>. Is this not compatible with an agent’s being uncertain 
about <P> after/before coming to assent to <NECSP>? Von Fintel and Gillies (2020, pp.10-11) 
write: 
 
‘We think that is what is going on here [...]: Lassiter has found some examples in the wild 
where epistemic modals undergo shifts in the possibilities deemed relevant, the modal 
horizon. In the first sort of example, a must is followed by uncertainty: this is a speaker 
who is expanding the modal horizon. In the second sort of example, a speaker is 
considering some possibilities but then concludes with a must: here there’s a decision to 
reset the modal horizon to a more realistic boundary. Both sorts of cases involve instability 
across contexts and the claim that must 𝜙 entails 𝜙 is about what happens within a given 
context.’ 
 
Von Fintel and Gillies then argue that if we control these cases for changes in context, the resultant 
juxtapositions look marked. For example, when someone goes from assenting to <NECSP> to 
expressing uncertainty about <P>, it is possible to just ask them what they currently think. Their 
 
29 See Holguín (2020, no pagination), and references therein.  
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example (von Fintel and Gillies, 2020, p.11): 
 
(41)        X: That must be an old DTS diesel setup but I’m not certain. Why would they 
have added this extra injector?  
Y: So, given that you’re not certain, do you still think that it must be an old 
DTS diesel setup?  
X: I guess not./Yeah, it must be; I’m sure of it./Like I said: it must be but I’m 
not certain.  
 
It is the judgment of von Fintel and Gillies (2020, p.11): that only this last response is problematic, 
although they note that both their reviewers did not share in this judgment. But divergences in 
intuition also arise with respect to their appeal to ‘although’ prefixes, which are known to control 
for changes in context. Thus, von Fintel and Gillies (2020, p.12): claim that assent to <NECSP> 
after expressions of uncertainty about <P> are marked when an ‘although’ prefix is used. They 
feel as though (42) is marked, although their reviewers do not agree:  
 
(42) Although I’m not certain, it must be an old DTS diesel setup.  
 
The final context-controlling device that von Fintel and Gillies (2020, pp.12-13): consider is 
embedding behaviour. They imagine a scenario in which two tests are available for a disease. Test 
A is cheap but fallible, often indicating only that a patient is more or less likely to be infected. Test 
B is extremely expensive, but is always definitive. Von Fintel and Gillies then suggest that an 
insurance company would have rules like (43a), but not like (43b): 
 
(43)      a. Test B can only be administered if the results of Test A are that it is not 
certain that the patient has the disease but that she likely has it.  
b. ?? Test B can only be administered if the results of Test A are that it is not 
certain that the patient has the disease but that she must have it.  
 
Likewise, von Fintel and Gillies suggest that in an insurance company’s training manual, one might 
find questions like (44a), but not like (44b): 
 
(44)      a. Suppose the results of Test A are that it is not certain that the patient has 
the disease but that she likely has it. Should we approve Test B?  
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b.  ?? Suppose the results of Test A are that it is not certain that the patient 
has the disease but that she must have it. Should we approve Test B?  
 
Now, von Fintel and Gillies (2020, p.13) happily report that their reviewers agree that (43b) and 
(44b) are marked. As do I. However, this might not be because there is something problematic 
about conjoining <NECSP> with an expression of uncertainty about <P>. My preferred 
explanation would exploit the fact that subjective modals can struggle in the antecedents of 
conditionals and within supposition reports anyway. It is a well-established fact that subjective 
modals struggle in many embedded contexts. Looking at corpus data, Valentine Hacquard and 
Alexis Wellwood (2012, p.6) have observed that the subjective ‘must’ is basically absent from the 
antecedents of conditionals. We would therefore expect the same pattern within supposition 
attitude reports, and this seems to be the case:  
 
(45) a. ? Test B can only be administered if the results of Test A are that the patient  
must have the disease.  
b. ? Suppose that the results of Test A are that the patient must have the disease.30 
 
Now if subjective necessity modals really are compatible with prejacent uncertainty, it follows from 
Indicative Presupposition that asserting <NECSP & (¬)P → Q> should be felicitous. And that is 
indeed what we seem to find:  
 
(46) a. Although I’m not totally certain, it just has to/must rain tonight – I mean, look 
at those clouds! And if it does, indeed, rain tonight, the tomatoes will be saved. 
b. Although I can’t be sure, it must have escaped. What else could explain those 
terrible howls last night? But if hasn’t escaped, then it still in here.  
 
I therefore claim that, contra the CKV theory and prevailing wisdom, indicatives do not 
presuppose antecedent subjective possibility.   
 
 
30 Some more examples: 
 
(C) a. ?? If he must be in town, then he’s buying ice cream.  
 b. ?? Supposing that he has to be in town, then he’s buying ice cream. 
 
As with (45a) and (45b), these sentences are only felicitous when the modal is read objectively or deontically.  
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2.5.3 Second Problem: Weak Subjunctives Needn’t Have Unlikely Antecedents  
 
The distinctive claim of the CKV theory is that weak indicatives presuppose antecedent 
improbability. Although they do not cite DeRose (2010, p.9), it should be noted that he briefly 
wonders whether the weak subjunctive conditional ‘somehow signals that its antecedent is 
improbable, where the type of signalling in question is such that the conditional is not rendered 
false or wrong if the antecedent is not actually improbable.’ In any case, here is an example that 
Crespo, Karawani, and Veltman (2018, p.5) use to motivate their theory: 
 
(47) Journalist:   Sir, what will you do if you lose the election?  
Candidate: I expect to win by a big amount. 
Journalist:  I see, sir, but what if you were to lose?  
 
This is an intriguing case, although it seems insufficient motivation for their presuppositional 
hypothesis. Indeed, we can rewrite the example so that the indicative has the same effect as the 
weak subjunctive: 
 
(48) Journalist:   Sir, what would you do if were to lose the election?  
Candidate: I expect to win by a big amount. 
Journalist:  I see, sir, but what if you do lose?  
 
More importantly, however, their theory is subject to plausible counterexamples:  
 
(49) I know that it’s very unlikely that I’ll win the lottery. But in spite of that, I would 
still be disappointed if I were to lose.  
(50) It’s a fool’s errand. Your chances of success are as good as zero. And if you were  
indeed to fail, think about how humiliating that would be!  
 
Neither conditional above seems marked or infelicitous to me. And I am unconvinced about 
Crespo, Karawani, and Veltman’s (2018, p.9) claim that the following is marked: 
 
(51) Maybe John will come to the party, and if he came, he would have a great time. 
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Counterexamples aside, this presuppositional hypothesis would also make it rather mysterious why 
it is so easy to opt for weak subjunctives when practically deliberating. If these conditionals 
presupposed the unlikeliness of their antecedents, then we would surely expect these conditionals to 
be less common than the indicative in deliberative circumstances. This is because, ceteris paribus, it 
is less rational to deliberate bringing about some P thought unlikely than it is to deliberate bringing 
about some Q not thought unlikely. The same goes for their role in IBE.  
 Now it was perhaps with examples like the above in mind that DeRose (2010, pp. 9-10) 
wrote that: 
 
when one more carefully considers the range of situations in which one might opt for the 
[weak subjunctive] I think one will be led to postulate a somewhat more general 
hypothesis, and say instead that the function of [weak subjunctives] is to call attention to 
the possibility that the antecedent is (or will be) false, where one reason one might have 
for calling attention to the possibility that the antecedent is (or will be) false is that it is 
quite likely that it is (or will be) false.  
 
But as DeRose (2010, p.37) points out, this role of weak subjunctives:  
 
does not seem to have the status of a warranted assertability condition of [weak 
subjunctives]: if you were to assert a [weak subjunctive] when there is no good reason to 
call attention to the possibility of the falsity of its antecedent, this does not make your 
assertion seem wrong or unwarranted.  
 
Indeed, DeRose (2010, p.37) would go on to present an alternative, ‘more serious’ difference 
between weak subjunctives and indicatives (discussed in fn.15 below). Finally, it may be awkward 
for this account that, like indicatives, weak subjunctives are felicitous when their antecedents are 
(the negations of) the prejacent of a subjective necessity modal:  
 
(52) a. Although I’m not totally certain, it just has to/must rain tonight – I mean, look 
at those clouds! And if it were, indeed, to rain tonight, the tomatoes would be 
saved. 
b. Although I can’t be sure, it must have escaped. What else could explain those 
terrible howls last night? But if that weren’t the case, then it would still be in here.  
 
We should also note that, as a theory of the subjunctive mood more broadly, this DeRoseian 
amendment to the CKV theory is obviously in tension with at least many of the contexts in which 
strong subjunctives are felicitously used. For this reason, I think that we should look elsewhere for 
a general theory of subjunctive conditionals.  
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2.6 Suppositions and Subjunctives  
 
I will now outline a new theory of subjunctive conditionals. The theory draws on the proposals, 
suggestions and clues of many different writers. The basic idea is that all conditionals have the 
Ramsey Test as their assertability condition; that weak and strong subjunctives have a more 
demanding assertability condition than the indicative; and that the strong subjunctive has a still 
more demanding assertability condition than the weak subjunctive. After introducing my theory, I 
will show that it aligns nicely with the different roles that indicatives and subjunctives have been 
found to play. I will also defend it against some objections.  
 
2.6.1 How Should We Understand the Ramsey Test? 
 
I want to build up to my theory by first arguing that the Ramsey Test is best understood in terms 
of suppositions. This is because the notion of “hypothetical belief addition” is problematically 
underspecified. Do we mean by this that there is a special mode of belief that deserves the prefix 
‘hypothetical’? If so, what are its distinguishing marks? And what is it to “add” a belief to one’s 
belief set, hypothetically or otherwise? Can this even be done, if doxastic voluntarism is false? In 
response to these difficult questions, my preferred strategy is to interpret talk of hypothetical belief 
addition as talk of supposition, leaving unaddressed the extent to which supposition looks like 
belief. If we do so, a simple version of the Ramsey Test will look something like this: ‘A > C’ is 
assertable by s IFFs has supposed that A, and <C> is assertible within the scope of this 
supposition.  
Mitchell S. Green (2000), in an illuminating discussion of supposition, advances a similar 
relationship between conditionals and suppositions. I endorse five points from Green’s article 
(2000, pp.377-380). Firstly, suppositions can be speech acts and intentional states both. Secondly, 
suppositions-qua-speech-acts can be occasioned explicitly – i.e. ‘I suppose that P’ – or non-
explicitly. Thirdly, supposition involves non-assertorically putting forth a proposition, in such a way 
that (i) the reasoner is entitled to draw inferences from that proposition, perhaps in conjunction 
with some auxiliary propositions, and where (ii) this kind putting forth differs from assertion, but 
also conjecture, presupposition, and presumption, in that the reasoner is not at fault should the 
supposed proposition be untrue. Fourthly, if some proposition is inferred in this way, it is inferred 
within the scope of that supposition, and is not automatically believed or accepted outside its 
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scope. Fifthly, if a reasoner infers <Q> from within the scope of the supposition of <P>, then she 
has epistemic reason to believe the corresponding conditional: ‘P > Q’.  
This last point is in need of generalisation. When a conditional is evaluated, the reasoner 
supposes its antecedent, and sees whether she is in a position to assert its consequent from within 
the scope of that supposition. And as Green says, this could be because the reasoner has inferred 
the consequent from within the scope of the supposed antecedent. However, inference is not the 
only way in which someone might find themselves able to assert a proposition from within the 
scope of a supposition. To see this, consider Alan White (1971, p.291) on inference.   
 
To infer is neither to journey towards, nor to arrive at or be in a certain position; it is to 
take up, to accept or to change to a position. Inference is not the passage from A to B, 
but the taking of B as a result of reflection on A. 
 
Thus, I suppose that it will rain tomorrow. Within the scope of that supposition, I assent to <the 
earth spins tomorrow>. However, this is not because I reflected upon <it will rain tomorrow>: and 
yet it nonetheless seems as though I have reason to believe <if it rains tomorrow, the earth will 
spin>.  
 
2.6.2 Divers and Elstein on Supposition  
 
If we understand the Ramsey Test in terms of supposition, then perhaps one important difference 
between indicatives and subjunctives is that different kinds of supposition are involved in their 
assertability conditions. Drawing on the contrast between indicatives and strong subjunctives, 
Divers and Daniel Y. Elstein (2012) have distinguished between supposing-as-actual (A-supposition) 
and supposing-as-counterfactual (C-supposition). Generalising this thought to encompass weak 
subjunctives, we might therefore suggest that an indicative’s Ramsey Test uses A-supposition, 
whereas a subjunctive’s Ramsey Test uses C-supposition.  
Although I think that different conditionals do employ different versions of the Ramsey 
Test, I am not certain that these differences are best thought about in terms of their being different 
kinds of supposition. In my view, supposition (or, at least, supposition-qua-speech-act) is everywhere 
the same: it is a species of non-assertoric propositional putting-forth, which is able to evidentially 
support conditionals. However, depending on the conditional that is being evaluated, different 
constraints are imposed on the corresponding supposition, so that a person’s being able to properly 
assert a conditional’s consequent, within the scope of the supposition of its antecedent, requires 
that person to jump through more or less hoops.  
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It will nonetheless be extremely important to look at Divers and Elstein’s discussion of A- 
and C-supposition for clues about what these constraints might be. Divers and Elstein (2012, 
pp.122-123) have suggested that A-supposition, but not C-supposition, is subject to an epistemic 
constraint on supposition-relative belief. This constraint is supposed to have an effect on which 
of our antecedent beliefs are (properly) believed within the scope of an A-supposition, as well as 
on whichever further beliefs we may acquire within its scope:  
 
When we A-suppose, we typically project assumptions that vary from our beliefs about 
what is actually the case: and we do so—usually—for such purposes as working out how 
things would look if certain things are true which we currently believe false, or about which 
we are presently agnostic. [...] The way in which what follows from an A-supposition 
deviates from what is antecedently believed is epistemic: when we believe that P, and A-
suppose that S, P will still be believed under the supposition unless S is (taken to be) a 
defeater for our knowledge that P.  (Divers and Elstein, 2012, pp.122-123) 
 
The problem with this suggestion is that C-supposition is also subject to the epistemic constraint, 
whether conceived as acting on assertion or belief. When we C-suppose that Oswald did not shoot 
Kennedy, neither <someone shot Kennedy> nor <Oswald killed Kennedy> remain assertable or 
believable within the scope of this C-supposition, because within the scope of this C-supposition, we no 
longer have good enough epistemic reasons to claim knowledge of either proposition. Whether 
we A- or C-suppose that P, what may (still) be believed or asserted to within its scope depends 
upon what epistemic reasons we have for belief or assertion relative to the supposition that P.  
Divers and Elstein (2012, p.123) also suggest that C-supposing a proposition means 
treating it as a limiting condition on a (potentially) non-actual world, whereby propositions 
accepted within the scope of this supposition are taken to be about that (potentially) non-actual 
world:  
 
What is C-supposed is treated less as if it were believed than what is A-supposed; rather it 
is considered as a limiting condition on a world, where that world may be non-actual, and 
the conclusions of the suppositional reasoning concern that world.  
 
But I am also unsure about this, because we often conceive of C-supposed contents as being about 
the actual world. for example, as being about the actual Oswald and Kennedy. This aspect of the 
phenomenology of C-supposition is well-known and, indeed, it may even inform Kripke’s (1980, 
p.45) famous Humphrey objection to Lewis’ (1968) counterpart theory. But it also suggests that 
someone who C-supposes a proposition treats it as a limiting condition on the actual world. And 
the problem is that this seems true of A-supposition as well.  
Now I do not want to deny that, unlike A-suppositions, the contents of C-suppositions 
appear somewhat detached from the actual world. But we risk overstating or misconstruing this 
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fact by appealing (however metaphorically) to non-actual worlds. Both A- and C-suppositions 
impose limiting conditions on the actual world, in the sense that both impose limitations on 
supposition-relative acceptance that is about that world. I think that the “detachment” that we feel 
when we C-suppose is most likely an artefact of the fact that C-supposition is often directed 
towards strong subjunctives. More specifically, I think that our feeling of detachment is due, in part, 
to the psychological effects of Strong Subjunctive Presupposition, but also to a unique constraint, to be 
introduced shortly, on the strong subjunctive’s Ramsey Test.  
Finally, I want to turn to a brief remark of Divers and Elstein’s (2012, p.123) which, I 
think, points us in the right direction: ‘When we C-suppose, we are concerned not with such 
evidential dependence but instead with some form of (broadly) worldly dependence.’ I believe that 
this is broadly correct. When we “C-suppose”, we are indeed interested in some form of 
dependence. In my view, this is because “C-supposition” just is an act of supposition whose role 
is to evidentially support a subjunctive conditional (mutatis mutandis for “A-supposition” and 
indicatives”). And subjunctive conditionals, in turn, have an assertability condition that requires us 
to be sensitive to dependencies (whereas indicatives do not).  
However, I am not entirely happy with the thought that this dependence is worldly. Talk of 
worldly dependence brings to mind talk of dependencies amongst facts or things, but one might 
worry that such dependencies may be difficult to characterise in a satisfying way, especially when 
we C-suppose propositions whose subject-matters are opaque to us. For example, when C-
supposing a countermathematical, one may lack any impression of what worldly dependence 
amounts to. I therefore think that, at least as far as the assertability conditions of subjunctives go, 
we should view the dependence as broadly explanatory: when we C-suppose some <P> with the 
intention to evaluating a subjunctive ‘P > Q’, we have to be sensitive to propositions of the form 
<Q because R>. We can then let these propositions track whatever it is that they ordinarily track, 
outside the scope of the supposition. Perhaps, in some cases, that will be some form of causal (and 
hence worldly) dependence. But perhaps in other cases we think about explanation in wholly 
different terms: we do not think about our explanations as being good or bad in virtue of their 
tracking certain kinds of dependencies between facts or things.   
I have said that when we C-suppose some <Q> with the intention to evaluating a 
subjunctive ‘P > Q’, we have to be sensitive to propositions of the form <Q because R>. Now it 




If we want to express a dependency hypothesis in ordinary language, it is hard to avoid 
the use of counterfactual conditionals saying what would happen if the agent were to 




It is clear that not just any counterfactual could be part of a pattern expressing causal 
dependence. [...] We must exclude “back-tracking counterfactuals” based on reasoning 
from different supposed effects, back to different causes and forward again to differences 
in other effects. Suppose I am convinced that stroking [the cat] has no influence over 
purring, but that I wouldn’t stroke Bruce unless I were in a mood that gets him to purr 
softly by emotional telepathy. Then I give credence to  
 
I stroke Bruce, →  he purrs softly.31 (Lewis, 1981, p22) 
 
Lewis’ example tells us that it would be rash to expect subjunctive conditionals to have an 
assertability condition that is sensitive to explanatory propositions which link consequent to antecedent. 
However, the insight that weak and strong subjunctives pertain to (explanatory) dependencies is 
one that should be preserved. I now want to show that this can be done by positing a special 
assertability condition for subjunctives.  
 
2.6.3 The Theory   
 
Indicatives are distinguished from subjunctives, in part, by a layer of past-tense morphology. In 
my view, this “fake past” is related to the fact that subjunctives, but not indicatives, have an 
assertability condition that is sensitive to our beliefs about what explains what, within the scope of 
a supposition. Perhaps the fake past tense simply encodes this information about this assertability 
condition. Or, perhaps the fake past tense encodes some information about the “truth-conditions” 
of subjunctives, which are themselves reflected in their assertability conditions. Either way, I 
propose the following difference between indicatives and subjunctives:  
 
Indicative Mood – An indicative conditional, ‘P → Q’, is assertable by s IFF, within 
the scope of the supposition of <P>, <Q> is assertible by s.  
 
 
31 Indeed, Edgington (2011, p.86) uses this example against DeRose’s (2010, pp.37-38) proposal about weak 
subjunctives. For DeRose, weak subjunctives which are not deliberationally useful are unassertible in any 
context, even when the context is not one of practical deliberation. And because DeRose takes 
deliberationally useless conditionals to just be conditionals whose assertion was dependent upon 
backtracking reasoning, DeRose’s theory is therefore that back-tracking dependent weak subjunctives are 
always unassertible. But Lewis’ example doesn’t seem always unassertible.   
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Subjunctive Mood – A (weak or strong) subjunctive conditional, ‘P > Q’, is assertable 
by s IFF, within the scope of the supposition of <P>, (i) <Q> is assertible by s, 
and (ii) either (a) <Q> is adducible by s within the scope of the supposition that 
<P>, or (b) for some <R> that is adducible by s within the scope of the supposition 
that <P>, <Q because R> is assertible by s. 
 
In order to understand the contrast between these assertability conditions, we must have a 
conception of adducible propositions. A proposition is adducible within the scope of a supposition 
when it is rationally permissible for somebody to take that proposition for granted when 
developing that supposition. It is to use that proposition in developing the supposition, without 
having first inferred that proposition from the supposed content. Thus, when I suppose that P in 
order to check whether <Q> is assertable within its scope, I might reason from <P> to some 
<R>, and then use <P&R> to reason to Q. In so doing, I am not adducing <R>.  
Clearly, having propositions to adduce is extremely useful. If we were only permitted to 
reason from the antecedent of a conditional, then we would get absolutely nowhere in checking 
most conditionals for assertability. We must therefore be able to draw on propositions which come 
from somewhere other than the supposed proposition itself. But where does this stock of 
adducible propositions come from?  
In my view, they are a subset of the propositions about which we are certain, outside the 
scope of that supposition. Indeed, in many cases, adducible propositions will be a proper subset of 
those certainties, as the requirement that our suppositions be logically consistent will weed out certain 
beliefs. This constraint on adducible propositions is active in the assertability conditions of 
indicatives and subjunctives, weak and strong. But I think that strong subjunctives are subject to a 
further constraint, one that is related to their extra layer of past tense morphology. And I think 
that this extra layer does communicate temporal information: it tells us that, within the scope of the 
supposition of a strong subjunctive’s antecedent, a belief that makes reference to a time is only 
adducible if that time is earlier than the antecedent time, if it has one. More specifically:  
 
Maintain Consistency: For any conditional, ‘P > Q’, any proposition <R> is not 
adducible by s, within the scope of the supposition of <P>, if (i) s does not believe 
that R with certainty, or if (ii) <R> is inconsistent with <P>.  
 
Rewind: For any strong subjunctive, ‘P → Q’, if <P> makes reference to some 
time, t2, then any proposition <R> which makes reference to some time, t1, is only 
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adducible by s, within the scope of the supposition of <P>, if t1 is earlier than t2.  
 
As advertised, indicatives, weak subjunctives and strong subjunctives can be ordered by the 
number of constraints that are imposed upon their Ramsey Tests. Indicatives are subject to 
Indicative Mood, but strong and weak subjunctives are subject to Subjunctive Mood, which is a more 
demanding constraint on what can be asserted, within the scope of the corresponding supposition. 
Additionally, strong subjunctives are subject to Rewind, which imposes a stronger constraint on 
what can be adduced, within the scope of the corresponding supposition, than Maintain Consistency, 
to which every conditional is subject. My theory correlates these differences in assertability 
conditions, in a principled fashion, with the morphological differences between our three 
conditionals.  
 Rewind plays an important role in my theory. In fact, attending to Rewind is crucial for 
warding off a potential misunderstanding. After all, a quick glance at Indicative Mood and Subjunctive 
Mood might suggest that every time a subjunctive conditional is assertable, then so is the 
corresponding indicative. This is because Subjunctive Mood is conjunctive, and has Indicative Mood as 
a conjunct. However, if my theory predicted this, then clear counterexamples would abound. For 
instance, it seems right to say that, if Oswald had missed, Kennedy might have survived; it seems 
wrong to say that, if Oswald missed, Kennedy might have survived.  
Thankfully, however, my theory does not have this consequence. Whilst it is true that no 
weak subjunctive conditional is assertable unless its indicative counterpart is assertable too, this is 
not the case when it comes to strong subjunctives. Why? Because whether or not a conditional’s 
consequent is assertable, relative to the supposition of its antecedent, partly depends upon which 
propositions are adducible within the scope of the supposition. And since Rewind will often act to 
remove certain propositions from the adducible set of strong subjunctives, a proposition could be 
unassertible when Rewind is not in effect, but become assertable when it is. It is wrong to say that, 
if Oswald missed, Kennedy might have survived. Why? Because the proposition that Kennedy 
died is adducible within the scope of the corresponding proposition. But when Rewind kicks in, 
that proposition is no longer adducible. We are then at liberty to assert that Kennedy might have 
survived, within the scope of the supposition that Oswald had missed. 
 But for all the good that Rewind does here, some may object to its presence. Sidney 
Morgenbesser has drawn our attention to a range of prima facie assertable strong subjunctives 
which, if indeed assertable, are incompatible with Rewind. Thus: after betting heads on the outcome 
of a coin toss (whilst the coin is in mid-air), and then seeing it land tails, it seems perfectly fine to 
complain that, if I had only bet tails, I would have won. However, Rewind would make the 
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proposition that the coin landed tails unadducible, when developing the supposition of this 
conditional’s antecedent. And if all we know, within the scope of this supposition, is that a fair 
coin is currently in mid-air, then it seems unwarranted to assert that the coin would land tails: it 
might not. But that clashes with our original intuitions about this case.  
 It should be conceded that Morgenbesser cases are compelling. They present a good 
reason to be suspicious of any Rewind-like principle. But let me make two points in response. Firstly, 
one might be able to find such counterfactuals compelling, without ultimately conceding their 
assertability. Ian Phillips (2007, p.42), for instance, has argued that Morgenbesser cases appear 
correct because we are under the grip of a ‘deeply entrenched deterministic mind-set.’ Once we 
control to exclude the possibility of determinism, the coin’s landing tails – to take the present 
example – becomes harder to assert within the scope of the same supposition.32 Secondly, it may be 
possible to deny Rewind, but to accept a weaker Rewind-like principle which could, if adequately 
fleshed out, nonetheless insulate my theory from the disastrous consequence that every strong 
subjunctive is assertible only if its indicative counterpart is too. Channelling Edgington’s (2003) 
response to Morgenbesser cases, we could allow as adducible those propositions which refer to a 
later than does the antecedent, but only when these propositions are explanatorily independent of the 
counterfactual’s antecedent. For instance, since my betting heads or tails was explanatorily 
independent of the coin’s landing tails, the coin’s landing tails remains assertable within the 
supposition that I bet tails. Contrastingly, when we ask what would have happened if Oswald had 
missed, then since Oswald’s not missing explains why Kennedy died, Kennedy’s death is no longer 
adducible within the scope of the supposition that Oswald missed. 
 
2.6.4 Mood and Function   
 
With those caveats in place, and by way of illustration of and motivation for my theory, I want to 
show how these assertability conditions are related to the functional distributions of different 
conditionals.  
 I have argued that the weapon of choice for reasoning by Modus Ponens and Modus Tollens 
is the indicative. This is what we would expect, given the permissive nature of its assertability 
condition. For if these conditionals had been subject to Subjunctive Mood, then our capacity for 
reasoning by Modus Ponens and Modus Tollens would have been diminished.33 Consider a scenario in 
 
32 Phillips’ argument has been questioned by Arif Ahmed (2011); Phillips responds in his (2011).  
33 It may seem outrageous to express that thought with a strong subjunctive. But given Strong Subjunctive 
Presupposition, what choice did I have? Moreover, I am not here reasoning from the antecedent of the 
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which Jones, the infallible mathematician, has declared that he will stop working on the Riemann 
hypothesis next Sunday. We are certain that it will be impossible for Jones to be unhappy on 
Monday if he proves the Riemann hypothesis on Sunday. We are also certain that that he will either 
prove or disprove it on Sunday. You then say: 
 
(53) If Jones is happy on Monday, the Riemann hypothesis is true.  
 
The conditional seems assertible. If we find out that Jones was happy on Monday, we can then 
reason by Modus Ponens to the Riemann hypothesis. If we find out that the Riemann hypothesis is 
false, we can instead reason by Modus Tollens to Jones’ terrible Monday. But the conditional would 
be unassertible, if subject to Subjunctive Mood: within the scope of the supposition that Jones is 
happy on Monday, there is no adducible <R> which is such that I may assert, within the scope of 
this supposition, that the Riemann hypothesis is true because R. None of my primitive mathematical 
beliefs could even begin to make that assertible for me. Conversely, then, Subjunctive Mood explains 
why the weak subjunctive version of (54) sounds quite odd: 
 
(54) ? If Jones were to be happy on Monday, the Riemann hypothesis would be true.34 
 
Subjunctive Mood also explains why weak subjunctives are helpful for reasoning by IBE. Did the 
patient take arsenic? ‘If that were the case, he would certainly be showing these symptoms’. Given 
clause (iib) of Subjunctive Mood, the conditional is assertible only because amongst the doctor’s 
adducible propositions is the certain belief that arsenic poisoning has such-and-such effects, a 
belief which puts her in a position to assert, within the scope of the supposition that the patient 
 
conditional, to its consequent, so that I may then reason by Modus Tollens: after all, I am already certain that 
antecedents and consequents are false.  
34 Consider also the strong subjunctive: 
 
(D) If Jones had been happy on Monday, the Riemann hypothesis would have been true.  
 
Given Strong Subjunctive Presupposition, our speaker must be certain that Jones was unhappy on Monday. This 
means that she is certain that the Riemann hypothesis is false. But then by Maintain Consistency, she cannot 
adduce, within the scope of the supposition that Jones was happy on Monday, one of the following beliefs: 
<the Riemann hypothesis is false> and <it was impossible for Jones to be unhappy on Monday and for the 
Riemann hypothesis to be true>. Which has to go? This is Goodman’s (1955) problem of cotenability, in an 
epistemological setting. I briefly address it in the next section. Clearly, however, there seems to be 
something very odd about jettisoning <the Riemann hypothesis is false>. And if this belief does indeed 
remain adducible, it follows from clause (iia) of Subjunctive Mood that (D) is unassertible.  
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took arsenic, that he is showing those symptoms because he took arsenic, which has has-and-such 
effects.35 
 Can Subjunctive Mood also explain why many have thought that the conditionals of 
deliberation are subjunctives? We must at this stage tread very carefully. For if the suggestion is that 
Subjunctive Mood makes weak subjunctives useful in practical deliberation by encouraging us to 
consider the causal consequences of our hypothetical actions, then it will be difficult to avoid 
straying into vexed debates in the theory of rational decision making.36 Still, reflecting on the causal 
consequences of our actions needn’t be useful for us because (say) it gives us the best possible 
decision procedure. Rather, reflecting upon those consequences may be helpful because it draws 
attention to what we might (hypothetically) be morally responsible for. Indeed, it is difficult to imagine 
a concept of moral responsibility that is not in any way sensitive to the presence or absence of our 
actions’ causal profiles.37  
 I also want to argue that Rewind is an important constraint on strong subjunctives, given 
the role that they have in action evaluation. Suppose that you have missed your 15:15 train, because 
at 15:00, you went to your favourite coffee shop for a quick fix, where a large queue and a 
mismanaged order kept you behind for too long. Was that decision a mistake? Should you feel 
regret?  
It depends. Suppose that just before 15:00, it was incredibly unlikely that the train would run. 
For instance, we might suppose that the on-board computer system was hacked, and that the odds 
of removing the malware in time were very low. However, the technician gets lucky: at 15:00, the 
odds of a running 15:15 skyrocket to their normal middling levels. In this situation, it seems 
somewhat irrational to feel foolish about your decision. Within the scope of the supposition that 
you did not go for coffee at 15:00, you adduce the belief that, just before 15:00, the odds of a 
running train were very low. You then reason to the belief that you would have most likely been 
late, cold, and coffeeless (rather than late, warmed up from the walk, and sipping on some great 
 
35 We should note two things at this stage. First, the indicative’s permissive Ramsey Test explains why the 
indicative version of the above conditional sounds marked in this context: it brings nothing new to the 
table, whereas the weak subjunctive’s assertability condition forces reflection upon an explanatory 
relationship. Second, we should record the curious case of mixed indicative-weak subjunctives, which, as 
Fogelin (1967, pp.19-20) notes, are also well-suited to reasoning by IBE: 
 
(E) If he took arsenic, he would be showing these very symptoms.  
 
A reasonable hypothesis about these odd conditionals is that they emerged to help us cope with the 
awkwardness of past-directed subjunctives, and (hence) are subject to Subjunctive Mood.  
36 As (e.g.) Lewis (1981) and Edgington (2011) do.  
37 Although see Carolina Sartorio (2007) for the difficulties and subtleties involved in making this 
connection interesting and plausible.  
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coffee, as you actually are). Not so if you instead adduce the belief that, at 15:00, the odds of a 
running train were decent: in that case, you would reason to its being pretty likely that you would 
get onto the train, and hence be warm, though coffeeless. This might make your action seem 
regrettable or foolish, when intuitively it was not.  
Aside from these functional considerations, some linguistic data suggests Rewind. Vishnu 
is annoyed, because James did not go to Emma’s wedding ceremony, only to the reception. He 
tells James: 
 
(55) # If you had come to the ceremony, then since you would have come to the 
reception, you would have made Emma really happy! 
 
There is something a bit marked about (55): specifically, about the use of ‘since’, which suggests 
that James’ counterfactually going to the reception was a given. Intuitively, however, it isn’t a given. 
Rewind predicts this: even though Vishnu is certain that James went to the reception, he cannot 
simply adduce this belief when he is evaluating (55), because it concerns a time after the antecedent 
time.  
 
2.6.5 Goodman’s Problem of Cotenability  
 
I now want to turn to some difficulties for my theory. The first one is shared by just about anybody 
who ventures some thoughts about conditionals: it is Goodman’s (1955) problem of cotenability. 
The second problem – or, rather, family of problems – affect the proposal that strong subjunctives 
are subject to Rewind. I will turn to those problems in the next section, after making some brief 
points in connection with the problem of cotenability.  
When Goodman (1955, pp. 9-16) was searching for truth-conditions for counterfactual 
conditionals, he struggled to discern which propositions to bundle together with the antecedent. 
It was supposed to be from this bundle of antecedent and auxiliary propositions that the 
consequent would (not necessarily logically) follow, IFF the counterfactual was true. The problem 
of finding the right auxiliary propositions is the problem of cotenability.38  
 In the present setting, where our concern is assertability conditions, the problem of 
cotenability is the problem of adducible propositions.  I have suggested that adducible propositions 
 
38 More specifically, in the arena of truth-conditions, it is the problem of avoiding what Goodman (1955, 
p.15) ultimately felt forced to do: appealing to the very notion of counterfactuality in specifying the 
propositions in the bundle. Goodman introduced the term ‘co-tenable’ to mark the bundled propositions 
which are not such that, had the antecedent been true, they would have bene false.  
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are subsets of our certain beliefs. Which subsets they are depends upon the conditional in question: 
whilst all conditionals are subject to Maintain Consistency, only strong subjunctives are subject to 
Rewind. But those constraints do not solve the problem of cotenability.  
 My theory does handle some problematic conditionals pretty well. Consider the following 
example from Goodman (1955, p.14), said of match that was never struck: 
 
(56) If that match had been struck, it would have lit.  
 
For Goodman, the difficulty was to find a rule which generated a bundle of propositions that 
would make (56) come out true. This bundle could not contain, for instance, the proposition that 
the match was wet, but it should contain the proposition that the match was dry. My theory tells 
us that we may adduce <the match was dry> only if we believe this for certain, in which case we 
may not adduce <the match was wet>. In this scenario, then, the epistemological problem of 
cotenability is solved. But what about if we are unsure that the match was dry? Again, I think that 
the theory gets us the right results: (56) comes out unassertible. Without that proposition, we are 
simply not in any position to assert that the match would have lit, within the scope of the 
supposition that the match had been struck.  
 It should be noted that this problem arises for indicatives too: 
 
(57) If that match is struck, it will light. 
 
This conditional is also unassertible, given uncertainty about the match being dry. Indeed, I think 
that the epistemological problem of cotenability is a quite general one. Whether all conditionals also 
face this problem qua problem about their truth conditions depends upon at least two things: first, 
upon whether all conditionals have truth conditions, and second, upon whether there is a tight 
connection between the assertability and truth conditions of all conditionals. But that is not a topic 
that I could hope to get into now.  
  Generally speaking, when an uncertain proposition R is made salient during the course of 
our attempting to apply the Ramsey Test, it seems to me as though the supposition that P 
decomposes into two different suppositions: that of P&R, and that of P&¬R. If the consequent, 
<Q>, is unassertible within the scope of either, or in one, then the conditional ‘P > Q’ is also 
unassertible. And it is tempting to say that the conditional would be assertible if <Q> is assertible 
within the scope of both. However, one might worry about that suggestion, given the fact that 
there will be many an uncertain proposition which could itself decompose the suppositions that 
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P&R and that P&¬R, if it were to be made salient. I do not know how to respond to this difficulty, 
other than with the timid suggestion that assertability within the scope of suppositions may be 
relativized to salient propositions.   
 The decomposing of suppositions also occurs, I believe, when Maintain Consistency 
determines that some proposition must go, but there seems to be no principled way of choosing 
which. Goodman’s example is that of a subjunctive whose antecedent is <Jones was in Carolina 
at its formation>. Suppose that we are certain about the following:  <Jones was not in South 
Carolina at its formation>, <Jones was not in North Carolina at its formation>, <North Carolina 
plus South Carolina is identical with Carolina >. Which proposition must go? The contest is 
naturally between the first two, but it would be arbitrary to side with either. In that case, the 
supposition decomposes into that of <Jones was in South Carolina at its formation> and that of 
<Jones was in North Carolina at its formation>. The conditional is then assertible if its consequent 
may be asserted within the scope of both.39 
 
2.6.6 Lewis 1979    
 
In his 1979 paper, Lewis proposes and then rejects a theory that is somewhat similar to Rewind. 
Although a detailed comparison of these theories would take us too far afield, we can nonetheless 
draw on Lewis’ discussion, which suggests some important questions for my theory.   
 The theory which Lewis (1979, 462) briefly considers provides a truth-condition for strong 
subjunctives. The truth condition interprets strong subjunctives as being about possible worlds. 
Where P is entirely about some stretch of time, t, the strong subjunctive ‘P → Q’ is said to be 
true IFF every possible world in which (i) P obtains, and which (ii) is exactly like the actual world 
at all times before a short transition period that begins before t, and which (iii) conforms to the 
actual laws of nature at all times after t, is also a possible world in which Q obtains. 
Whilst there are many differences between this theory and Rewind, the important similarity 
lies in the thought that the antecedent time determines which worlds or propositions are 
“bundled” together with the antecedent. This idea can be expressed in all sorts of theoretically 
inflected ways but it is, at its core, a familiar one. The phenomenology of strong subjunctive 
thinking often does suggest that, when we suppose the antecedent of a strong subjunctive, we 
“think back” to what actually occurred just before the antecedent’s time and, from a time slice in 
 
39 Why does it seem just obvious that we should keep <North Carolina plus South Carolina is identical with 
Carolina > on-board? For the same reason that we should keep <the Riemann hypothesis is false>, if we 
are certain that it is false: a reason that we will get to in the next chapter. 
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that vicinity, develop the supposition in a forward-looking direction. The question is about the 
extent to which we can work this intuitive thought into the truth or assertability conditions of 
conditionals.   
One important difference between Lewis’ theory and Rewind is that Lewis (1979) allows 
for a transition period that begins shortly before the antecedent’s time. If I were to build some 
such transition period into Rewind, then not every pre-antecedent-time belief would be adducible 
within a suppositions scope, even once Maintain Consistency had done its thing. But Lewis was 
motivated to postulate this transition period because he thought there would be ‘abrupt 
discontinuities’ without it: ‘Right up to t, the match was stationary and a foot away from the striking 
surface. If it had been struck at t, would it have travelled a foot in no time at all?’ (Lewis, 1979, 
p.463) Does Rewind therefore commit me to the absurd conclusion that, upon supposing that the 
match was struck at t, adducible is our belief that, at some slightly earlier time, the match was a 
foot away from the striking surface?  
It does not. I have said that when we suppose the antecedent of a strong subjunctive, we 
may draw on any belief that concerns a pre-antecedent time, provided we retain consistency. We 
suppose that the match was struck at t4. But even thought <at t3, the match was a foot away from 
a striking surface> concerns a pre-antecedent time, some of our other beliefs are rich enough for 
it to be ousted by Maintain Consistency. One such belief concerns ordinary objective impossibility 
of a matches being struck the merest moment after being a foot away from a striking surface: <at 
t2, it was impossible for the match was a foot away from a striking surface at t3, and to be struck 
at t4>. Given the alethicity of objective modality, it follows that either the t3 belief, about the 
match being far from the striking surface, or the earlier t2 modal belief, has got to go.  
At this point, we are engaging in backtracking reasoning. And I think that a plausible 
constraint on backtracking reasoning, at least for strong subjunctives, is the following: 
 
Roll Back: For any strong subjunctive, ‘P → Q’, if two certain beliefs, <R> and 
<S>, are inconsistent with <P>, where <R> and <S> and <P> make reference 
to t1, t2, and t3 respectively, then when any s develops the supposition that P, 
unadducible within its scope is t2.  
 
The idea behind Roll Back is simple: at least in so far as strong subjunctives are concerned, Maintain 
Consistency is immune to the problem of cotenability when there is a temporal difference between 
beliefs that satisfy Rewind. At this point, consistency is maintained time slice by time slice, going 
backwards in the temporal order. That, I claim, just is strong subjunctive backtracking. And in 
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Lewis example, it makes us remove the belief that, at t3, the match was a foot away from the 
striking surface.  
Of course, that just creates another abrupt discontinuity, between the match’s being a foot 
away from the striking surface at t2 and its being mysteriously close to the surface at t3. But then 
Roll Back and Maintain Consistency kick in again: for the “abrupt discontinuity” is simply, in my view, 
an artefact of the fact that we believed, at some yet earlier time t1, that it was impossible for the 
match to be far away from the striking surface at t2, but then suddenly close to the surface at t3. 
So, we may no longer adduce the belief that, at t2, the match was far away from the striking surface, 
preserving our earlier modal belief. This process continues until we are satisfied that we have 
avoided inconsistency. How far back we have to go before we have eliminated inconsistency in 
this way depends upon the content of the supposition in question.  
It seems undeniable to me that our ordinary beliefs about objective modality play a crucial 
role in backtracking reasoning. Indeed, I would say that backtracking revisions to our pre-
antecedent beliefs are often simply illegitimate, within the scope of a supposition, unless a problem 
of logical inconsistency can only be resolved by altering an ordinary necessity or impossibility 
beliefs. Consider, for instance, an example discussed by Lewis (1979, p.456): 
 
Jim and Jack quarrelled yesterday, and Jack is still hopping mad. We conclude that if Jim 
asked Jack for help today, Jack would not help him. But wait: Jim is a prideful fellow. He 
never would ask for help after such a quarrel; if Jim were to ask Jack for help today, there 
would have to have been no quarrel yesterday. In that case Jack would be his usual 
generous self. So if Jim asked Jack for help today, Jack would help him after all.  
 
There is only one way for this last strong subjunctive to be true, given the information we have: 
before the argument took place yesterday, it was impossible for Jim and Jack to argue yesterday, 
and for Jim to ask Jack for help today. If that was, indeed, an impossibility, then upon supposing 
that Jim asks Jack for help today, Maintain Consistency and Roll Back require that we backtrack to an 
earlier time slice, yesterday, and remove the belief that an argument took place. In so doing, we 
preserve our belief about some still earlier time slice: that the day before yesterday, it was 
impossible for Jim and Jack to argue yesterday, and for Jim to ask Jack for help today. 
Why did Lewis not anticipate the above response to the problem of abrupt discontinuities? 
Why, indeed, did he not consider seeing these discontinuities as glitches in the modal matrix? For 
the same reason, I conjecture, that Lewis wanted to accommodate certain judgments about 
backtracking strong subjunctives which are, in my view, faulty: Lewis inhabits a philosophical 
perspective that downplays our ordinary modal notions. I will not speculate as to whether this is 
mainly due to Lewis’ Humeanism, or to a preoccupation with the more exotic “modal” notions. 
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And I do not wish to suggest that Lewis’ concerns about our ordinary modal notions are not well-
founded. Objective impossibilities and necessities and contingencies are mysterious things indeed. 
But these notions also occupy a special, central role in our ordinary thinking about the world, 
including our ordinary, subjunctive thinking about the world. 
Lewis (1979, p.464) discuses a few other problems for the (1979) theory. One is that some 
strong subjunctive antecedents are not about specific times: ‘If kangaroos had had no tails...’ But 
these antecedents are just incomplete. In order to be properly evaluated, they must be precisified. 
And their incompleteness afflicts all conditionals, not just strong subjunctives. You ask we what 
happened to kangaroos if, at one point in their evolutionary history, they had no tails. I can then 
pick some arbitrary time, or simply ask you for more temporal information.  
 Another problem for the (1979, p.464) theory is provided by strong subjunctives that are 
about time travel. If, at t5 I had gone back in time to strike the match at t3, it would have lit at t4. 
That seems right. How does Rewind handle it? Perfectly fine, although it shows us just how hard it 
is to evaluate time travel strong subjunctives. Presumably, it was impossible at some still earlier 
time, t2, for me to go back in time, at t5, to strike the match at t3. So, that modal belief has to go. 
But was that impossibility merely contingent at some yet earlier time, t1? If not, then it was 
necessary at t1 that, at t2, for me to go back in time, at t5, to strike the match at t3. So, the t1 modal 
belief has got to go. How much further back do we have to get, before we can adduce our prior 
beliefs? And how many of those beliefs would be left standing within the scope of our supposition? 
Possibly very few: there is a reason why most people don’t torture themselves in an attempt to 




In this chapter, I have argued that the morphological and functional differences between 
conditionals are both correlated with differences in their assertability conditions. Although many 
questions remain unanswered, I hope to have shed some light on these constructions, and on their 
relationship to suppositions. We are now better placed to begin theorising about the functions of 















































In Chapter 1, I argued that an investigation into the similarities and differences between ordinary 
and philosophical objective modalizing would do well to focus on the neglected issue of modal 
function. After having spent a good deal of time investigating the closely related matter of 
conditionals and suppositions in Chapter 2, we are now in a position to begin our functional 
theorising in earnest. But where to start? 
 In Section 1, I will introduce what I call the Toulminian Programme, which is named after its 
first, and arguably only, serious exponent: Stephen Toulmin (1958). Toulmin’s insight was that 
different kinds of ordinary modals – objective, subjective, deontic – all play remarkably similar roles 
in our practical and theoretical deliberations: the crucial Toulminian thought being that ordinary 
modals are used to demarcate what does and does not get (further) deliberated about. After 
providing some theoretical motivation for functional unity in our ordinary modalizing, I will 
introduce Toulmin’s work on ordinary modals, before showing that his functional hypotheses have 
been echoed in the writings of several contemporary thinkers. That ought to give the Toulminian 
Programme some plausibility, which I then reinforce by addressing some methodological 
questions for the Programme. 
 In Section 2, I will introduce what I call the Millian Programme. This Programme has 
developed a remark of J. S. Mill’s (1891) into a serious and sophisticated account of the function 
of certain philosophical modals: the key idea being that A-necessity modals function to induce a 
disposition to accord their prejacent a special status, within the development of any C-supposition 
whatever. I will comment on some recent incarnations of the Millian Programme, suggesting some 
minor amendments.  
Finally, in Section 3, I address the issue of how to bring these Programmes into accord. I 
suggest that we ought to focus our attention on those C-suppositions which are directed towards 
practical and theoretical deliberation. We should then investigate the roles that different modals 
have in structuring these goal-directed C-suppositions: both with respect to what is C-supposed, and 
with respect to what is adduced within their scope.  
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3.1 The Toulminian Programme  
 
The same word, like ‘can’ and ‘must’, can express different modal notions: subjective, objective, 
deontic. These different uses nonetheless have remarkably similar functions – or so argued 
Stephen Toulmin in The Uses of Argument (1958). Unfortunately, the Toulminian Programme was 
never developed beyond a somewhat programmatic (!) stage. It deserves better than that. In this 
section, I will motivate, describe, and defend this neglected approach to the function of ordinary 
modals.  
 
3.1.1 Motivating Functional Unity   
 
After providing a story about the function of propositional knowledge ascriptions, Craig (1990, 
pp.140-162) felt compelled to extend his account so that it may cover ascriptions of abilative 
knowledge, knowledge by acquaintance, and linguistic knowledge. Why? Because the pattern that 
can be observed with the English word ‘knows’ – in which the same word is used to ascribe 
different kinds of knowledge – is replicated, with respect to translations of ‘knows’, across a wide 
range of (un)connected languages.  
The situation is much the same with modals. Cross-linguistic analysis suggests that many 
languages have a group of words, which roughly translate to English language modals like ‘can’ 
and ‘must’, wherein each word may express several different meanings, or a single meaning that 
possesses a highly context-sensitive parameter (on this issue, see Viebahn & Vetter (2017)). On 
one occasion, ‘can’ expresses objective possibility. On another, subjective possibility. On yet 
another, deontic permissibility. Is functional unity therefore a prima facie desideratum in the theory 
of modal function?  
Although Craig never tells us why the linguistic data supports his methodological 
assumption, it isn’t too difficult to image an argument to this effect. In the first instance, notice 
that if many languages have one word, ‘W’, which can express <F> or <G> or <H>, then there 
can’t be anything too disadvantageous about this system. After all, if it were too disadvantageous, it 
wouldn’t be so prevalent. And if the uses of ‘W’ which express different concepts have similar 
functions, then this would go towards explaining why the system isn’t too disadvantageous: for 
then not much could go wrong, if one were to incorrectly interpret a tokening of ‘W’ as expressing 
(say) <F> rather than <G>.  
But how, exactly, does a word with several, similar functions come to express different 
concepts? Here is a sketch. Recall the Millikan (2005)-inspired conception of function that we 
 84 
encountered in the previous chapter: that the function of a linguistic construction in a community 
is the effect that its utterance has on the members of that community which explains why the 
construction is reproduced. Now suppose that, at first, ‘W’ is reproduced because its effect on the 
population is E1. After some time, however, subtle variations begin to emerge in this effect, so 
that ‘W’, when uttered in situation S1, gets reproduced because it has effect E1, and when uttered in 
situation S2, gets reproduced because it has effect E2.  
Now since ‘W’ is reproduced in this way for a while, it must be doing something useful for 
the population which produces it, often enough. So, it would make sense that certain norms would 
arise with respect to ‘W’, norms which: (i) discouraged the predication (say) of ‘W’ to anything 
which is neither S1 nor S2; (ii) encouraged those who assent to ‘x is W’ in S1 to bring about E1; (iii) 
encouraged those who assent to ‘x is W’ in S2 to bring about E2. In this situation, we might be 
seeing the emergence of two concepts, <F> and <G>, whose “acquisition” or “truth” or 
“assertability” conditions are, respectively, S1 and S2. 
I therefore think that we should expect some degree of functional similarity in our ordinary 
modalizing. And Toulmin found exactly that. In what follows, I will draw extensively on Toulmin’s 
writings to determine his functional hypotheses. I will then show that similar hypotheses have 
been endorsed, in some form or another, by several contemporary authors.  
 
3.1.2 Modals and Deliberation  
 
Toulmin’s suggestions about the function of modals occupy an early chapter of The Uses of Argument 
(1958) The matter of modal function is therefore nor the primary focus of Toulmin’s project. But 
in spite of his more expansive agenda, Toulmin leaves us with some valuable clues about modal 
function, clues that we would be unwise to ignore. At the heart of the Toulminian picture lies the 
idea that modals structure our deliberations, which I understand roughly as follows:  
 
Deliberation: An activity in which agents look for, present or assess (putative) 
normative reasons for or against belief – theoretical deliberation – or action – practical 
deliberation – with the intention of resolving (psychological) uncertainty about what 
to believe or what to do. 
 
I will make two brief comments about the above. Firstly, it is my hope that one might appeal to 
the language of reasons without incurring an ontological debt. Indeed, I suspect that appeals to 
reasons can be paraphrased in terms of agents’ concerns about making correct judgments about 
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reasons for action or belief, or in terms of agents treating certain things as reasons for action or 
belief, or something similar. Nevertheless, talking in the material mode is helpful for expository 
purposes.    
Secondly, something must be said about the normative status of normative reasons, and here 
I will allude to a familiar contrast. On the one hand, there are motivating reasons, the reasons for which 
people act and believe in the ways that they do. Thus, my being hungry is the reason for which I 
ate the cake, and my misreading the label is the reason for which I took it to be healthy. On the 
other, there are the normative reasons: reasons in favour of acts or beliefs, which are capable of 
providing justification for actions and beliefs.40 In what follow, ‘reasons’ is elliptical for ‘normative 
reasons’.  
 Now, in looking at Toulmin’s work, we see no explicit mention of deliberation. 
Nevertheless, I believe that an undeniably Toulminian account of modalizing will place deliberation 
at its heart, and that this account, though not explicitly Toulmin’s, is harmlessly attributed to the 
author. After all, Toulmin’s (1958, p.7) interest in modals was contingent on his primary goal of 
understanding the very process of argumentation, which often occurs in a deliberative setting: 
 
Arguments can be compared with law-suits, and the claims we make and argue for in extra-
legal contexts with claims made in the courts, while the cases we present in making good 
each kind of claim can be compared with each other. A main task of jurisprudence is to 
characterise the essentials of the legal process: the procedures by which claims-at-law are 
put forward, disputed and determined, and the categories in terms of which this is done. 
Our own inquiry is a parallel one: we shall aim, in a similar way, to characterise what may 
be called ‘the rational process’, the procedures and categories by using which claims-in-
general can be argued for and settled. 
 
Talk of arguing for and settling claims brings to mind deliberation, and theoretical deliberation at that. 
Indeed, when providing examples of questions which could prompt argumentation, Toulmin 
(1958, pp.16-17) reveals a penchant for theoretical matters:  
 
When will the next eclipse of the moon take place? Who will play in the doubles in the 
American team for the next Davis Cup match? Were there sufficient grounds in law for 
condemning Crippen?’ In these cases, we can formulate clear enough questions. All we 
may be able to do, however, is to ask, less coherently, ‘What are we to think of Sir Kenneth 
Clark’s reassessment of Piero?’ or, ‘How are we to make sense of the phenomenon of 
electrical super-conductivity at extremely low temperatures?’ 
 
And when is concerned with theoretical deliberation, subjective modals take centre stage:  
 
40 Of course, there are deep questions about how these relate to one another. But we needn’t engage with 
these issues here, as everyone is familiar with reasons under the normative guise, so to speak: that stealing is 
wrong is reason in favour of not stealing; that the president incoherently rambles on is reason in favour of 
thinking him inept. These are the reasons that matter for deliberative purposes. 
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These terms—‘possible’, ‘necessary’ and the like—are best understood, I shall argue, by 
examining the functions they have when we come to set out our arguments. To mention 
the first stage first: in dealing with any sort of problem, there will be an initial stage at 
which we have to admit that a number of different suggestions are entitled to be 
considered. They must all, at this first stage, be admitted as candidates for the title of 
‘solution’, and to mark this we say of each of them, ‘It may (or might) be the case that....’ 
At this stage, the term ‘possibility’ is properly at home, [...]: to speak of a particular 
suggestion as a possibility is to concede that it has a right to be considered.41  (Toulmin, 
1958, p.17) 
 
What we have from Toulmin, then, is a suggestion about the function of subjective possibility 
modals. It receives a slightly different formulation elsewhere in the text (Toulmin, 1958, p.34):    
 
In order for a suggestion to be a ‘possibility’ in any context [...] it must ‘have what it takes’ 
in order to be entitled to genuine consideration in that context. To say [...] ‘Such-and-such 
is a possible answer to our question’, is to say that, bearing in mind the nature of the 
problem concerned, such-and-such an answer deserves to be considered. 
 
The core of the proposal seems clear enough: the language of subjective possibility functions to 
recommend a proposition for consideration. However, Toulmin is never explicit about what 
consideration amounts to, which forces the Toulminian to attempt a characterisation of theoretical 
consideration that is faithful to the spirit of Toulmin’s writings. I have settled for the following:  
 
Theoretical Consideration: When an agent theoretically considers <P>, they look for, 
present or assess (putative) epistemic reasons for or against believing <P>, with the 
intention of resolving uncertainty as to believing <P>. 
 
On the account so far, then, an assertion of subjective possibility functions to prompt the theoretical 
consideration of its prejacent. And consistent with this functional hypothesis is the suggestion that 
subjective impossibility modals function to stop the theoretical consideration of a proposition:  
 
taking into account everything of whose relevance we are aware, we may still not find any 
one conclusion unequivocally pointed to as the one to accept. [...] We may at any rate be 
able to dismiss certain of the suggestions initially admitted to the ranks of ‘possibilities’ as 
being, in the light of our other information, no longer deserving of consideration: ‘After 
all,’ we say, ‘it cannot be the case that such-and-such.’ One of the original suggestions, that 
is, may turn out after all to be inadmissible. In such a situation further modal terms find a 
natural use – ‘cannot’, ‘impossible’, and the like.  (Toulmin, 1958, p.20) 
 
41 Notice that paradigmatic expressions of subjective possibility employ the word ‘might’. Moreover, if P 
really is worth considering, then it isn’t enough for it to be objectively possible, since it can be the case both 
that P is objectively possible and that P doesn’t obtain. 
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But there is more to Toulmin’s theory than subjective modality and theoretical consideration. 
Toulmin also discusses practical deliberation, deliberation about what to do. This occurs when 
Toulmin (1958, p.23) writes about ‘cannot’:  
 
Your physique being what it is, you can’t lift that weight single- handed—to attempt to do 
so would be vain’; ‘The bye-laws being as they are, you can’t smoke in this compartment, 
Sir—to do so would be a contravention of them and/or an offence against your fellow 
passengers. 
 
In these examples, Toulmin the modals are naturally as expressing objective impossibility and 
deontic impermissibility or impropriety. And with this change of focus comes a different 
suggestion about modal language, one which centres not on ‘claims’, but on actions (Toulmin, 1958, 
p.27): 
 
But the common implication of all these statements, marked by the use of the word 
‘cannot’, should be clear by now. In each case, the proposition serves in part as an 
injunction to rule out something-or-other—to dismiss from consideration any course of 
action involving this something-or-other— 
 
Notice an important similarity between deontic impermissibility and impossibility modals: all 
function to stop our considering something. Subjective impossibility modals function to halt the 
theoretical consideration of their prejacents. Objective impossibility and deontic impermissibility 
modals halt the practical consideration of the actions which their prejacents describe.  
 
Practical Consideration: When an agent practically considers Fing, they look for, 
present or assess (putative) practical reasons for or against Fing, with the intention of 
resolving uncertainty as to whether to F. 
 
Now, Toulmin (1958, p.19) sometimes slides between practical and theoretical concerns, such as 
in his discussion of the function of ‘necessary’ and its cognates:  
 
At any rate, when we do for once find ourselves in a situation in which the information at 
our disposal points unequivocally to one particular solution, we have our characteristic 
terms with which to mark it. We say that the conclusion ‘must’ be the case, that it is 
‘necessarily’ so – a ‘necessity’ of the appropriate sort. ‘Under the circumstances’, we say, 
‘there is only one decision open to us; the child must be returned to the custody of its 
parents.’ [...] Or again, ‘Considering the dimensions of the sun, moon and earth and their 
relative positions at the time concerned, we see that the moon must be completely obscured 
at that moment.’ 
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Despite these slides, we must take care to notice the differences that have emerged. Whilst all 
‘musts’ function to force the consideration of something when deliberating, the subjective ‘musts’ 
function to force the theoretical consideration of the propositions expressed by their prejacents, 
whilst the deontic and objective ‘musts’ function to force the practical consideration of the actions 
described by their prejacents. That, at any rate, is how I propose to make sense of the differences 
that we find in Toulmin’s descriptions of the subjective and non-subjective cases, where talk of 
‘claims’ are allied with the former, and talk of ‘actions’ with the latter. 
Further inquiry in Chapter 4 will prompt us to revise this simple, bifurcated picture, in 
which objective modals only effect practical deliberation. But it will do us no harm to go forward 
with Toulmin’s original hypotheses in mind, as their simplicity does not belie the crucial 
Toulminian thought: that modals can function to effect what it is that we practically and 
theoretically consider. They are the agenda setters, the tools with which we demarcate the 
boundaries of our deliberations. 
 
3.1.3  Contemporary Support  
 
If a slogan is needed for the Toulminian Programme, then we cannot do much better than a remark 
of Blackburn’s (1993, p.60): ‘We allow possibilities, rule out impossibilities, and insist upon 
necessities.’ And as the offhand nature of Blackburn’s remark suggests, the germ of the Toulminian 
programme is prima facie plausible. Unsurprisingly, then, Blackburn isn’t the only contemporary 
writer with a Toulminian leaning. This is Vetter (2015, p.244): 
 
Knowing that the vase can break (dynamic modality) or not being able to rule out that it 
will break (epistemic modality) both lead to the same result: I will pack the vase safely. A 
child’s knowing that she is unable to do a cartwheel in the classroom (dynamic modality) 
and her knowing that she is not allowed to do a cartwheel in the classroom (deontic 
modality) both have the same result, at least in a rational and obedient child: she will not 
attempt to do a cartwheel in the classroom. Dynamic, deontic, and epistemic modality 
alike play the role of delimiting the space of options in our practical deliberation. Their 
metaphysics may be very diverse, and they may easily come apart in more sophisticated 
deliberation. But the basic function of the different types of modal knowledge is the same. 
 
Vetter’s use of the functional idiom suggests that we are at liberty to side-line the appeal to modal 
knowledge, but maintain the core of her suggestion, that modals function to structure our practical 
deliberations. For Vetter, this is where modals earn their keep, and we can see reminders of 
Toulmin’s position in Vetter’s suggestion about deontic and objective (‘dynamic’) modals. Notice, 
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however, that we also find a complication of the simple Toulminian story: for Vetter, assertions 
of subjective modality effect our practical deliberations.  
 Vetter’s proposal about the function of deontic modals is of a kind with a suggestion of 
Gunnar Björnsson and Stephen Finlay’s (2010). Concerned with the use of deontic ‘ought’-
sentences, during the course of practical deliberation, they write that “ought claims [...] have the 
pragmatic role of recommendations” for action. (Björnsson and Finlay’s, 2010, p.22).  Extending 
the thought, we get the idea that ‘ought not’ has the pragmatic role of discouraging action. Although 
this connection between ‘ought’ and practical deliberation doesn’t exactly match Vetter’s suggestion 
– that the deontic ‘cannot’ supresses, and doesn’t merely discourage, action – the connection to 
practical deliberation stands out in both. Modals can push and shove.  
Inspired by Björnsson and Finlay’s paper, Benjamin Lennertz (2014, p.192) has argued that 
“an assertive utterance of ‘It might be that S’ [...] typically conveys that [the content of S] is a 
serious option in reasoning and deliberation.” Lennertz’s proposal, which concerns subjective 
possibility, can be illustrated with his own compact vignette. Imagine that two people are trying to 
get to the bottom of who ate their cookies. After some time theoretically deliberating the following 
assertion is made: 
 
(1) Angelica might be the thief. 
 
On Lennertz’s (2014, p.191) view, this assertion presents “Angelica’s being the thief as a serious 
option in reasoning and deliberation about the question at hand.” The conveyance can be 
understood in a few different ways (Lennertz, 2014, pp.193-194): 
 
First, an utterance of (1) might be an assertion that it is a serious option that Angelica is the 
thief. Second, an utterance of (1) might offer a recommendation—one to take seriously the 
possibility that Angelica is the thief. Third, an utterance of (1) might be an expression of 
some mental state of taking it as a serious option that Angelica is the thief. 
 
The idea that assertions of subjective possibility function as recommendations to take seriously a 
proposition obviously chimes nicely with Björnsson and Finlay’s suggestion about deontic 
‘oughts’. It is also close to Toulmin’s original proposal about subjective possibility, and Lennertz 
(2014, p.191) does cite Toulmin (1958) as an early proponent of this view.  
Finally, Brett Sherman’s (2018) recent picture of subjective modal discourse is striking in 
its resemblance to Toulmin’s dynamic, inquiry-relative account. Indeed, Sherman provides many 
interesting insights which support the Toulminian account. Consider, for instance, what Sherman 
(2018, p.826) has to say about the word ‘possibility’: 
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imagine that you approach a group of people who are in the middle of a conversation. 
You hear one of the conversational participants say, ‘Well, that’s one possibility.’ What 
information can you glean from overhearing that remark? [...] Among other things, you 
learn that there is some issue or question that is taken to be unsettled, and under 
discussion, by the conversational participants. The issue might be a theoretical one: how 
to explain the double-slit experiment. It might be practical: how to get to the conference 
hotel. It might concern the future: how will climate change affect coastal cities? It might 
concern the past: when did horses first arrive in North America? The utterance reveals 
that a particular answer to an open question of this sort has been proposed, but the 
question has been left on the table. You can infer this simply from the fact that the speaker 
characterises what was proposed as a possibility.  
 
This observation aligns nicely with Toulmin’s description of the first stage of inquiry, in which 
‘possible’ and its cognates is used to forward potential solutions to questions or problems. And 
just like Toulmin, Sherman will argue that the subjective ‘must’ often takes as its prejacent the last 
answer that remains standing, after the others have been disregarded.   
The Toulminian Programme, then, seems well worth pursuing. A unified account of the 
function of ordinary modals is desirable, and Toulmin’s picture is the closest that we have come 
to some such account. Moreover, within contemporary circles, a Toulminian sensitivity to the 
functional unity of modalizing is slowly emerging, one that has evolved largely independently of 
Toulmin’s work. But before committing to this programme, something must be said about the 
Toulminian methodology: about the aspiration to view modals as devices which function to 
structure our practical and theoretical deliberations, and about the manner in which we are to 
detect the functions of modals. I turn to these issues next.  
 
3.1.4  Circularity Concerns  
 
I have described deliberation as an activity in which agents look for, present or assess (putative) 
normative reasons for or against belief or action, with the intention of resolving uncertainty with 
respect to what to believe or what to do. Some may have noticed, however, that at least two 
circularity worries might be raised by this definition.  
 The first circularity worry is triggered by analyses of reasons in terms of deliberation, like 
that proposed by Jonathan Way (2015). After all, if an analysis of this kind is correct, then my 
characterisation of deliberation becomes less informative, on account of including in its analysans 
a concept that can only be analysed in terms of the analysandum. But although this conditional is 
no doubt true, I find myself rather unperturbed. After all, the antecedent is not a given; and even 
if it were, it would not follow that my characterisation of deliberation is uninformative, as the appeal 
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to reasons doesn’t exhaust what I say about this phenomenon. Moreover, in providing this rough-
and-ready characterisation of deliberation, I did not aim to give an original or insightful account 
of deliberation. My intention was rather to fix our ideas on an important and relevant 
phenomenon, and it is hardly obvious that circular analyses are unfit for that purpose.  
The second circularity worry is of greater concern. This worry is rooted in an important 
Toulminian desideratum: that our conception of deliberation does not make reference to modalizing 
itself. After all, on the Toulminian story, we have been placing the use of modal terms within the 
activity of deliberation, with the aim of showing how the deployment of this vocabulary functions 
to facilitate or shape the deliberative enterprise. But this presupposes that deliberation can be 
characterised without reference to modalizing itself, which is not obviously the case. I have spoken 
of deliberation as being animated by the intention to resolve uncertainty about what to believe or 
do. But in talking about resolving uncertainty about what to believe or do, it is tempting to describe 
this mind-set as a concern to determine what one ought to believe or do. And if that is indeed what 
this mind-set reduces to, then we cannot hope to purge deliberation of modalizing.  
 These are large and delicate issues that I cannot hope to resolve here. One thing that seems 
worth mentioning, however, is that I am not alone in my suspicions about an ought-centric 
conception of the deliberative mind-set. For instance, Björnsson and Finlay (2010, p.16) suggest 
that: 
‘agents’ fundamental concerns in deliberating are to promote and protect certain values or 
things that matter to them, and not simply to determine the correct answers to particular 
ought questions 
 
Going a little further in the same direction, I propose that we drop the concern with modal 
questions altogether. When practically deliberating, we are aiming to make a decision about our 
future actions, in such a way that those actions align with that which we value or desire. And when 
we are theoretically deliberating, our fundamental concern is not to determine the correct answer to 
the question of what to believe. Rather, our fundamental concern is to form beliefs that are true, 
and perhaps even justified – or so I would suggest, following Christopher Hookway (1999, pp.380-
381):  
 
Deliberation can be carried out well or poorly; and in general, we hope that if our 
deliberations are carried out well, they will lead to true justified beliefs. In this respect, 
individual deliberation is analogous to public inquiry in which we attempt to reach the 
truth through discussion, experimentation and other investigative techniques. 
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With that, I end this discussion of the circularity worry (noting also that when I speak of practical 
and theoretical deliberation, I have in mind its solo- and multi-agent forms). I now turn to another 
methodological issue: that of how, exactly, we are to detect the functions of modals. 
 
3.1.5  Detecting Functions 
 
Toulmin was prescient in his perception of functional unity amongst modals. But Toulmin didn’t 
simply state his account of modal function: he also wished to defend it, by inferring modal functions 
from the kinds of behaviours which, given on one’s assent to some modal declarative, would 
typically, and prima facie correctly, be apt to elicit certain normative judgments from an invested 
onlooker (for want of a better term, I will call this the normative data). I now want to explore this 
aspect of Toulmin’s work, and to provide it with a little more theoretical underpinning. 
What justifies these inferences from normative judgments to function? In Chapter 2, I 
argued that if certain hypotheses about the functions of different conditionals are true, then 
different conditionals would acquire certain presuppositions, which would themselves explain 
those judgments of (in)felicity that are provoked by the assertion of these conditionals in various 
contexts. And in the context of that discussion, I drew on Millikan’s (2005) view of function in 
order to justify this inference to the best explanation. I propose to do the same thing here. 
Consider, for instance, Toulmin (1958, p.18) on subjective impossibility modals:  
 
Suppose, for instance, that a man is required to defend some claim he has made; that a 
counter-suggestion is made to him, and he replies, ‘That is not possible’; and yet that he 
proceeds on the spot to pay close attention to this very suggestion [...] with the air of one 
who regards the suggestion as entitled to his respectful consideration. If he behaves in 
such a manner, does he not thereby lay himself open to a charge of inconsistency, or 
perhaps of frivolity? He says that this suggestion is not possible, yet he treats it as possible. 
 
The basic Toulminian idea is that if x assents to <IMPSP>, then x would be judged inconsistent or 
frivolous for proceeding to theoretically consider <P>. It is from this inconstancy data that Toulmin 
infers that subjective impossibility modals function to halt the theoretical consideration of their 
prejacents.42  
 
42 This inconsistency data – and I do think that we are dealing with inconsistency in the case of subjective 
impossibility modals, not frivolity – may appear to be subject to an important exception, which must be 
mentioned at the outset. When one is asked to justify one’s assent to <IMPSP>, then the only way forward 
is to look for, present or assess (putative) epistemic reasons for or against believing <P>. However, one is 
not doing so with the intention of resolving uncertainty as to believing <P>, but rather with the intention 
of persuading the interlocutor to one’s point of view. So, when we look for, present or assess (putative) 
epistemic reasons for or against believing <P> in this context, we are not theoretically considering <P>. 
This is an important aspect of modalizing quite generally, and it should be born in mind as we proceed to 
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Millikan’s (2005) approach to function can help us to explain why this inference may be 
reliable.  We can imagine that an ancestor to the subjective impossibility modal was reproduced in 
large part because it prompted people to halt the theoretical consideration of its prejacent. Because 
this was useful to us in some way, certain pro and con attitudes began to emerge, with regards to 
this proto-modal: perhaps it became common to call someone irrational if they assented to 
<PROTO-IMPSP> and then theoretically considered <P>. This made it even more likely that 
assertions of <PROTO-IMPSP> were reproduced because they stopped the theoretical 
consideration of <P>. Perhaps the norms of judgment then became even further entrenched, and 
so forth, until we finally reach the modern practise of subjective modalizing.  
Now like any form of IBE, this kind of reasoning is defeasible. Moreover, there is 
something very speculative about the above genealogy of subjective modalizing. We should not, 
however, let that deter us. Every inquiry has to begin from somewhere, and this includes taking 
certain methodologies for granted, at least in the first instance. Perhaps there are other, better ways 
of detecting functions, as well as other, better conceptions of function, than those which we have 
drawn on so far. But this is not intended as the final word on the matter, and so it should not be 
treated as such.43  
Indeed, as with any form of inquiry, improvements and developments in our theoretical 
and methodological backdrop can arise organically, as new situations and problems are countered. 
For example, Toulmin’s (1958, p.18) discussion of subjective possibility modals suggests a modest 
but important distinction amongst linguistic functions:  
 
if when a particular suggestion comes up he says, ‘That is possible’ or ‘That might be the 
case’, and yet does not thereupon pay any attention whatever to the suggestion, a similar 
situation arises: once again he must be ready to defend himself against a charge of 
inconsistency. There will, of course, in suitable cases be a perfectly good defence. He may, 
for instance, have reason to believe that this particular suggestion is one of the more 
remote possibilities, which there will be time enough to consider after we have found 
grounds for dismissing those which at present appear more serious. But, by allowing that 
a particular suggestion is ‘possible’ or ‘a possibility’, he at any rate allows it a claim on his 
attention in due course: to call something ‘possible’ and then to ignore it indefinitely 
without good reason is inconsistent. 
 
Toulmin is suggesting that someone who assents to <POSSP> is inconsistent unless <P> is given 
 
discuss other modals.  
43 Of course, not every behaviour or action that might attract appraisal or criticism is indicative of function. 
It is inconsistent to assert the negation of a subjective impossibility modal claim, right after having assented 
to that very claim. However, blocking the negations of subjective impossibility modal claims is presumably 
not what the assertions of those claims are for. It will be important to bear this general point in mind as we 
go forward. 
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some theoretical consideration. This inconsistency data would indicate that subjective possibility 
modals function to prompt the theoretical consideration of their prejacents. Now, I don’t myself 
think that it is inconsistent for someone to assent to <POSSP> and then to forget about <P>: for 
example, if they believe that P is very unlikely, but nonetheless assert that POSSP, merely in order 
to challenge another person’s assertion that IMPSP. Still, there does seem to be something 
objectionably frivolous about asserting POSSP, not in response to contradictory modal assertion, 
and in a context in which everyone is attempting to answer an open question, but without then 
giving P any thought. What, then, should we say about the function of subjective possibility 
modals?  
It seems to me that we must at this stage distinguish between what I will call negative and 
positive functions. The negative function of an expression is an effect which constitutively interferes 
with another function. Thus, subjective possibility modals have, as negative functions, interference 
with subjective impossibility and necessity modals. For instance, if I assert that IMPSP, and you 
convince me that POSSP, then your assertion that POSSP interfered with the effect that my 
assertion that IMPSP functions to produce: halting the theoretical consideration of <P>. As for 
positive functions, they are simply non-negative functions. And in the case of subjective modals, 
an important positive function is revealed by the frivolity data: the assertion that POSSP functions 
to prompt the theoretical consideration of <P>.  
This contrast is helpful when we think about the function of an impossibility modal. By 
asserting that POSSP, <P> is blocked from entering into our deliberations about what is the case. 
But why is that useful? Well, in part, it is useful because assertions of <P> themselves function to 
prompt certain behaviours, behaviours which are not beneficial if, for instance, P is not the case. 
So, aside from the fact that impossibility modals save us from the wasteful enterprise of 
theoretically deliberating something that is not the case – this can be considered their positive 
function – they also have the negative function of undercutting the functions of their prejacents.44 
 
3.2 The Millian Programme  
 
 
44 It may at this point justly be wondered what distinguishes ordinary impossibility modals from the mere 
denial of their prejacents, and ordinary necessity modals from mere assertion of their prejacents. In a sense, 
that is the mystery of impossibility and necessity, recast as a puzzle about function. What distinguishes 
treating something as false from treating it as impossible, and treating something as true from treating it as 
necessary? What extra ingredient is supplied by the modal judgment? In the next chapter, I will venture a 
tentative answer to this question on behalf of the Toulminian Programme.  
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Having motivated interest in the Toulminian Programme, I now turn to the Millian Programme. I 
call it that out of respect for J. S. Mill (Book III, Chapter v, Section 6), whose important remark – 
‘The necessary, that which must be, means that which will be, whatever supposition we make with 
regard to other things’ – prompted Ian McFetridge (1990, p.150) to begin the Programme in 
earnest. Since the Millian Programme is far more firmly established than the Toulminian 
Programme, I will allow myself to ignore its historical development, focusing instead on its detailed 
implementation in Divers and Elstein (2012) and Divers and González-Varela (2013).  
In Section 3.2.1, I will outline the account of belief in A-necessity that is developed in 
those papers. In so-doing, I will argue against its more complex iteration in Divers and González-
Varela (2013), settling for a middle-ground between those accounts. Then, in Section 3.2.2, I will 
propose a further small change to the resultant proposal, one which is suggested by Divers and 
Elstein. In so-doing, I make a stronger case for the utility of belief in A-necessity. 
 
3.2.1  Belief in A-Necessity  
 
What is the purpose of A-modalizing? The Millian Programme invites us to answer this question 
by turning to the beliefs that our talk of A-necessity functions to co-ordinate: more specifically, by 
turning to the ways in which such beliefs are properly manifest.45 The manifestation condition in 
question involves C-supposition.46 Let us begin with the condition that Divers and Elstein (2012, 
p.127) argue is, for every rational x, both necessary and sufficient for manifesting belief in the A-
necessity of P: 
 
(AN) In aiming at stability-preservation, x is prepared to add <P> as a premise to any 
un-nested C-supposition S.  
 
 
45 Why not begin this story, as Divers and Elstein (2012, p.110) do, with McFetridge’s (1990) central 
concern: the logical modalities? After all, one might quite reasonably be tempted to join Divers and Elstein 
in viewing logical necessity as a subspecies of A-necessity. However, one might also, again quite reasonably, 
be tempted to join Edgington in characterising logical modalizing as a kind of subjective modalizing. In the 
interest of maximising theoretical neutrality, we will therefore approach A-modal belief without prejudging 
the issue of its relationship to the logical case.  
46 In Chapter 2, I argued that C-suppositions are suppositions which function to evidentially support weak 
and strong subjunctive conditionals. Since checking a subjunctive conditional requires the reasoner who 
supposes its antecedent to anticipate and explore explanatory connections, C-suppositions have a different 
and more demanding character than A-suppositions. But although my notion of C-supposition is not 
identical to that found in Divers and Elstein (2012) and in Divers and González-Varela (2013), it is similar 
enough that the differences will often go unnoticed. 
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Two things must immediately be noted about (AN). Firstly, the norm of stability-preservation is 
intended to capture one important respect in which rationally manifesting belief in A-necessity is 
tied to only certain C-suppositions, those for which certain norms of thought (justifiably) hold sway. 
And for a great many C-supposition – though perhaps not for all, such as in the special case of 
reductio proof – proper reasoning from within its scope requires adhering to the norm of stability-
preservation: it to those C-suppositions that manifesting belief in A-necessity is rationally tied. The 
norm in question instructs us not to add, to our C-supposed and stable {<S>}, any <P> which 
would render {<S>, <P>} unstable, where the instability of a set of propositions consists in its 
having an arbitrary proposition as a consequence. (Divers and Elstein, 2012, p.116) 
Secondly, the requirement that the C-supposition be un-nested is absolutely crucial in guarding 
against the fact that many a believer in the A-necessity of P will not be prepared to add <P> as a 
premise to any C-supposition simpliciter. Consider, for instance, the Kripkean modalizer who, 
despite believing in the A-necessity of Socrates’ being human, is disposed not to add <Socrates is 
human> as a premise to those C-suppositions which themselves occur within the A-supposition of 
(say) <Socrates is not human>. (Divers and Elstein, 2012, pp.124-125) 
The above qualifications insulate (AN) from unproductive criticism. More positively, 
Divers and Elstein (2012, p.125) argue that (AN) is necessary for manifesting belief in the A-
necessity of P, via an appeal to the widespread acceptance of (the left-to-right direction of) 
Unrestricted Invariance: P is A-necessary IFF S (S → P). Their argument, reconstructed, runs as 
follows:  
 
(I) For all rational x: If x believes that it is A-necessary that P, then for every S, x will 
be prepared to believe <S → P>.  
(II) For all rational x: For every S, if x is prepared to believe <S → P>, then in aiming 
at stability-preservation, x will also be prepared to add <P> as a premise to any 
un-nested C-supposition S.  
(III) Therefore, for all rational x: If x believes that it is A-necessary that P, then in aiming 
at stability-preservation, x is prepared to add <P> as a premise to any un-nested 
C-supposition S.47 
 
47 This proposed relationship between Unrestricted Invariance and C-supposition does give us reason to pause, 
and to consider its connection to the view, advanced in the previous chapter, that subjunctive conditionals 
come in two forms. For given my picture of C-supposition as a directed activity, one which can have both 
weak and strong subjunctives as objects, and which is subject to different constraints in accordance with 
the kind of subjunctive that it is directed towards, it follows that the crucial premiss (II) may well be false, 
given counterexamplery C-suppositions that are directed towards weak subjunctives only. Now this premise 
could, of course, be salvaged: for instance, by augmenting Unrestricted Invariance so that it covers all 
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Something very much like (AN) is therefore well-motivated, in light of the core idea that drives so 
much contemporary theorising about A-necessity. The proposal is then further developed in 
Divers and González-Varela (2013, pp.387-388), where (MAN) replaces (AN), and is advanced 
alongside (ACQ), a necessary and sufficient acquisition condition for belief in the A-necessity of P: 
 
(ACQ) (i) x believes that P and x finds herself [(ii) able to A-suppose that P and 
(iii) unable subsequently to C-suppose that not-P]. 
(MAN) (i) x believes that P and (ii) for all S, such that x finds herself [(ii) able to 
A-suppose P and (iii) subsequently to C-suppose that S] x is prepared to 
add <P> as a premise in reasoning from the C-supposition that S. 
 
Now there are several things to note about (ACQ) and (MAN). The first is that they are intended 
to be rationally interdependent: a rational x satisfies (ACQ) IFF x satisfies (MAN). The second is that 
(ACQ) and (MAN) are implicitly restricted to the proper acquisition and manifestation of belief in 
A-necessity, where propriety is partly a matter of these acquisition and manifestations conditions 
being canonical and, at least in the case of (ACQ), of the best possible kind. The third is that (ACQ) 
and (MAN) are implicitly restricted to the development of suppositions that are (intended to be) 
rational, where this involves the intention to preserve stability, as in Divers and Elstein (2012), but 
also to avoid loss of content: upon supposing <S>, our subsequently attending to <S> within the 
scope of that supposition must not be confused with our subsequently attending to some <S>-
seeming counterfeit. In the case of (ACQ), these conditions are (amongst) those that must be met, 
in order for someone to count as having successfully developed a supposition. If some x finds that 
she cannot develop the C-supposition that ¬P without loss of content or instability, then she finds 
herself unable to develop that supposition. She thereby satisfies condition (iii) in (ACQ). (Divers 
and González-Varela, 2013, p.371) 
 It is also noteworthy that (ACQ) and (MAN) involve explicit mention of A-supposition, 
in condition (ii). This has the effect of guarding against the cases that motivated Divers and 
Elstein’s (2012) appeal to un-nested C-supposition. But it also introduces the need for condition 
 
subjunctive conditionals, and not just counterfactuals. And in light of the twin facts that many have glossed 
over the distinction between weak and strong subjunctives when discussing “counterfactuals” and A-
necessity, and that all subjunctives share an important assertability condition, this augmentation would 
certainly not be unmotivated. Indeed, so as to simplify inquiry, it is to this revised version of Unrestricted 
Invariance that I will henceforth refer. But I do not thereby deny possibility of hidden difficulties for this 
approach, difficulties which should perhaps prompt the Millian Programme to restrict its attention to the 
C-suppositions that specifically pertain to strong subjunctives.  
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(i): for conditions (ii) and (iii) are jointly satisfied by belief in the A-impossibility of P as well. For 
example, the Kripkean, who believes in the A-impossibility of Aristotle’s not being human, is 
perfectly able to A-suppose that Aristotle is not human, and within the scope of that supposition, 
is unable to develop the supposition that Aristotle is a human. Extensional adequacy is restored 
once we add to (ACQ) the belief condition (i).  
 But I am sceptical about condition (ii), as it seems to get the phenomenology of belief 
acquisition wrong: it strikes me as inaccurate to describe my beliefs in A-necessity as having been 
reached via (ii). Divers and González-Varela (2013, p.375) do address this concern, suggesting that 
we may often overlook a conventional attitude of A-supposing that which we believe, unless asked 
to do otherwise. However, it seems unlikely that some such convention is actually in place. In the 
first instance, it would appear to be both cognitively redundant and demanding. Moreover, in 
Divers and Elstein (2012, p.122) it is correctly observed that, unlike belief that P, one cannot 
automatically infer from one’s A-supposing that P that one believes that P, within the scope of that 
supposition. But then given (ACQ), it would follow that someone’s properly acquiring belief in 
the A-necessity of P coincides with their being a state in which they may not automatically infer 
that they believe that P. And although these are admittedly not the firmest of grounds for dismissal, 
introspection appears to suggest otherwise.  
 It therefore seems to me that condition (ii) is unnecessary, and that (implicitly) appealing 
to un-nested C-suppositions is enough to ward off counterexample. And if condition (ii) goes, then 
so does some motivation for (i), as the case of A-impossibility is no longer problematic: the 
Kripkean who believes in the A-impossibility of Aristotle’s not being human is able to C-suppose 
that Aristotle is human. Still, Divers and González-Varela (2013, p.376) argue that condition (i) is 
also important because it easily secures the (essential) result that a rational x who believes in the 
A-necessity of P also believes that P. Respecting this intuition, I will therefore build (i) into the 
simpler acquisition and manifestation conditions that I now propose on behalf of the Millian 
Programme:   
 
(ACQ-S) (i) x believes that P and (ii) x finds herself unable to C-suppose that not-P. 
(MAN-S) (i) x believes that P and for all S, such that x finds herself able to C-suppose 
that S, (ii) x is prepared to add <P> as a premise in reasoning from the C-
supposition that S.48 
 
48 It may be worth noting that the difficulty which the Kripkean encounters in C-supposing, but not in A-
supposing, that <Socrates is not human>, may well be explained by the more demanding character of the 
former supposition. For in developing the former, we will often try to have this proposition figure as an 
explanation of something else. This isn’t necessary when developing the latter.  
 99 
 
3.2.2 A Modest Revision  
 
If we approach the function of A-modalizing via the manifestation conditions of the beliefs that 
it helps to co-ordinate, it follows that assertions of A-necessity function to coordinate the 
disposition to add their prejacents as a premise within the scope of any C-supposition whatsoever. 
And as Divers (2018, p.18) emphasises, some such disposition could be extremely helpful, when 
we are C-supposing some outlandish <S>. For in those situations, we may encounter the crippling 
worry that some candidate premise is unsuited for premisory addition within this C-supposition’s 
scope. In these situations, belief in the A-necessity of P is helpful because it allows us to deploy 
<P>, as a premise or “imaginatively”, ‘without further ado – without the need to consider the 
limits of co-tenability (Goodman 1954) imposed by the content or context of the supposition.’ 
(Divers, 2018, p.18) 
 But I have two concerns with this thought. The first is with regards to the nature of the 
suggested disposition: for without the crucial qualification that <P> be judged relevant to the 
development of the supposition that S, counterexamples to (MAN-S) abound. The second is with 
regards to its suggested value: for whilst it is no doubt true that the disposition in (MAN-S) would 
be useful in the situations that Divers describes, one might suspect that these situations are not all 
that common, even when we are C-supposing some far-out propositions.  
 It would therefore be nice if we could find a counterexample-free manifestation condition 
for belief in A-necessity, one which can also give belief in A-necessity a more impressive functional 
profile. And this can indeed be done. Not, as Divers and Elstein (2012, p.115) initially suggest, by 
understanding the disposition in (MAN-S) as a preparedness not to resist the addition of some A-
necessary P to any C-supposition whatever. This suggestion is also prone to counterexample: upon 
C-supposing many a (humdrum or extraordinary) <P>, the addition of <1=1> as a premiss will 
often be resisted, on grounds of irrelevancy. We should instead aim to develop Divers and Elstein’s 
(2012, p.115) other suggestion, that the disposition is one to treat the propositions as permanently 
available for premisory addition. And given the terminology of Chapter 2, this would appear to 




(MAN-S*) (i) x believes that P and for all S, such that x finds herself able to C-suppose 
that S, (ii) x treats < P> as adducible from within the scope of the C-
supposition that S.49 
 
Now just as Divers (2018) says, (MAN-S*) will indeed be useful when our C-suppositions are so 
radical that we will be disposed to worry about the adducibility of many a proposition. This can 
happen when, for instance, we are unsure about whether a C-supposed <S> is inconsistent with 
our certain beliefs. But the discussion in Chapter 2 also shows us how this disposition could be 
useful in less unusual settings. Consider, for instance, the C-supposition that <Jones was in 
Carolina at its formation>. We are certain about the following:  <Jones was not in South Carolina 
at its formation>, <Jones was not in North Carolina at its formation>, <North Carolina plus 
South Carolina is identical with Carolina >. Given Maintain Consistency, one proposition must go. 
But although nothing in Maintain Consistency forces us to do so, it seems clear to many of us that 
<North Carolina plus South Carolina is identical with Carolina> will remain adducible. Why? 
Because this proposition is a true identity statement, and many of us Kripkeans are therefore happy 
to call it A-necessary. It is the sort of proposition whose negation we (have found that we) cannot 
C-suppose. So, if Maintain Consistency operates over a set that contains this proposition, we will 
treat it as exempt from the constraint. The disposition in (MAN-S*) therefore reduces the potential 
for any C-supposition to decompose into further C-suppositions, when a set of inconsistent 
propositions is recognised as such. And that ought to be recognised as an advantage no matter the 
content or context of the C-supposition. 
 
3.3 Bridging the Gap 
 
I have introduced the Toulminian and Millian Programmes. The former has been concerned with 
the roles of (ordinary) modals in demarcating what gets deliberated about. The latter has been 
concerned with the roles of (philosophical) modals in demarcating what is adducible within the 
scope of C-suppositions. I contend that a satisfactory account of the functional (dis)continuities 
between ordinary and philosophical modals will accommodate the insights of both. However, the 
full range of possible functions that falls within the remit of the resultant project far exceeds what 
can be treated here. For this reason, I will focus on an artificially restricted range of modal 
 
49 It may be worth noting that the difficulty which the Kripkean encounters in C-supposing, but not in A-
supposing, that <Socrates is not human>, may well be explained by the more demanding character of the 
former supposition. For in developing the former, we will often try to have this proposition figure as an 
explanation of something else. This isn’t necessary when developing the latter.  
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functions as we go forwards. The functions in question, however, are of undeniable importance, 
for they concern the roles that various modals have in demarcating (i) what is C-supposed, and (ii) 
what is adduced within the scope of C-suppositions, where the C-suppositions in question are directed 
towards two significant goals: practical and theoretical deliberation.  
 In Chapter 2, I followed DeRose (2010) in taking weak subjunctives to be involved in 
practical deliberation. These conditionals can be used to practically consider the (negations of) 
their antecedents: in asking ourselves what would happen if we were (not) to do such-and-such, 
we can begin to weigh the reasons for and against so-acting. But weak subjunctives are evidentially 
supported by C-suppositions and – whether directly or via this evidential role – they can themselves 
be directed towards the practically consideration of a proposition: supposing that we were to do 
such-and-such, what would happen? And with respect to these goal-directed C-suppositions, we 
can determine some of the normative data that attaches to some modal, ‘M’.  
The first is the normative data which, given assent to <MP>, pertains to our practically C-
supposing that (¬)P. The second is that of the normative data which, given assent to <MP>, 
attaches to our adducing <P> within the scope of the practical C-supposition of some <Q>. 
Would these behaviours be frowned upon? Would they be encouraged? Or is assent to this modal 
simply irrelevant to what may properly be C-supposed or adduce when practically deliberating? 
With answers to these questions in hand, we can then follow Toulmin in positing some plausible 
functions for ‘M’: functions which pertain to those goal-directed C-suppositions.  
 In Chapter 2, I also argued that weak subjunctives can be used in reasoning by IBE. But 
in so-using weak subjunctives, we are theoretically considering their antecedents: the extent to which 
the antecedent explains some phenomena becomes relevant to the case that can be made for 
(dis)believing it. For this reason, C-suppositions can also be directed towards the goal of 
theoretically considering their antecedent. And as before, we can inquire into the normative data 
that, given our assent to <MP>, pertains both to the theoretical C-supposition of <P>, and to the 
adducing of <P> within the scope of the theoretical C-supposition of some other <Q>. This will 
allow us to propose some plausible functions for ‘M’, functions which pertain to these goal-directed 
C-suppositions.  
 In the context of practical and theoretical deliberation, C-supposed propositions are 
practically or theoretically considered. It will be interesting to see whether and how ordinary and 
philosophical modals function to circumscribe what is so-considered. It will likewise be interesting 
to see how and whether these modals function to circumscribe what is adduced, within the scope 
of these goal-directed C-suppositions. And in focusing on these possible modal functions, we keep 
to a manageable discussion, while further developing the insights from the Millian and Toulminian 
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Programmes. But it should again be emphasised that this is emphatically not to suggest that modal 
locutions are only useful because of their effects on (these) goal-directed C-suppositions.  
 For instance, we saw in Chapter 2 that strong subjunctives can be used to evaluate our past 
actions: that they can help us to recognise and learn from mistakes, to elicit or manage feelings of 
regret or remorse, and that they figure amongst the processes that apportion blameworthiness and 
praise. Since C-suppositions can evidentially support strong subjunctives, it follows then we can 
evaluate our past actions by developing a C-supposition, whose object describes our doing 
something other than what we really did. And it seems clear to me that the ordinary notion of 
objective contingency is, in these contexts, of crucial importance in circumscribing the objects of 
these goal-directed C-suppositions.   
 Indeed, there are many important topics that our inquiry must leave out. One is the matter 
of deontic modals. Whilst a functional account of these modals is absolutely essential to the 
development of Toulmin’s (1958) vision of functional unity within ordinary modalizing, it is far 
beyond the scope of this thesis to consider them here. Deontic modals are also somewhat 
tangential to this thesis’ central preoccupation, which is that of the relationship between ordinary 
and philosophical objective modals. Having said that, I will be providing an account of the functions 
of our ordinary subjective modals. This is because an accurate measure of the degree of functional 
similarity amongst ordinary and philosophical objective modals will be facilitated by our having an 
impression of the functional profile of ordinary modals in general.  
 The plan is therefore as follows. Focusing on those C-suppositions which are directed 
towards the practical and theoretical considerations of their supposed contents, we will attempt to 
determine two sets of normative data, both of which pertain to our assenting to certain modal 
declaratives: those of ordinary objective and subjective modalizing, and those of A-modalizing. 
The first set concerns the sorts of normative judgments that it would be reasonable to receive, 
given ones’ assent to some modal declarative, with respect to one’s (not) C-supposing (the negation 
of) its prejacent. The second set concerns the sorts of normative judgments that it would be 
reasonable to receive, given ones’ assent to some modal declarative, with respect to one’s (not) 
adducing its prejacent, within the scope of the C-supposition of a different content. This normative 
data will then be used to formulate some plausible functional hypotheses for our different modal 
locutions. And those functional hypotheses will then be used to gauge the degree of functional 





In this chapter, I have outlined two important approaches to the functions of modals. The first is 
the (neglected) Toulminian Programme, which looks to the roles of ordinary modals in practical 
and theoretical deliberation. The second is the Millian Programme, which looks to the roles of 
philosophical modals in our C-suppositions. I also suggested a method for developing the insights 
of both, in a way that facilitates a comparison of ordinary and philosophical modalizing. In the 





































In this chapter, I try to bring together some of the insights of the Toulminian and Millian 
Programmes. I do so with the overarching aim of illuminating the functional profiles of ordinary 
and absolute objective modalizing. My central contention will be that in so far as we are concerned 
with C-suppositions that are directed towards practical and theoretical deliberation, ordinary 
objective modals, but not A-modals, have significant roles to play.  
 In Section 1, I will begin by charting the deliberative roles of mere assertion and denial, 
which will serve as crucial contrast classes to assertions of necessity and impossibility. I will argue 
that assertion and denial are sometimes governed by epistemic standards, and sometimes by 
practical standards, anticipating the importance of this contrast to our functional theorising. In 
Section 2, I argue that ordinary subjective modals have an important role to play in our theoretical 
deliberations, and a less prominent role to play in our practical deliberations. In Section 3, I argue 
that ordinary objective modals have important roles to play in both. And in Section 4, I argue that 
A-modals do not have a significant role to play in either. Finally, in Section 5, I will summarise the 
functional hypotheses so far considered, before briefly discussing the relevance, to the Ascetic 
Modalizer, of the functional differences between ordinary and absolute objective modals.   
 
4.1 Assertion and Denial   
 
4.1.1 The Practical and Theoretical Viewpoints  
 
Something happens. Does it matter whether this was contingent or necessary? Another thing 
doesn’t. Do we stand to gain anything special from knowing whether it was impossible or 
contingent? An account of modal function should light the way towards a satisfactory answer to 
these questions: modal locutions are far too widespread and entrenched for the assertion of P’s 
necessity to contribute nothing more than the assertion that P; mutatis mutandis for the assertion of 
P’s impossibility and the denial of P.  
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But what is that something more? And how does it relate to the function of contingency 
claims? In this chapter, I will venture some answers to these questions, as they pertain to subjective, 
objective, and A-modalizing.  
My primary goal is, of course, to ascertain the degree of functional similarity amongst the 
latter two species of modals. But for this reason, subjective modalizing must also be investigated: 
for when we eventually reconsider the figure of the Ascetic Modalizer – who suspects that ordinary 
and philosophical “modals” are so functionally disparate that they should not both be considered 
modals – the degree of functional similarity amongst ordinary modals becomes dialectically 
important. After all, the more functionally homogenous this domain, the harder it will be to 
convince the Ascetic Modalizer to expand her modal lexicon. 
Our investigation will centre on the roles that modals have in structuring goal-directed C-
suppositions. These C-suppositions are goal-directed in the specific sense that their development 
is supposed to help an agent to gauge the reasons for believing or doing what the C-supposed 
content describes. They therefore occur within the contexts of theoretical and practical 
deliberations. And in order to inquire into the functional differences between (say) asserting that 
P and asserting that P is necessary in those contexts, we will need to compare the normative data that 
pertains to assenting to P and to assenting to the necessity of P in those contexts.50  
That in turn requires us to fix our ideas about the sorts of norms that operate upon assertion 
within our practical and theoretical deliberations. And it is tempting to think that assertion and 
denial are governed by entirely different norms, depending on whether the context is theoretical 
or practical. After all, in a theoretical context, our beliefs are sensitive to epistemic reasons for belief, 
such as evidence. This is even the case when we are forming beliefs about our own future actions. 
In a theoretical context, we may lean on what evidence we have for believing that P, where <P> 
describes our doing such-and-such: for example, on the fact that we sometimes don’t do what we 
set out to do. In practical contexts, however, our beliefs about what we will do are sensitive to the 
reasons that we can discern for so-acting. In such contexts, we do not seek to predict our own 
actions: we seek to resolve to act in certain ways.51  
 
50 This is very important, because at least in so far as (say) ordinary necessity modals go, there is no semantico-
conceptual or logical obstacle to C-supposing some P judged necessary. However, there is something marked 
about doing so when the C-suppositions are directed towards the theoretical considerations of the supposed 
content, for instance. And that is because, as Toulmin (1958) showed, there is something marked about 
theoretically considering a necessity modal’s prejacent. C-suppositions therefore inherit the normative data 
which pertain to the broader activity towards which they are directed.  
51 As Yang Liu and Huw Price (2019) show, we can accept some such thought without denying that there 
is a sense in which we can assign credences to our own actions.  
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By way of illustration: I am practically deliberating about whether to go on my usual run. 
Will I complete it today, or will I not? It is horribly cold and wet and windy outside. I know that 
every time I’ve completed this run, I’ve felt much better, no matter the weather. I also know that, 
in the vast majority of cases, I had quickly abandoned this run, or had not even attempted it, because 
the weather had been this uninviting, and even though I knew that it would likely have beneficial 
effects. In this situation, I weigh the practical reasons for and against running. On the one hand, 
it would make me feel good. On the other, it is difficult. But I nonetheless resolve, quite sensibly, 
to complete my run: the pros outweigh the cons.  
The situation is different form the onlooker’s perspective. Will I complete my run today, 
or will I not? In this situation, it seems that the onlooker can safely ignore the practical reason that 
I have for running. (This is especially so if the onlooker knows that I had considered this practical 
reason in all similar past deliberations.) The onlooker can just predict what I will do on the basis 
of my terrible track record. He will reason that, since I often don’t complete my run in this weather, 
there is ample evidence that, ceteris paribus, I will do so again.  
Notice how the very same fact – my often not running in such weather – is interpreted 
differently, depending on which perspective we take. From the theoretical perspective, it is taken 
as a good epistemic reason to believe that I will not run. From the practical perspective, however, 
it would be really strange for me to reason as follows: since I often don’t do my run in this weather, 
I will not do so today. In so-reasoning, there would be a sense in which I am “giving up” on my 
own agency.52 However, this fact is not irrelevant to my practical deliberation. It can instead be 
approached as evidence that doing my run in his weather is difficult, where the difficulty of an action 
is, quite plausibly, the sort of thing which can act as a practical reason not do resolve to do it.53 But 
it is only one practical reason amongst many, and that is why, whilst it is rational for the onlooker 
to believe that I won’t complete my run, it is also rational (or so I would argue) for me to resolve 
do so.  
In such cases, theoretical and practical rationality seem to pull in opposite directions. This 
is a deep puzzle, which I cannot address here. However, prima facie clashes between different 
normative considerations are not uncommon. It can be epistemically irrational, but practically 
useful, to deceive oneself. It can be epistemically rational, but ethically impermissible, to perform 
animal testing. Nevertheless, I understand the impulse to downplay the differences between the 
practical and theoretical standpoints. Mightn’t it be, for instance, that practical reasons can also act 
 
52 This idea dates back at least to Jean-Paul Sartre (1969). Berislav Marušić (2015, pp.122-174) develops it 
in a very sophisticated way.  
53 This insight is essentially Marušić’s (2015, pp.122-174) 
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as theoretical reasons? Mightn’t the fact that the reason for running outweighs the reason for not 
running constitute an epistemic reason: a reason to believe that I will run?  
The idea that practical deliberation is just a special kind of theoretical deliberation, perhaps 
one that has an extra motivational component, undoubtedly has its attractions. I do not have a 
decisive objection against it – and, anyway, so long as some important difference divides these cases, 
what follows will remain largely unaffected.54 So, regardless of how, exactly, we frame these cases, 
it is presumably of great importance that we can take these different perspectives on our actions. 
That is certainly what I will assume throughout this chapter. 
But how do these perspectives interact with the fact that assertion is a norm-governed activity: 
with the fact that when it comes to assertion, not just anything goes? Is assertion governed by a 
broadly evidential standard when we are theoretically deliberating, and a broadly practical standard 
when we are practically deliberating? I think that this is exactly right. However, I also think that 
assertion is governed by exactly the same norm in practical and theoretical contexts, a norm which 
can nonetheless be respected differently, depending on the standards which operate in that 
context.55 And that is because I take assertion to be subject to a norm of certainty, where certainty 
is sometimes normatively constrained by our evidence, and sometimes by our practical reasons.  
 Now Beddor (2020a, 2020b) has argued that assertion is governed by a norm of subjective 
certainty – assert that P only if you are subjectively certain that P – and by a norm of epistemic certainty: 
assert that P only if you are epistemically certain that P. Beddor has also argued that these species 
of certainty are linked by a normative biconditional similar to the following: 
 
 
54 I do have a tentative argument against this view, however. I approach it by making some controversial – 
but not, I think, unmotivated – assumptions. First, that treating something as a normative reason for belief 
or action is treating is as something that explains why there is reason for belief or action – this is Daniel 
Fogal’s (2016) idea. Second, that explanations are cognitive phenomena: there are no explanatory relations “out 
there”. Third, that which explanation it is appropriate to give is dependent upon the ‘why’-question at issue. 
Fourth, that in practical deliberation, the ‘why’-question at issue is ‘will I (or should I) F?’ In theoretical 
deliberation, it is ‘what will I (or should I) think about x?’ It follows that, in the practical context, to treat 
something as a reason for action is to use it to explain why there is reason for that action; it is not to use it 
to explain why there is reason to believe that we will so-act, simply because that is not the question under 
discussion. (Which is not do deny that we do not form beliefs in light of our practical deliberations.)  
55 In this respect, my view is different to that of Berislav Marušić’s (2015, pp.150-155), who argues that 
assertions which express theoretical beliefs are subject to the knowledge norm of assertion – assert P only if 
you know that P – whereas assertions which express practical beliefs – beliefs about one’s own actions, which 
‘are formed in light of, and made rational by’ the practical reasons for so-acting – are not: the norm for 
these assertions is instead to assert that we will F only if we should F. It is beyond the scope of this thesis 
to address Marušić’s extremely subtle and interesting discussion of these and related matters, a discussion 
that is certainly relevant to this thesis’ concern. However, it seems to me as though Marušić would welcome 
what I am about to say about assertion, as it can accommodate his insights without resorting to a disjunctive 
norm of assertion.   
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Epistemic Certainty – P is epistemically certain for s IFF it is epistemically rational 
for s to be psychologically certain that P.56 
 
I agree that assertion is governed by a norm of psychological certainty. But I don’t think that it is 
governed by a norm of epistemic certainty. Rather, I think that it is governed by a norm of proper 
certainty – assert that P only if it you are properly certain that P – where proper certainty can 
sometimes be epistemic, and sometimes practical: 
 
Practical Certainty – P is practically certain for s IFF it is practically rational for s to 
be psychologically certain that P. 
 
When will it be practically rational for s to be psychologically certain that P? Although I don’t have 
a settled answer to this question, the basic thought must be that (i) <P> describes the s’s doing 
such-and-such, and that (ii) it is rational for s to such-and-such. I have even less to say about the 
difficult question of epistemic certainty. It would certainly not be epistemically rational for s to be 
psychologically certain that P, if s’s evidence for P is weak, or if they have some evidence to the 
contrary. It would also be epistemically irrational for s to be psychologically certain that P if they 
did not know that P. But the details do not matter so much for our purposes: I think that we all 
have an intuitive grasp on when psychological certainty is epistemically rational, and on when it is 
not. That will be enough to carry us through this discussion.  
On my view, then, assertion is governed by a norm of proper certainty. However, proper 
certainty comes in two different flavours, epistemic and practical. Meeting this norm of assertion 
therefore requires either epistemic or practical certainty, depending on the kind of proper certainty 
that we ought to be aiming for. For this reason, in deliberative contexts, assertion requires the kind 
of proper certainty that is appropriate to the nature of our deliberation. Thus, when we are 
theoretically deliberating whether P, we are looking to resolve our uncertainty as to whether P by 
weighing the epistemic reasons for believing that P. In this context, asserting that P therefore 
requires epistemic (and psychological) certainty that P. But when we are practically deliberating 
whether to F, we are looking to resolve our uncertainty as to whether to F by weighing the practical 
 
56 Beddor actually appeals to ‘P is epistemically certain for s IFF s ought to be psychologically certain that 
P’ in his (2020a), and to ‘P is epistemically certain for s IFF s’s epistemic position renders it permissible for 
s to be psychologically certain that P’ in his (2020b). I have opted for a formulation that stays true to the 
spirit of these proposals, but which does not presuppose a grasp of deontic modal locutions.  
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reasons for so-acting. In this context, asserting that we will F therefore requires practical (and 
psychological) certainty that we will F.57 
 
4.1.2 Normative Data: Non-Modal Assent and Denial 
 
Our investigation is into the roles of ordinary and philosophical modals within our practical and 
theoretical deliberations. Our approach will put a good deal of weight on the differences between 
asserting that P and asserting its necessity, and on the differences between denying that P and 
asserting its impossibility. It will therefore be helpful to end this section with a brief rundown of 
the normative data, as they pertain to assent and denial. This will allow us to gauge the effects that 




Table 1 - Non-Modal Assent 
 
Table 1 records the normative data that pertains to assenting or denying a non-modal proposition 
(denying P is treated as equivalent to assenting to ¬P). We note three of its properties at the outset. 
Firstly, the locutions ‘marked’ and ‘unmarked’ are not intended to register sui generis kinds of 
normative statuses, but rather as umbrella terms for all manner of (respectively) negative and 
neutral normative statuses. For example, something could be marked because irrational, or 
trivialising, or inconsistent, and unmarked because it fails to be irrational, trivialising, and 
inconsistent. Secondly, positive normative statuses, which are not represented in the above, will be 
recorded with ‘marked ¬’, to be read as ‘marked not to’. Thirdly, the supposing and adducing 
columns pertain to distinct episodes of theoretical deliberation and practical deliberation. In 
particular, when we ask whether assenting to <P> is consistent with adducing <P> within the 
 
57 The fact that assertion goes by different standards in different deliberative contexts will be extremely 
important to the issue of modal function. It should be remembered, however, that not every assertion in 
(say) the practical context must be accompanied by practical certainty. Plausibly, those which are not about 
our own future actions are subject to epistemic standards. And in theoretical contexts, there may be moral 
reasons not to let assertions about our own future actions go with an epistemic standard, because there is 
something problematic about merely predicting one’s own actions. These caveats will have to be borne in 
mind as we begin to record the normative data that we need. 
Assent To
C-Suppose (¬)P Adduce P C-Suppose (¬)P Adduce P
P Marked Unmarked Marked Unmarked
¬P Marked Marked Marked Marked
Theoretical Deliberation Practical Deliberation
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scope of a C-supposition, we are not asking about the consistency of adducing <P> within the 
scope of the supposition that (¬)P. Rather, we are asking about whether <P> might be adducible 
within the scope of the C-supposition of a different proposition.  
 Now in the theoretical and practical cases both, C-supposing that (¬)P is inconsistent 
with assenting to (¬)P. When <P> or <¬P> were asserted, the inconsistency is straightforwardly 
explained by the fact that these assertions require certainty that P or that ¬P. But being certain 
that (¬)P is inconsistent with one’s sincerely C-supposing (¬)P, with the aim of theoretically or 
practically considering (¬)P. After all, theoretically or practically considering (¬)P requires 
psychological uncertainty that P.58  
 The normative data that pertains to adducing propositions within the scope of these 
goal-directed C-suppositions is a little more delicate. In Chapter 2, I argued that within the scope 
of any C-supposition, the set of adducible propositions is a subset of those propositions which we 
are certain to be true. For this reason, assenting to ¬P is inconsistent with adducing <P>. And at 
first blush, whether adducing <P> is consistent with assenting to P will depend upon whether 
<P> is ousted by constraints on adducible propositions beyond those imposed by the requirement 
of psychological certainty. In particular, one might think that whether it is proper to adduce <P> 
within the scope of these C-suppositions depends upon whether <P> has been ousted by the all-
important Maintain Consistency. Accordingly, it would seem to follow that, given one’s assent to P, 
adducing <P> is neither marked nor unmarked simpliciter: that assenting to P carries no invariable 
commitment with respect to adducing <P> within the scope of these C-suppositions. But against 
this natural thought, I want to argue that when C-suppositions are directed towards practical and 
theoretical deliberation, adducing <P> is always unmarked given assent to <P>.  
 Suppose that we are practically or theoretically considering some <Q>, about which 
we are ipso facto uncertain. Suppose also that we have assented to P and that, because we were 
sincere, we are psychologically certain that P. But now imagine that in C-supposing that Q, we find 
that <P> is inconsistent with <Q>. We have at this point reached a fork in the road. On the one 
hand, we might become certain that ¬Q, in which case our goal-directed C-supposition breaks 
down. In this scenario, it is therefore impossible for us to adduce <P> within the scope of the very 
C-supposition that we started out with. So, there is no normative data which pertains to our 
adducing <P>, given assent to <P>, within the scope of that C-supposition. On the other hand, we 
might become uncertain that <P>, in which case the requirement that adducible propositions be 
 
58 It is less obvious why assenting to these assertions has the same normative profile. Perhaps this is simply 
because assent is subject to the same norms as assertion. However, I will not assume that this is the case as 
we go forward, leaving unexplained the fact that assent seems to pattern like assertion in the scenarios that 
we will focus on. 
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psychological certainties rules against our adducing <P> within the scope of the C-supposition. 
But that does not mean that adducing <P> is marked given our assent to <P>, for in this new context 
we are no longer entitled to assent to <P>. As soon as we become uncertain that <P>, we are no 
longer bound by our earlier act of assent. So, again, there is no normative data that pertains to our 
adducing <P>, given assent to <P>, within the scope of the C-supposition.59  
 It is absolutely essential to bear in mind that the above is due to the deliberative roles of 
these C-suppositions. When we C-suppose some <Q> for an entirely different purpose – say, that 
of evaluating our past actions – adducing <P> is not always unmarked, nor always marked, given 
assent to <P>. In those contexts, whether it is proper to adduce a proposition to which we have 
assented is partly a matter of whether or not Maintain Consistency has ousted that proposition. But 
when practical or theoretical deliberation is in the offing, finding logical inconsistency either causes 
the C-supposition to break down, or creates a situation in which we are no longer bound to our 
assent. In either case, assenting to P is never inconsistent with adducing <P> within the scope of 
the goal-directed C-supposition.  
With all that being said, it is time to begin our investigation into the deliberative functions 
of our modal locutions. I will warm up to the main event – ordinary objective modalizing and A-
modalizing – by first considering ordinary subjective modalizing. In all cases, I will begin by 
determining the normative data that pertains to deliberative C-suppositions, before using this data 
to formulate functional hypotheses. I will do so for theoretical C-suppositions, and then for 
practical C-suppositions.  
 
4.2 Ordinary Subjectives    
 
4.2.1 Theoretical Deliberation  
 
Assenting to NECSP is inconsistent with the theoretical consideration of (the negation of) its 
prejacent. This is nicely illustrated by an example of Matthew Mandelkern’s (2019, p.239): 
 
(1) Detective A: The gardener must be the murderer. 
 
59 Some may at this point protest. As we saw in Chapter 3, there are sometimes cases in which we are 
uncertain about whether our supposed <Q> is inconsistent with some certain <P>. And in those situations, 
wouldn’t we choose to err on the side of caution, as Divers (2018) suggests, removing <P> from the set of 
adducible propositions? That is indeed correct, but it doesn’t threaten the argument given here. For upon 
becoming uncertain about the consistency of {<P>, <Q>}, it seems to me that we are required to become 
uncertain that P: for in this situation, we are uncertain that Q and uncertain that P&Q. But then if we become 
uncertain that P, we are no longer bound by our prior assent. 
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Detective B:  ?? I concur. Let’s bring him and the butler in to see if we can pin 
down which of them actually is the murderer.  
 
The inconsistency is manifest in oddity of assenting to NECSP and theoretically C-supposing (¬)P: 
 
(2) X:  We’ve looked everywhere else. It must be in the garage.   
Y: a. ?? I agree. And suppose that that were true... 
b. ?? I agree. But suppose that that were true... 
 
The same goes for assenting to IMPSP. However, assenting to POSSP is perfectly consistent: 
 
(3)   X:  It might be in the garage. 
Y:  a. I agree. And suppose that that were true... 
b. I agree. But suppose that that were true... 
 
Indeed, after assenting to POSSP, there is something frivolous about not theoretically considering 
(the negation of) its prejacent. This was already observed by Toulmin (1958).  
 Assenting to NECSP is also consistent with adducing its prejacent within the scope of a 
theoretical C-supposition. This is not the case with assent to IMPSP or POSSP: 
 
(4) X: Oh no! It must be in the garage.  
Y: And suppose that James were to go in there... 
X: Then since it’s in the garage, it would eat James! 
(5) X: Oh phew. It can’t be in the garage.  
Y: And suppose that James were to go in there... 
X: ?? Then since it’s in the garage, it would eat James! 
(6) X: Oh my! It might be in the garage.  
Y: And suppose that James were to go in there... 
X: ?? Then since it’s in the garage, it would eat James! 
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The normative data for assenting to NECSP and to IMPSP are therefore identical to those which 
are found for assent to P and to ¬P. Table 2 records this with highlighted rows for NECSP and 





Table 2 - Subjective Modals: Theoretical Deliberation 
 
Does this tell us that necessity and impossibility modals function just like the assertion and denial 
of their prejacents? Yes and no: for there is more to function than normative data.  
I have been working under the assumption that assertion is subject to norms of 
psychological and proper certainty. In a theoretical context, the latter norm instructs us not to 
assert that which is epistemically uncertain. I think that this is correct, and that it helps us to see 
what is distinctive about assertions of subjective necessity and impossibility. The crucial point is 
that theoretical assertion is subject to demanding epistemic standards. 
Now I think that it is usually a good thing that theoretical assertion is subject to these 
demanding norms. Even if these norms are routinely flouted, they motivate us to assert sensibly. 
But sometimes, attempting to abide by these norms can be damaging. Sometimes, we do not feel 
psychologically certain that P, even though we cannot see how it could be that P is false. In these 
circumstances, we may also feel uncertain about the level of psychological certainty that it is 
epistemically rational for us to have: we are not sure that P is epistemically certain for us. But we 
don’t always have the luxury of further inquiring into some proposition about which we are 
uncertain. Likewise, we are sometimes pressed to rely on propositions which we feel like we cannot 
assert.  
 For instance, Brett Sherman (2018, p.830) discusses situations in which, after reasoning 
by elimination, we remain uncertain about the remaining <P>. This can happen if we are unsure 
about whether the standards that have ruled out the other propositions should also rule out <P>. 
It can also happen if we worry that our initial disjunction was not expansive enough. And it is easy 
 
60 Throughout this chapter, dotted lines indicate that the circumscribed normative data is functionally de 
jure. 
Assent To
C-Suppose (¬)P Adduce P
NECS P Marked Unmarked




to imagine scenarios such as these, in which it would be against our best interests to further C-
suppose that (¬)P, or not to adduce <P> when C-supposing that Q.  
 It is exactly for this reason that we have assertions of subjective necessity. In effect, the 
subjective necessity operators allow us to lower – or, better, to circumvent – the epistemic standards 
of assertion, so that propositions like the above can sneak through. These are propositions which 
have been caught in limbo: we do not quite have enough psychological or epistemic certainty to 
properly assert them in a theoretical context, but no plausible alternatives suggest themselves to 
us. The subjective impossibility operator does exactly the same for denial. These operators allow 
us to close deliberation, even though it has not reached its natural stopping point: we are still 
unsure about their prejacents. And they allow us to adduce propositions which are not usually 
adducible, because we are not certain that they are true.61 
Consider an example. We are trying to determine who ate the cookies. Could it be James? 
No, he doesn’t like chocolate. Randa then? No, she wasn’t here yesterday. Only Nathan remains. 
But we do not make such accusations lightly. Some doubt remains in our minds. Although we 
can’t think of another possible suspect, there’s still the sense that we might have overlooked a 
crucial detail, or that we have been misled. In this situation, it seems appropriate for us to say that 
Nathan must have eaten them.  
Notice how these functional hypotheses nicely explain an observation of Mandelkern’s 
(2019, p.228): 
 
Support – Assertions of subjective necessity are degraded unless an argument for 
believing its prejacent is endorsed by the speaker and salient to the audience.  
 
Given the functional hypotheses, we would expect some such norm to arise, so that subjective 
necessity and impossibility modals are not exploited. These norms arose as safeguards against 
people prefixing any old claim with a subjective necessity or impossibility modal, so that they might 
simply evade, without any consideration for their importance, the usual epistemic norms on 
assertion. 
 As for subjective possibility modals, I cannot much improve upon Toulmin’s (1958) initial 
hypothesis. Their negative function is to allow people to theoretically consider (and hence C-
 
61 This idea aligns nicely with Lassiter’s (2016) proposal that subjective modals can be given a kind of 
threshold semantics. Suppose that epistemic certainty can be measured by assigning it a number between 0 
and 1 inclusive. We can now say that asserting P requires being certain that P to degree 1, and that asserting 
must P requires being certain that P to a degree that is equal to or greater than x, where x is less than 1 but 
high enough. If we accept that the subjective must and might are duals, then asserting might P requires being 
certain that P to a degree that is greater than (1-x). 
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suppose) their prejacents. Their positive function is to act as prompts for the theoretical 
consideration (and hence C-supposition) of their prejacents. But they also have positive and 
negative functions with respect to what we can adduce when theoretically C-supposing some <Q>. 
In particular, subjective possibility modals function negatively to stop us from adducing their 
prejacents. And they function positively by prompting us to decompose our C-supposition into 
two: one in which the prejacent is C-supposed along with <Q>, the other in which the negation of 
the prejacent is C-supposed along with <Q>.  
 
4.2.2 Practical Deliberation   
 
Practically C-Supposing the prejacent of a subjective modal is always marked. I will build up to 
this conclusion by first appealing to Support. Imagine that we are practically deliberating whether 
P, where <P> describes our doing such-and-such. In this context, an argument for believing that 
P just is an argument for P. It is an argument that appeals to the practical reasons that are in favour 
of P. It would therefore appear to follow that, in a practical context, assertions that NECSP would 
be sensitive to practical argument for P. But that is not what we find. Indeed, even when a practical 
argument for its prejacent is salient, it is difficult to get a subjective reading from a necessity modal:  
 
(7) I am perfectly able to stay at home or to go out. I have no moral or legal or 
prudential obligation to do either. But since I feel a slight preference for having a 
cup of tea, I must go out.   
 
The de re ‘must’ in (7) reads like a claim of deontic obligation or objective necessity, one that seems 
inconsistent with the opening monologue. However, going syntactically de dicto can force a 
subjective reading:  
 
(8) I am perfectly able to stay at home or to go out. I have no moral or legal or 
prudential obligation to do either. But since I feel a slight preference for having a 
cup of tea, it must be the case that I will go out.   
 
But that modal claim seems false, or at least infelicitous. Someone who hears (8) could, quite 
reasonably I think, deny the modal claim, on the grounds that weak preferences for actions don’t 
generally constitute good evidence for those actions being carried out. More likely, they would 
simply find the modal out of place. Notice, however, that asserting the bare prejacent is not 
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similarly perplexing:   
 
(9) I am perfectly able to stay at home or to go out. I have no moral or legal or 
prudential obligation to do either. But since I feel a slight preference for having a 
cup of tea, I will go out.   
 
The assertion that I will go out is apt in this practical context. Moreover, challenging it on the 
grounds that weak preferences for actions aren’t good evidence for those actions just misses the 
point: in the absence of countervailing reasons, weak preferences are perfectly acceptable practical 
reasons for action. 
 This disparity can be explained if, whenever a necessity modal describes our future actions, 
the only reasons that are relevant to the modal’s assertability are epistemic reasons to believe that 
we will act in some way; this amounts to a strengthening of Support. In other words, subjective 
necessity modals are only sensitive to epistemic standards on belief and assertion. And when we 
make explicit the (epistemic) argument for believing their prejacents, their oddness in the practical 
context stands out even more:  
 
(10) What shall we do tonight? 
a. ?? Well, we sometimes go out, and sometimes don’t. So, we might go out.  
b. ?? Well, since we always go out, it must be the case that we will go out. 
 
Subjective modals introducing a standard of assertion and belief that is at odds with the present 
deliberative context. The subjective modal invites us to predict our future behaviour, when we are 
trying to make a decision about what to do. But then the preconditions for making assertions of 
subjective necessity modals are incompatible with the preconditions for practically considering, 
and hence C-supposing, their prejacents. 
However, these pre-conditions are not inconsistent with adducing <P> when practically 
considering Q. Indeed, assenting to NECSP is even consistent with treating P as a non-hypothetical 
reason for action, as another example of Mandelkern’s (2019, p.239) demonstrates: 
 
(11) Detective A: The gardener must be the murderer. 
Detective B:  I concur. Let’s arrest him.  
 
By contrast, adducing <P> within the scope of the practical supposition of <Q> is inconsistent 
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with assenting to IMPSP or to POSSP: 
 
(12) a. It must be in the garage. And suppose that we were to go in there. Then since it 
would be in there with us, it would surely attack us.  
b. ?? It might be in the garage. And suppose that we were to go in there. Then 
since it would be in there with us, it would surely attack us.  
c. ?? It can’t be in the garage. And suppose that we were to go in there. Then since 
it would be in there with us, it would surely attack us.  
 
So, just as in theoretical contexts, the normative data for assent to NECSP and to IMPSP are 
identical to those for assent to P and to ¬P. And although the practical and theoretical cases also 
boast the same adducing data with respect to POSSP, there is a difference in the normative data 




Table 3 - Subjective Modals: Practical Deliberation 
 
The most significant difference between the practical and theoretical cases, however, is that in so-
far as practical C-supposition goes, the normative data are only significant when they pertain to 
what it is that we adduce, and not to what it is that we suppose. Thus, when we practically C-suppose 
that Q, asserting that NECSP still works to circumvent the epistemic standards that operate over 
what is assertable and assentable in this context.62 But the normative data which pertains to what 
we C-suppose is irrelevant to the functions of these modals. Why? Because the data is explained 
by their being a clash between the preconditions for making subjective modal assertions, and those 
for practically C-supposing their prejacents. Thus, we do not fail to practically C-suppose that P 
because we have asserted that NECSP. Rather, we do not practically C-suppose that P for the same 
reason that we assert that NECSP: we are using epistemic reasons to predict our own behaviour. A 
 
62 Note that Beddor (2020b) has produced independent arguments for epistemic and psychological certainty 
being the norm of relying on a proposition when practically deliberating.  
Assent To
C-Suppose (¬)P Adduce P





raison d’être of subjective modals is therefore not that of circumscribing what we practically 
consider. 
 
4.3 Ordinary Objectives    
 
4.3.1 Theoretical Deliberation  
 
Determining the normative data which pertain to objective modals is a lot easier than determining 
those which pertain to their subjective cousins. This is because we treat objective necessity and 
impossibility claims as alethic: something’s being objectively necessary means that it happens, 
something’s being objectively impossibly means that it won’t.63 For this reason, asserting that P is 
objectively necessary or impossible boasts the same normative data as asserting or denying that P, 
both with respect to the theoretical C-supposition that (¬)P, and with respect to adducing <P> 
within the scope of a theoretical C-supposition. And I also think that assertions of objective 
contingency can be somewhat frivolous, if we do not theoretically consider their prejacents. The 




Table 4 - Objective Modals: Theoretical Deliberation 
 
But what does this data mean for the theoretical functions of objective modals? Let us begin with 
their role in demarcating what gets theoretically C-supposed.  
 
63 Do we not treat subjective modals as alethic? I will argue in the following chapter that we do not.  
64 Partly for want of space, and partly to focus on the more interesting deliberative cases, the ordinary 
objective modal claims that we will investigate will always be such that the time at which P obtains is later 
than the time at which P has whatever modal status the claim says it does. For instance, we will be looking 
at claims which tell us that, right now, it is impossible for us to travel to Mars, or that, at noon, it was 
necessary for the sun to set at dusk. We will not be concerned with claims to the effect that, right now, the 
past is necessary. Moreover, when it comes to ordinary objective contingency modals, I am only interested 
in the data that pertains to their assent in situations where we are uncertain about their prejacents: where 
the most that we know about <P>’s truth-value is that it is objectively contingent.  
Assent To
C-Suppose (¬)P Adduce P
NECo P Marked Unmarked




 It seems to me that there is a large asymmetry here between the past and the future. When 
the prejacent of an objective modal concerns the past, it does not seem to matter very much 
whether it was necessary, contingent, or impossible. If we assent to necessity or impossibility, we 
thereby assent to truth or falsity. Hence, theoretical C-suppositions are ruled out. If we assent to 
contingency, theoretical C-suppositions are ruled in. And the same is, of course, true of those 
prejacents which concern the future. However, there is an important difference between past and 
future contingents: we are sometimes epistemically certain of the former, but we are arguably never 
epistemically certain of the latter. Here is A. N. Prior (1968, pp.36-36):  
 
But while contingent futures [...] can in this way be correctly or incorrectly guessed, I 
cannot see in what way they can be ‘known’; or to put it another way, I cannot see in what 
way the alleged knowledge, even if it were God’s, could be more than correct guessing. 
For there could be ex hypothesi nothing that could make it knowledge, no present ground for 
the guesses’ correctness which a specially penetrating person might perceive.  
 
Now this thought inhabits a sophisticated discussion about omniscience, one which is sensitive to 
the sometimes highly counterintuitive debates about the metaphysics and semantics of future 
contingents. But it seems to me that Prior’s remark can be taken to expresses an intuitive and 
powerful idea regardless of one’s commitments (or lack thereof) about the nature of future 
contingents.  
 I consider it a datum that we take ourselves to have more a posteriori knowledge about the 
past than we do about the future. History is not a foolish enterprise when, but only when, it 
concerns itself with what has gone before. We do, of course, make predictions about the future. 
However, the nature of prediction further supports the belief that we feel less epistemic certainty 
about the future. As Fabrizio Cariani (2020) convincingly argues, there are counterexamples to the 
popular and intuitive view that prediction invariably concerns the future. However, the future is 
not wholly irrelevant to prediction: predicting that P is a speech-act that seems to be sensitive to 
our feeling that P is not yet epistemically settled, but that future evidence will (likely) settle the 
question of whether P. But notice what this suggests about our epistemic self-conception. When 
we think about prediction, it is almost irresistible to think of them as future-directed. Plausibly, 
this is because most predictions are about the future. Intuitively – to me, at least – this is because 
we are less likely to feel that any given future-directed proposition is presently epistemically settled, 
when compared to a given past-directed one.  
Why should this be the case? Well, we get a posteriori knowledge via our sense experience. 
We see or hear or feel or smell or taste that something is so-and-so. We hold the corresponding 
belief in our memory, from which it can be retrieved. Others can then acquire it through our 
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testimony. But that process only ever takes us from the past to the present. We never literally see 
what will be. We don’t remember the future. We don’t gossip about tomorrow’s events. The 
pathways to a posteriori knowledge don’t reach back to us from beyond the temporal horizon. We 
take ourselves to be responsive to the world, and this responsiveness goes forwards in time.  
I think that this is why we feel less certain about the future than we do about the past. And 
on the plausible assumption that retro-causation never occurs, this thought is consistent with a 
causal theory of a posteriori knowledge. That is perhaps not the only way of fleshing out the intuitive 
idea that a posteriori knowledge requires responsiveness, and that we are not responsive to the 
future. But it is a plausible way to do so, and I’ll take it in stride going forward.  
This picture of ourselves does not have to be true for it to be widespread and influential. 
Indeed, it does not have to be true for it to be useful. But it also seems to me that remaining 
epistemically uncertain about every future-directed a posteriori proposition could be a hindrance. 
Thankfully, then, we have concepts which allow us to mark exceptions to this epistemological self-
image. When we take ourselves to be epistemically certain that it was objectively necessary or 
impossible that some future P obtains, then we also take ourselves to be epistemically certain that 
(respectively) future P does or does not obtain. This is because (i) our modal knowledge seems to 
be causally downstream from the modal facts themselves, and (ii) these modal concepts are alethic: 
<NECSP> implies <P>. We can therefore be epistemically certain in our knowledge that P will 
occur when we think that P was pre-determined. The extent of our epistemic certainty, however, 
is confined to those cases. When someone is overconfident that P will occur, we need only remind 
them of P’s contingency to make them snap out of it: it could go that way, or it could not.   
This means that in so far as future contingents go, inquiry can never properly end until the 
future contingent becomes present or past. When we are theoretically deliberating whether P, we 
are aiming to resolve uncertainty as to whether P. However, given the normative link between 
psychological and epistemic certainty, we know that we never should feel certain about a future 
contingent, until it becomes present or past: for only then might it be true that we know it to 
obtain. Knowing that some past or present P was contingent is therefore no obstacle to our 
eventually asserting P to be the case, and (hence) it is no obstacle to our eventually putting a 
moratorium on P’s being theoretically C-supposed. Not so when some future P is currently 
contingent.  
The objective modal notions therefore have a crucial role in demarcating which future-
directed propositions get theoretically C-supposed. The notion of an objective future contingency 
is the notion of something that it is presently epistemically irrational to be certain about: it is 
therefore the notion of something that cannot be asserted, that can be theoretically deliberated 
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about, and that cannot be adduced within the scope of a theoretical C-supposition. The notion of 
an objective future necessity is the notion of something that it is presently epistemically irrational 
to not be certain about: it is therefore the notion of something that can be asserted, that cannot be 
theoretically deliberated about, and that can be adduced within the scope of a theoretical C-
supposition.  
I have claimed as widespread the idea that some future propositions are never known to 
be true, because knowledge of those truths would require (say) our beliefs about the corresponding 
states of affairs to be caused by those states of affairs, which would require backwards causation, 
which does not occur. Those propositions we call future contingents. But why would it be useful 
to so-demarcate some future-directed propositions, excluding them from the realm of epistemic 
certainty?  
I do not know how to answer this question. Suppose that we were to survey the genesis 
of our ordinary objective modalizing. Those of our ancestors who remained uncertain about 
certain future-directed propositions tended to fare better than those who did not. The concept of 
an objective contingency thereby arose to co-ordinate this response. Our ancestors stopped 
asserting and adducing those kinds of future-directed propositions. Doing so had “survival value”, 
when it was applied to those kinds of future-directed propositions. But why did it not have survival 
value when the judgments were directed towards these other future-directed propositions? It will at 
this point be almost irresistible to appeal to objective modality “itself” in our explanation: it was 
useful for our ancestors to so-treat these propositions because they were future-contingents!  
If we do go down this route, then we also give an explanatory role to objective modals. Not 
everyone will be happy with that. It may be objected that the ordinary notions of objective 
modalizing are too mysterious for them to have this explanatory. The question is then about the 
extent to which the Humean can accept the above functional account in good conscience. I do 
not have any constructive thoughts about this deep problem.  
 
4.3.2 Practical Deliberation   
 
Given the presumed alethicity of objective modals, the normative data that pertains to practical 
deliberation is identical to that which pertains to theoretical deliberation, in the case of necessity 
and impossibility. And it also seems to me that assenting to the future-contingency of some P 





Table 5 - Objective Modals: Practical Deliberation 
 
But what do these data tell us about the practical functions of objective modals? I think that the 
adducing functions are exactly the same as those in the theoretical case: they determine those 
future-directed propositions that are rational to adduce. But what about their functions in 
determining what gets practically C-supposed? When someone asserts that IMPOP and then 
practically C-supposes that (¬)P, they present themselves as being in an irrational or perhaps even 
impossible state of mind. But we should perhaps spend some time unpacking and defending this 
alleged inconsistency, before using it as a foundation for our functional theorising.  
To this end, let us begin not with practical C-suppositions, but with actions and intentions. It 
initially looks just obviously true that assenting to IMPOP
 makes it irrational to try to (¬)P. Indeed, 
one might even suggest that it is impossible to genuinely try to (¬)P, given one’s sincere assent to 
IMPOP. For one might think that trying to P requires intending to P, which itself requires believing 
that P, which is impossible if one already believes that P cannot happen. But Kirk Ludwig (1995) 
has taken issue with this picture.  
Ludwig (1995, p.465) argues that we can intend and attempt to do what we think is 
impossible. He gives the example of a man who maintains that he cannot perform some athletic 
feat. But his friend thinks that this individual is perfectly capable of it, and so keeps pestering him 
until, exasperated, the man decides to show his friend that he cannot do it. This involves the man 
trying as hard as he can to perform a feat that he believes to be impossible. And against all odds, 
he succeeds! But then since it looked like he performed this feat intentionally, then assuming that an 
intentional action was an intended action, it follows that the man intended to do that which was 
impossible. Ludwig (1995, p.566) writes: 
 
The only reason it can seem puzzling that one can intend and try to do something one 
believes to be impossible is that generally the point of intending and trying is derived from 
the successful carrying out of the intention. This is a pragmatic, not a conceptual 
connection, however. The examples I give exploit the possibility of having reasons for 
intending and trying to do something other than one's chances of success.  
 
Assent To
C-Suppose (¬)P Adduce P
NECo P Marked Unmarked




That seems exactly right. We can have reasons to intend or to try to F, which are unconnected to 
the success of these activities. In Ludwig’s example, the reason is that of demonstrating the very 
impossibility of the thing that is being intended and attempted, which is precisely why intention 
and trying are required. So, one can have reasons to intend or attempt that which is believed to be 
impossible.65 
But can that make the intention or attempt rational? Ludwig wants to say so. He recounts 
a tragic folk tale, in which a fisherman has been stranded on a remote island with his son. The tide 
is rising, the water is freezing cold. The man sees that it is impossible for him or his son to survive. 
And yet the man raises his son’s head above his shoulders, keeping him from the rising tide. 
Ludwig (1995, p.564) writes:  
 
What was the fisherman trying to do? What did he intend? He meant to hold his son's 
head above the water [...] Did he believe that he could do this? Did he believe that he 
would live, or that his son would live? Part of the tragic heroism of the fisherman in the 
story lies in his knowledge that he could not do this; that both he and his son would die 
of drowning in the frigid waters of the ocean. If he had believed his efforts could be 
successful, he would not be heroic, but foolish. 'Perhaps, then, he did not intend or try to 
save his son's life, but was only going through the motions, or perhaps only meant to 
preserve it as long as possible.' He did not try to save his son's life! He did not intend to 
save it! Could he not try to save his son's life, though he had no hope of success? There 
was nothing that meant more to him than this end. To fail to try, to strain every fibre of 
his body, would have been ignoble, a failure to act out of the great love that he felt for his 
child. 'He must have deluded himself, then. He must have thought that he could hold his 
son's head above the water through the long night.' But this is again to make him out to 
be a fool. 'Was he, then, perhaps, simply irrational?' Irrational? No. Surely the rational man 
does not have to await his fate passively. These revisionary accounts of this tale of stoic 
heroism ring false.  
 
I largely agree with Ludwig, until his last objection. For mightn’t the tragic heroism of the 
fisherman’s actions be at least partly rooted in their irrationality? It seems to me plausible that this 
is so. Love and desperation have driven the fisherman to compromise the rational accord that 
would otherwise exist between his actions and his beliefs about the possibility of their success. But 
that doesn’t make us see him unfavourably. Sometimes, we simply don’t care about rationality. 
Indeed, we sometimes think that the irrational response is the appropriate, even honourable one! 
 
65 Some might suggest that the man’s intention and trying are simply to prove his friend wrong, rather than 
to perform the athletic feat x. But this suggestion can be resisted, and arguably it should. Ludwig doesn’t 
want to deny that the man is intending and trying to prove to his friend that he cannot do x. Rather, Ludwig 
wants to say that the man intends and tries to prove this inability by unsuccessfully trying to do x. How else 
to prove the inability to x, other than to really try to x? If the man were not to try, his friend could well 
insist that the inability is there. Thus, in characterising the man’s intention to prove his friend wrong, we 
must mention his intention to try to do x.  
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It may well be irrational to become indignant at a grave injustice, for instance, and yet we can 
sometimes feel frustrated at those who, in its face, manage to maintain their sang-froid.  
Less dramatically, consider Ludwig’s athlete. Isn’t there something rather absurd about the 
whole situation? The man was driven, out of sheer frustration, to intend and attempt that which 
he believed to be impossible. It is easy to imagine him feeling pretty silly, as he prepares to give an 
impossible doing his very best shot, only to silence his insufferable friend. Thus, although he had 
reason to do so-act, his actions were irrational. The absurdity of the situation appears to derive 
from exactly this fact. 
It is sometimes in our best interests to do something that is seemingly irrational, or not to 
do something which is seemingly rational. Roy Sorensen (2004) has some nice examples of this. Is 
it rational to fear a dot, if fearing that dot is rewarded by a free book? (Sorensen, 2004, p.257) A 
different case (Sorensen, 2004, p.258): 
 
Consider a man out on a ledge. He must escape a burning building by walking a long plank 
to a neighboring building. There is a real danger of falling, so the inner logic of fear is 
satisfied. But this fear is apt to cause a misstep. Accordingly, the man stifles his fear. (And 
his fear of the fear.) He averts his eyes from the abyss. He may even cultivate defiant anger 
against the fire to make his steps resolute. This anger is irrational. But out on the ledge, it 
is rational to cultivate a useful irrational emotion. (Fear of my dot may be like that.)  
 
Sorensen (2004) sees these cases as paradoxes of rationality. Perhaps that is also how we should 
see Ludwig’s (1995) examples: as cases of rational irrationality. I won’t pursue these thoughts any 
further, however, wishing only to note that there is a sense in which intending or trying (not) to 
do the impossible or the necessary is irrational – or imperfectly rational, or inadvisable, or perhaps 
simply absurd – even if it is possible to intend or attempt that which we think impossible or 
necessary. And by parity of reasoning, I want to say that there is a sense in which it is irrational to 
practically C-suppose that which we think impossible or necessary.66  This strongly suggests that 
there is an important conceptual connection between the notion of contingency and the notion of 
what it is not irrational to practically consider. I therefore propose that a practical function of 
 
66 Is it impossible to sincerely do so? Seeing as practically considering something requires intending to resolve 
uncertainty about bringing that something about, this seems unlikely. After all, given one’s belief in that 
something’s impossibility, there is no uncertainty to resolve. But perhaps a Ludwig-style (1995) 
counterexample is in the offing. Suppose that an evil scientist has connected you to a brain scanner. He 
tells you that if you do not practically consider something that you believe to be impossible, you will die. 
Thus, you must look for practical reasons for doing some impossible thing, with the intention of resolving 
uncertainty about what to do. Can you intend to do just that? Not if intention requires belief, for that would 
require you to believe that you will resolve uncertainty about what to do, even though you believe that this 
is impossible, since there is no uncertainty to resolve. But if intention doesn’t require belief, as Ludwig 
(1995) has argued, then it may be possible to form this intention.  
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ordinary contingency talk is that of demarcating what gets practically C-supposed, as Toulmin 
anticipated (1958).  
Now it is essential that we sometimes answer the question of what we will do by weighing 
the practical reasons for and against acting in different ways. Within this context, assertion and 
belief go by a practical standard: one is to assert and believe that which one has found most reason 
to do. But it would clearly be disadvantageous if we applied this standard of assertion and belief 
to every thinkable proposition. This is where the concepts of objective necessity and impossibility 
come in. In saying that something is objectively necessary or impossible, we are entitled not to 
practically consider that something without having to weigh up the reasons for and against so-acting. 
If it is impossible now for me to F later, then I may assert that I will not F, and not undertake to F, 
without working through the pros and cons.  
I have just said that it is disadvantageous to practically consider every proposition that we 
happen to think about, as we practically deliberate. Why should this be? I think that it will again 
be tempting to appeal to objective modality “itself” when answering this question. Perhaps those of 
our ancestors who practically considered certain future-directed propositions did less well than 
those who did not. Perhaps the notion of a future-contingent emerged in part to help us to co-
ordinate which future-direct propositions we practically considered. But not just any old future 
action is disadvantageous to practically consider: only those ones are. Which ones? Why the 
impossibilities and necessities, of course!  
 
4.4 A-Modals    
 
After having spent a considerable amount of time on the deliberative functions of ordinary 
objective modals, I turn more briefly to the issue of A-modals. More briefly, because we have 
already encountered, in this chapter and the last, nearly all the evidence that we need for a rather 
startling claim: that A-modals have no special role to play in our practical and theoretical 
deliberations.  
 Let us begin by briefly noting the fact that the alethicity of A-modals makes the normative 
data for claims of A-necessity and of A-impossibility identical to that of plain assertion and denial. 
As for claims of A-contingency, we must be reminded of what exactly those are supposed to be: 
 
A-Contingency – A-CONOQ IFF (P (P > Q) & S (S >  Q))
67 
 
67 Here ‘>’ indicates a subjunctive conditional. 
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How to paraphrase that equivalence into a homelier thought? Perhaps like so: Q is A-contingent 
IFF there is a way the world would have been, such that it isn’t the case that if the world had been 
that way, Q would have been the case, and there is a way the world would have been, such that it 
isn’t the case that if the world had been that way, Q would not have been the case. But that is still 
quite difficult to get a handle on. Indeed, I think that the easiest route to an intuitive grasp of this 
notion will go via the proper acquisition condition for belief in A-contingency, modelled – 
extremely crudely in the present case, as we only need to fix ideas – on the work of Divers and 
González-Varela (2013): we find that we can properly develop the C-supposition that Q, and also 
that we can properly develop the C-supposition that Q.  
 With that being said, what of the normative data which pertain to assenting to the A-
Contingency of P? It is clear that adducing <P> within the scope of practical and theoretical C-
suppositions is marked. But what about C-supposing that P in either of these goal-directed ways? 
When we are uncertain about P, there is no problem there. However, the mere fact that we can 
develop the C-supposition that P and that P is presumably not enough grounds to warrant further 
investigation: most propositions are like this. I therefore do not think that it is marked not to 




Table 6 - A-Modals 
 
But why do I say that none of the above normative data are functionally de jure? Well, one problem 
for A-modals lies in their acquisition conditions. More precisely, it lies in the requirement that 
properly acquiring belief in the A-necessity of P arises only when someone believes that P: 
 
(ACQ-S) (i) x believes that P and (ii) x finds herself unable to C-suppose that not-P. 
 
So, before having properly acquired belief in the A-necessity of P, we are already disposed not to 
practically or theoretically C-suppose that ()P, and to adduce <P> within the scope of a practical 
Assent To
C-Suppose (¬)P Adduce P C-Suppose (¬)P Adduce P
A-NECo P Marked Unmarked Marked Unmarked
A-CONoP Unmarked Marked Unmarked Marked
A-IMPoP Marked Marked Marked Marked
Theoretical Deliberation Practical Deliberation
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or theoretical C-supposition. Acquiring the modal belief doesn’t add anything new to those 
dispositions. 
 Some may respond to this problem by dropping condition (i). It is then incumbent on 
them to provide a similarly plausible condition that guarantees properly acquired belief in an alethic 
modality. But even if it is true that properly acquiring belief in the A-necessity of P does not require 
belief that P, it certainly seems to be a contingent empirical fact that these beliefs are acquired that 
way. For most of us, it seems fair to say that we discover that water is H20 before discovering its A-
necessity (and regardless of whether or not this further discovery came via our failing to C-suppose 
the contrary). But then there is at least one important sense in which talk of A-necessity does not 
have the above deliberative functions: any such deliberative dispositions would be explained by 
beliefs that were historically prior to the advent of A-modalizing.  
 Even if we could make sense of a properly (i.e. canonically) acquired belief that P is A-
necessary that did not presuppose belief that P, we might doubt whether such belief could qualify 
as knowledge. As Divers and González-Varela (2013, pp.377-378) emphasise, knowledge that P is 
A-necessary has historically been thought to go via our a posteriori knowledge that P, along with 
our a priori knowledge that if P, then P is A-necessary. But if we want our concept of A-necessity 
to function (say) as the ordinary concept of objective necessity does, then it would seem that a 
revisionary epistemology would have to be defended. For recall one crucial role of the ordinary 
notion of necessity: allowing us to circumvent the important conceptual obstacles to our seeing 
ourselves as having a posteriori foreknowledge. The ordinary notion of objective necessity can do 
this job because we take knowledge of these necessities to be a posteriori, causally downstream from 
the necessity itself, and to output knowledge of the prejacent via our capacity for deductive 
reasoning. It is therefore clear that a traditional epistemology of A-necessity makes the notion unfit 
to play this role.  
 Finally, it should be noted that even if our talk of A-necessity could be stretched into 
something that plays the deliberative roles of our ordinary talk of necessity, then the role of A-
necessity modals in demarcating what may be adduced is not that which was anticipated in Divers 
(2018) and Divers and Elstein (2012). For in so far as we are concerned with deliberative 
suppositions, what is adducible just is what is certain, and so there isn’t the scope to worry about 
what is co-tenable with what. For instance, if we C-suppose that P for the purposes of determining 
whether to P, then upon noticing that <P> is inconsistent with some certain <Q>, we either stop 
to C-suppose that P in this goal-directed way, or we become uncertain that <Q>. Nothing about 
that changes if we are certain that Q is A-necessary.  
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 There are, of course, certain goal-directed C-suppositions in which (ACQ-S) does not 
detract from belief in A-necessity having a special role in demarcating what remains adducible. 
Suppose, for instance, that we are C-supposing some past Q with the intention of determining 
whether it was (say) regrettable. In that context, finding an inconsistency between <Q> and our 
certain beliefs {<O>, <P>} does not cause the C-supposition to break down. And at this point, 
Maintain Consistency kicks in, and if we merely believe that O and P, then our C-supposition 
decomposes into C-supposing that Q&O and C-supposing that Q&P. But if we believe in the A-
necessity of P, then our C-supposition doesn’t need to decompose: we simply oust <O> from the 
set of adducible propositions. Thus, when it comes to those C-suppositions, belief in A-necessity 
has an identifiable and important role in circumscribing what is adducible. But it does not when 
we are looking at deliberative C-suppositions.  
 
4.5 Functional Differences      
 
Our discussion has been rather involved. In this closing section, I will summarise the key points 
that I have tried to make about the ordinary modals that we have looked at. I will then attempt to 
determine their significance to the Ascetic Modalizer’s position.  
 
4.5.1 Deliberative Functions 
 
Subjective necessity modals have the same effects as the assertion of their prejacents on what we 
adduce within the scope of deliberative C-suppositions; mutatis mutandis for subjective impossibility 
modals. Additionally, subjective necessity modals have the same effects as the assertion of their 




Table 7 - Subjective Modals 
 
Assent To
C-Suppose (¬)P Adduce P C-Suppose (¬)P Adduce P
NECS P Marked Unmarked Marked Unmarked
POSSP Marked ¬ Marked Marked Marked
IMPSP Marked Marked Marked Marked
Theoretical Deliberation Practical Deliberation
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The utility of these modals stems from the fact that they have the same effects as (theoretical) 
assertion and denial, but at a lower cost. Usually, theoretical deliberation reaches its goal when we 
resolve uncertainty about what we are considering. Subjective necessity and impossibility modals 
allow us to close inquiry in the absence of certainty. Usually, adducing a proposition when 
deliberating requires certainty in the propositions. Subjective necessity and impossible modals 
allow us to circumvent that requirement.   
Subjective possibility modals remind us not to adduce their prejacents within the scope of 
deliberative C-suppositions. Additionally, they can act as prompts for us to theoretically C-suppose 
their prejacents.  
Ordinary objective necessity modals have the same effects as the assertion of their prejacents 
on what we adduce within the scope of deliberative C-suppositions; mutatis mutandis for objective 
impossibility modals. Objective necessity modals also have the same effects as the assertion of 





Table 8 - Objective Modals 
 
In the case of practical C-supposition, the utility of these necessity and impossibility modals stems 
from the fact that when we are practically deliberating, resolving uncertainty as to whether P – and 
(hence) intending and announcing and promising that P – requires us to weigh the practical reasons 
for and against ()P. Not every proposition that pops into our mind is deserving of that attention. 
By calling them necessary or impossible, we can close or forestall their practical consideration (and 
hence practical C-supposition) without going through the oft-demanding process of practical 
consideration.  
 In the case of theoretical C-supposition, and in the case of adducing propositions within 
the scopes of deliberative C-suppositions, the utility of these necessity and impossibility modals 
stems from (what I am alleging to be) the twin facts that (i) we (take ourselves to) face considerable 
obstacles to being epistemically certain about future-directed propositions, and that (ii) being 
uncertain about every future-directed proposition is not useful. The problematic (i) stems from 
Assent To
C-Suppose (¬)P Adduce P C-Suppose (¬)P Adduce P
NECo P Marked Unmarked Marked Unmarked
CONoP Marked ¬ Marked Marked ¬ Marked
IMPoP Marked Marked Marked Marked
Practical DeliberationTheoretical Deliberation
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two prima facie common commitments: that (a posteriori) knowledge that P is causally downstream 
from P, and that causation doesn’t run backwards. By calling something necessary or impossible, 
we can be certain about its prejacent’s truth-value without being causally downstream from what 
the prejacent describes. The ordinary notions of necessity and impossibility are able to play this 
role because (a) we are (seemingly) causally downstream from the necessity or impossibility of 
some future P, and (b) <P> is entailed by <NECOP>, and <>is entailed by <IMP>OP.  
 Objective future contingency modals allow us to demarcate what gets deliberated about, 
and what it is best not to adduce. They can also sometimes act as deliberative prompts. Objective 
future contingents function to make us feel epistemically uncertain about their prejacents, when 
epistemic standards on thought and talk are in play. They also demarcate the propositions with 
respect to which it can be useful to direct practical standards of certainty: standards in which 
certainty goes by the strength of our practical reasons.  
 We should note at this point an important element of functional continuity between the 
objective and subjective cases. As I noted at the outset of this chapter, it is clear that something 
must distinguish mere assertion from assertions of necessity. And with respect to what we might 
call their deliberative outputs, it is hard to see any difference between them. However, this does not 
mean that ordinary necessity modals bring nothing to the table: that we could get by just as easily 
without them, settling instead with mere assertion. For necessity modals allow us to get around 
the various problems that pertain to mere assertion. Mere assertion, for instance, is often subject 
to a norm of epistemic certainty. When it is, many propositions do not pass the test: and so many 
cannot properly be adduced, and remain up for deliberation. And when this becomes a problem, 
subjective and objective necessity modals help us to get around it. The former allows us to make 
a statement that has the same force as an assertion of its prejacent, but without our being 
epistemically or psychologically certain about it. The latter allows us to do the same, by giving us 
the conceptual tools to feel confident that we are epistemically certain about its prejacent, in spite 
of the prima facie problems facing a posteriori foreknowledge.   
 
4.5.2 Revisiting the Credos  
 
These functional similarities are certainly relevant to the Ascetic Modalizer’s position. To recap, 
the central point of contention between the Ascetic Modalizer and her orthodox interlocutors is 




Credo in Rarefication – There are objective modalities beyond those countenanced 
by our ordinary objective modal concepts; these ordinary objective modal concepts 
do not exhaust the space of objective modal concepts. 
 
Now even if the functional differences between A-modals and ordinary modals are so great that 
the former should not, as the Ascetic Modalizer insists, be grouped with the latter, a wholesale 
rejection of this credo is clearly unwarranted. There are, after all, philosophical modals beyond the 
absolute case. Having said that, it should also be conceded that the absolute case is of great 
importance, as it arguably contains a host of significant philosophical modals as sub-species: 
(broadly) logical necessity, analytic necessity, mathematical necessity, and metaphysical necessity. 
(Divers and Elstein, 2012, p.110) It would therefore be a sizeable win for the Ascetic Modalizer if 
she could disqualify absolute modals from the modal realm. The important question for us is 
therefore that of the extent to which the above functional inquiry could motivate this radical move.  
 The most straightforward route to this conclusion would go via the suggestion that the 
above functions are essential to making a modal what it is. As a starting principle, this claim is 
obviously question-begging. But that is not how the Ascetic Modalizer should present it. Rather, 
this claim should be understood as deriving its plausibility from its explanatory potential. It is to 
be argued that we simply have no better criterion for modalizing; that the functional similarities 
between objectives and subjectives suggests that this criterion is on the right tracks; and that we 
can anticipate that the functions of deontic modals would further bolster our confidence that the 
criterion is correct: for it is obviously the case that those modals structure our deliberations. It 
could then, quite sensibly, be argued that the addition of A-modals would only dilute a natural 
kind concept into what is perhaps at best a family resemblance idea.  
 This would initially appear to be a promising move for the Ascetic Modalizer. And if I was 
at all correct, in Chapter 1, to represent the theoretical clash between the Ascetic Modalizer and 
her discontents as fast approaching deadlock, then one might well think that the suggested 
criterion could worry the orthodoxy. The matter, however, is not quite so simple, for even ordinary 
modals have functions beyond their deliberative roles. For instance, I briefly suggested in Chapter 
3 that ordinary objective modals have a crucial role to play in structuring the counterfactual evaluation 
of past actions. I suspect that deontic modals do too. And in this chapter, I also hinted that A-
modals sometimes lend their hand to this enterprise. Whether or not there are any significant 
functional continuities to be found there is a matter for inquiry. It does seem clear to me, however, 
that the battle for a functional criterion of modalizing must spill over into this terrain, if either side 
is legitimately to claim victory.  
 132 
 So it is with the Credo in Rarefication, so it is with another contentious principle:  
 
Credo in Invariance – (A) For any objective necessity, X, if Q is X-necessary, then for 
all P that meets some condition X, (P → Q); and (B) for any condition, X, if (P 
→ Q) for all P that meets X, then Q is objectively X-necessary.  
 
As far as the deliberative functions of modals go, it is clear that this credo is hopeless. For a start, too 
many of the necessity modals which it defines are not alethic, and so cannot have the same force 
as assertion. They are also extensionally inadequate. This is certainly the case with A-modals. For 
instance, the notions of A-necessity and A-impossibility are far too restrictive for those to be the 
only notions that we lean on in (say) demarcating what does not get practically deliberated. The 
Credo in Invariance defines many more such notions. Equally many have exactly the opposite 
problem: they are far too permissive. Indeed, we might at this point wonder whether there could so 
much as be different objective necessity modals that play the deliberative roles. We might therefore 
doubt that the deliberative functions of modals could ever support:  
 
Credo in Commensurability – Objective modalizing admits of different modal notions 
that are commensurable in strength.  
 
Recall Lewis’ (1976, p.150) “power” to speak Finnish. In view of facts about his larynx and nervous 
system, Lewis says that he can speak Finnish. In view of his lack of training, Lewis says that he 
cannot. Lewis then instructs us not to rely on the former possibility claim when making decisions: 
Don’t take me to Helsinki as your interpreter... But could there ever be a trip to Helsinki in which 
it would be useful, in a deliberative sense, to modalize in the first way – or, for that matter, in a way 
that is more permissive with what it counts as impossible? It is certainly the case that no two 
objective contingency modals could play the above deliberative roles in the same deliberative 
context. But why think that it is useful for us to hop between different contingency modals across 
deliberative contexts?  
 It remains to be seen whether these prima facie challenges to the unifying credos are 
generated by the functions of ordinary and philosophical modals in counterfactual evaluation. It 
also remains to be seen whether the orthodox modalizer can meet the challenges. But the Ascetic 
Modalizer will be happy with the progress that she has made so far: for our functional theorising 
has certainly put her interlocutor on the back foot. And it is within this dialectal context that the 
Ascetic Modalizer ends with a tu quoque.  
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 According to an important and widespread thought in modal theorizing, A-modal beliefs 
and knowledge go via our recognition of the limits of our capacity to entertain certain ideas. We 
wonder, for instance, whether some form of inconceivability might be a reliable guide to 
impossibility, in this most restrictive sense of ‘impossible’. In Chapter 3, we saw how Divers and 
González-Varela (2013) developed this core idea by appealing to C-suppositions: in particular, 
with the suggestion that properly acquiring belief in the A-necessity of P requires our finding that 
we cannot develop the C-supposition of its negation. It is against the A-modalizer who sees their 
A-modal beliefs or knowledge as stemming from a recognition of some such breakdown in 
thought that the Ascetic Modalizer now directs her argument.  
 As Divers and González-Varela (2013, pp.379-380) note, their account of the acquisition 
condition for belief in A-necessity is consistent with the perspective of the modal nihilist. On their 
account – or, rather, on my variation of their account – the modal nihilist is an individual who 
claims the ability to C-suppose the negation of any proposition whatsoever. Consequently, the 
modal nihilist does not see any proposition as A-necessary. Of course, this is a controversial 
position: we might simply not be prepared to grant that the modal nihilist can C-suppose whatever 
he likes. But the important thing to note for our purposes is that the debate between the modal 
nihilist and other A-modalizers is supposed to be a substantive one.  
Notice, however, that this debate would be instantly trivialised if, in claiming that it is 
possible for him to C-suppose the negation of any P, the modal nihilist was allowed to appeal to 
the notion of A-possibility. The modal nihilist could then simply assert (for instance) that it is not 
the case that, had his powers of thought been God-like, it would not have been the case that he 
would have developed the C-supposition that (say) 1≠1. Given the thought that A-POSO Q IFF 
P (P → Q), then if that counterfactual were true, it would be possible for the lazy modal 
nihilist to “find” that he “can” C-suppose that 1≠1. And although some may doubt that this 
counterfactual is true, it is presumably not over its truth-value that battles about the extent of A-
necessity are (taken to be) properly fought.  
The trivialisation of the debate could also go in the other direction, if we accept the Credo 
in Invariance. For that credo generates many highly inclusive notions of impossibility. We can then 
imagine a lazy necessitarian who “finds” that it is “impossible”, in one of these most inclusive 
senses of ‘impossible’, for him to C-suppose the negation of every propositions whatsoever. This 
lazy necessitarian will then label every proposition whatsoever A-necessary. Moreover, we can 
imagine an absurd situation, in which the lazy nihilist and the lazy necessitarian come to debate 
the extent of A-necessity, each claiming his own notion of “possibility” as wholly applicable to the 
present dispute. From our sensible perspective, this looks like a spurious debate.   
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 The Ascetic Modalizer will at this point wish to make four points. The first is that if we are 
to have a debate about the plausibility or otherwise of A-modal nihilism, then we must settle on 
one notion of possibility, which will figure in our conception of the acquisition of A-modal beliefs 
and knowledge. The second is that this modal notion cannot be located at the extreme ends of the 
spectrum of counterfactual invariance, on pain of trivialising or mis-locating the substantive 
dispute. The third is that all participants to the debate have known this all along, whether explicitly 
or not, and hence that they were giving a privileged role, in their thinking about A-modality, to 
this notion of possibility, whatever it may be. The fourth is that in the absence of any alternative 
and plausible suggestions, our default stance should be that this notion always was the ordinary 
notion of objective possibility. And so, the Ascetic Modalizer now claims, A-modalizers of the 
above stripe have been treating the ordinary modal notions as special all along: as having a 
privileged explanatory role in the A-Modalizer’s self-image.  
 Now it is admittedly not entirely clear what the Ascetic Modalizer can hope to achieve with 
this speech, even if each of the above points is true. Perhaps, as with all the moves that have 
preceded it, it has only served to further muddy the waters. But the under-represented Ascetic 
Modalizer will welcome that as a win. The above ad hominem suggests an important prima facie 
difference in the roles of ordinary and philosophical modals. The deliberative functions further 
solidify this vision of disunity. And so the Ascetic Modalizer will at this point want to probe into 
the source of the conviction that her position isn’t worth serious attention, should any such 
conviction remain.  
 
Summary      
 
In this chapter, I have charted some of the functional differences that exist between ordinary and 
absolute objective modals. I have also commented on the functions of ordinary subjective modals. 
The vision of ordinary and philosophical modalizing which the present inquiry delivers has been 
argued to be congenial to the Ascetic Modalizer’s vision of modal disunity. I have also indicated 
what I think is the most promising move for the orthodox modalizer: to focus on the topic of 
evaluative roles of counterfactuals, with the aim of unearthing some significant functional 
continuities there. That topic, however, is far too vast for it to receive a meaningful treatment here. 
In the next and final chapter of this thesis, my aim will therefore be to build on this chapter’s 
results, by determining their possible relevance to two ancient ideas about modality.  
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CHAPTER 5      





In the previous chapter, I proposed some functional hypotheses for ordinary subjective and 
objective modals. I also argued that these functional hypotheses do not settle the debate between 
the Ascetic Modalizer and the orthodoxy. In this final chapter, I want to explore the 
interconnections that exist between that discussion and two ancient ideas about modality.  
 In Section 1, I will briefly outline the doctrines of Aristotelian Entailment and of alethicity. 
The former tells us that a species of necessity pertains to deductively valid arguments. The latter 
tells us that the actual is always possible, and the necessary is always actual. But to what extent can 
the Ascetic Modalizer accept the former doctrine? And how do our functional hypotheses square 
with the thought that ordinary subjective and objective modals are alethic?  
 In Section 2, I explore the extent to which the Ascetic Modalizer can, without begging any 
questions, accept some of the ideas and intuitions that may lie behind Aristotelian Entailment. I show 
that she can accept McFetridge’s (1990) argument that these arguments are objectively necessarily 
truth-preserving, in the strongest sense of ‘necessary’, and that there is an important correlation 
between deductive validity and unrestricted counterfactual invariance. I also show that she can 
accept Edgington’s (2004) point that deductively valid arguments are maximally persuasive. I then 
sketch a way in which to develop the work of the Toulminian Programme into an account of belief 
in deductive validity, one that is neutral between Modal Asceticism and the orthodoxy. In this way, 
I hope to show that the Ascetic Modalizer is not obviously compromised in her thinking about 
deductive validity. 
 In Section 3, I turn to the alethicity of ordinary subjective modals. I argue that linguistic 
evidence suggests that they are not, though in the somewhat surprising sense that this evidence 
supports non-cognitivism about subjective modals. I then argue that if we were to engineer a 
representational meaning for these constructions, it could not support alethicity, on pain of making 
subjective modals functionally redundant. Finally, in Section 3, I argue that there is a disquieting 
prima facie tension between the role of objective modals and their presumed alethicity.  
 
5.1 Two Aristotelian Ideas  
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When a student is introduced to philosophy, they will be taught to distinguish between inductively 
valid and deductively valid arguments. Both kinds of argument have premises which support a 
conclusion. However, true premises in an inductively valid argument only need make the 
conclusion likely to be true, or something similar, whereas true premises in a deductively valid 
argument can be said to guarantee the truth of the conclusion.  
This guarantee applies to both formally and informally deductively valid arguments. I will not 
attempt here a precise characterisation of either, and will leave the distinction at an intuitive level. 
As an example of formal deductive validity, we have:  
 
(1) Socrates is a man; All men are mortal; Therefore, Socrates is mortal.  
 
Notice that there is a sense in which this argument has the same form as an argument whose subject 
matter is entirely different:  
 
(2) Tibbles is a cat; All cats are mammals; Therefore, Tibbles is a mammal.  
 
Both arguments seem to instantiate a form of deductively valid argument: x is an F; all Fs are Gs; 
Therefore, x is a G.  Contrast this with the following example of informal deductive validity:  
 
(3) The sky is blue; Therefore, the sky is coloured.  
 
Though this argument seems to be deductively valid, it instantiates a form of argument which is 
not: P; Therefore, Q. But despite the differences between formal and informal deductive validity, 
both kinds of argument are such that the truth of their premises can be said to “guarantee” the 
truth of their conclusions. The truth of <Socrates is a man> and <All men are mortal> seem to 
guarantee the truth of <Socrates is mortal>. Likewise, the truth of <The sky is blue> seems to 
guarantee the truth of <The sky is coloured>.  
But what exactly does this guarantee come down to? One important idea, which goes back 
at least to Aristotle’s day, is that a deductively valid argument is an argument that is necessarily truth-
preserving. Aristotle (Prior Analytics, 24b 18-19) writes:  
 
A deduction is a discourse in which, certain things having been supposed, something 
different from the things supposed results of necessity because these things are so. 
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I think that it should be conceded that some arguments provoke in us a phenomenology of 
necessity, so to speak. When someone accepts the premises in (1), and is then asked whether the 
conclusion is false, the answer seems non-negotiable: the conclusion just can’t be false. And 
although enquiry may eventually decide that this feeling only tracks an epiphenomenon to 
deductive validity, or perhaps even that it tracks nothing at all, the matter is surely worth 
investigating further.  
Let us then call this putative necessity broadly logical. So-understood, the notion of a broadly 
logical necessity is a theoretical one: it has been introduced in order to draw or to explain the 
contrast between inductively and deductively valid arguments. If we say that the relationship 
between the premises and conclusion of a deductively valid argument is that of consequence or of 
entailment, then our first principle of Aristotelian pedigree can be formulated as follows: 
 
Aristotelian Entailment – If a set of propositions, Γ, entails some proposition, <P>, 
then it does so with broadly logical necessity.  
 
We notice that there seems to be a contrast between two kinds of argument, and we notice that a 
feeling of necessity attaches to the one but not the other. We then introduce the notion of a broadly 
logical necessity on the back of this feeling, and we ask ourselves what sorts of properties it needs 
to have, if it is to do its work in circumscribing or explaining deductive validity:  
 
Deductive validity is the central topic of logic. So if, as Aristotle and others have thought, 
to think of an argument as deductively valid requires us to deploy a notion of necessity, 
then that notion, if any, will deserve the label 'logical' necessity. There will be a legitimate 
notion of 'logical' necessity only if there is a notion of necessity which attaches to the 
claim, concerning a deductively valid argument, that if the premisses are true then so is the 
conclusion. (McFetridge, 1990, p.136) 
 
The issue of whether and how Aristotelian Entailment is true is obviously of great significance to our 
understanding of logic and related matters. But as we shall now see, Aristotelian Entailment is also 
of importance to the second ancient idea about modality that this chapter aims to treat.  
Although Aristotle (De Interpretatione, 23a21-6) held some apparently outrageous doctrines 
about possibility and necessity, even he did not stray from the following intuitive pair:68 
 
(POS)  P (If P, then it is possible that P).  
(NEC)  P (If it is necessary that P, then P).  
 
68 On Aristotle’s unconventional perspective on modality, see Sarah Waterlow (1982).  
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Since Aristotle’s day, (POS) and (NEC) have remained central pillars of philosophical and logical 
inquiry into modality. Indeed, (POS) and (NEC) are amongst the axioms that Jan Łukasiewicz 
(1970, pp.352-354) thought necessary and sufficient for a modal logic – a logic which, pre-
theoretically, we might characterise as one that makes use of the terms ‘possible’ and ‘necessary’. 
It therefore seems to me that if any theory is worthy of being called a “doctrine of alethicity”, then 
it must include something like (POS) and (NEC). But it is also common to find analogues of (POS) 
and (NEC) represented as axioms of deductive modal logic – in system T, for instance –  and this 
is certainly how Łukasiewicz (1970) saw them. To my mind, this suggests that (POS) and (NEC) 
may have close cousins:  
 
(POS*)  <P> (<P> entails <Possibly P>).  
(NEC*) <P> (<Necessarily P> entails <P>). 
 
It is emerging that there might exist two doctrines of alethicity. We can define Plain Alethicity as 
the doctrine that (POS) and (NEC) are true, and Logical Alethicity as the doctrine that (POS*) and 
(NEC*) are true. Supposing that Γ’s entailing <P> implies the truth of <If Γ, then P>, it therefore 
follows that Logical Alethicity implies Plain Alethicity.  
Given their form, Logical Alethicity and Plain Alethicity act as criteria for possibility and 
necessity. This reflects Łukasiewicz’s idea (1970) that (POS) and (NEC) are necessary axioms for 
a modal logic, and Michael Huemer’s (2007, p.120) suggestion that the non-obtaining of the 
impossible ‘is a platitude that ought to hold for any sort of “impossibility” worthy of the name.’ 
But I do not myself believe that alethicity is a good criterion for modality. This is because I believe 
that, upon further inspection, prima facie paradigmatic modals turn out not to be alethic. In 
particular, I will eventually argue that (NEC) and (NEC*) are both false, when they are understood 
to be about ordinary subjective necessity.  
But much ground must be cleared before we can reach that point. In particular, 
determining the status of (POS*) and (NEC*) requires us to get clear on Aristotelian Entailment. In 
the next section, I will attempt to make a small contribution towards our understanding of this 
imposing topic. After that, I will try to determine whether or not ordinary subjective and objective 
modals are alethic.  
 
5.2 Deduction and Necessity   
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5.2.1 McFetridge’s Argument     
 
If a notion of necessity is needed in order to circumscribe or illuminate deductive validity, then 
what properties must that necessity have? Ian McFetridge (1990, pp.135-140) has argued that it 
must be the strongest objective necessity.69 Marking broadly logical necessity (L-necessity), objectively 
construed, with the sentential operator ‘L-NECO’, the claim that it is the strongest form of 
objective necessity comes down to this: for any objective necessity NO, and for any P, if L-NECOP, 
then NOP. McFetridge has an interesting argument for this conclusion:  
 
If the claim that an argument is deductively valid involves a notion of necessity then it 
involves the strongest notion of necessity. More fully: I understand the antecedent to be 
the view that for an argument ‘p, so q' to be valid is for it to be necessary, in some sense, 
i.e. logically necessary that if p then q. The consequent then claims that if it is logically 
necessary that if p then q, then there is no other sense of 'necessary' in which it is not 
necessary that if p then q, i.e. no sense of 'possible' in which it is possible that p and not-q. 
 
McFetridge wants to say that if Γ entails <P> only if L-NECO(If Γ, then P), then for any objective 
necessity, NO, NO(If Γ, then P). He will argue for this conditional by reductio: 
 
(i) There is an objective possibility, PO, such that PO(Γ&¬P). Assumption for reductio. 
(ii) For any objective possibility PO, if POP, then there is   Assumption. 
some <Q> which describes a situation in which P.  
(iii) Γ entails <P>.       Assumption. 
(iv) If Γ entails <P>, then for any <R>, Γ&<R> entails <P> Assumption. 
(v) If Γ entails <P>, then assertable is any conditional,   Assumption. 
indicative or counterfactual, of the form: If Γ, then P.       
(vi) There is some <Q> which describes a situation in which  From (i) and (ii). 
(Γ&¬P).  
(vii) Γ&<Q> jointly entail <P>.     From (iii) and (iv).  
(viii) Assertable is any conditional, indicative or subjunctive,  From (v) and (vii). 
of the form: If Γ&Q, then P. 
(ix) There is some <Q> which describes a situation in which  From (vi) and (viii). 
(Γ&¬P); and assertable is any conditional, indicative or  
subjunctive, of the form: If Γ&Q, then P. 
 
 
69 I follow Ian Rumfitt (2010, p.43) in taking McFetridge’s concern to be broadly, and not just formal, 
logical necessity. 
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Since (ix) is highly implausible, it follows that one of our assumptions must be false. McFetridge 
will say that it is assumption (i). But if (i) is rejected, then it looks like there cannot be a 
counterexample to McFetridge’s conditional. So, L-necessity is the strongest objective necessity. 
Even the Ascetic Modalizer can accept that L-necessity is the strongest objective necessity. 
After all, the Ascetic Modalizer only recognises one species of objective necessity, and this would 
trivially be the strongest objective necessity. But that is not how McFetridge conceives of L-
necessity. For McFetridge (1990, pp.150-153), Aristotelian Entailment is to be understood as stating 
that if Γ entails <P>, then it does so with absolute necessity: that Γ entails <P>, then A-
NECO¬(Γ&¬P). Notice, however, that McFetridge’s argument cannot by itself establish that L-
necessity is A-necessity, for it cannot establish the unrestricted counterfactual invariance of 
¬(Γ&¬P), nor Unrestricted Invariance: 
 
Unrestricted Invariance – P is absolutely necessary IFF P is unrestrictedly 
counterfactually invariant.  
 
It therefore follows that the Ascetic Modalizer may accept McFetridge’s argument, and accept that 
the unrestricted counterfactual invariance of ¬(Γ&¬P) is tied to Γ’s entailing <P>, without 
compromising her outlook. Of course, whether or not she is right to disqualify the notion of 
unrestricted counterfactual invariance from the modal realm is another matter entirely. In Chapter 
4, I tried to make a compelling case on behalf of the Ascetic Modalizer, but the results were 
inconclusive. Still, so as not to beg the question against this figure, it may be worth simply focusing 
on the question of whether the following principle is true: 
 
Invariance Entailment – If a set of propositions, Γ, entails some proposition, <P>, 
then it is unrestrictedly counterfactually invariant that ¬(Γ&¬P). 
 
Now if Γ’s entailing <P> with L-necessity just is its being the case that it is L-necessary that 
¬(Γ&¬P), and if L-necessities are the strongest objective necessities, and if Unrestricted Invariance is 
true, then Aristotelian Entailment is equivalent to Invariance Entailment. It is therefore consistent with 
the Ascetic Modalizer’s stance that Aristotelian Entailment and Invariance Entailment are both true, 
and that McFetridge’s argument is sound, provided that Unrestricted Invariance is false. In this way, 
we can see how even the Ascetic Modalizer can accept a great deal that is prima facie important 
about deductive validity.  
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5.2.2 The Edgingtonian A Priori 
 
We have so far been working under the assumption that L-necessity is an objective necessity. This 
can be denied. If it is, the resultant position is also consistent with Modal Asceticism. Indeed, it is 
even consistent with Modal Asceticism and Invariance Entailment. But should anyone deny that 
assumption? In order to answer that question, it will be instructive to look at an interesting attempt 
at a subjective conception of L-necessity. It is due to Edgington (2004).  
Edgington (2004, pp.8-10) approaches L-necessity like McFetridge (1990): as a theoretical 
posit for distinguishing deductive validity from the rest. However, Edgington suggests that our 
sense of deductive validity is sensitive to more than a feeling of necessity. For Edgington (2004, 
p.9), there is an epistemological component too:  
 
an argument is valid if and only if it is necessary that the conclusion is true if the premises 
are true [...] [and] if an argument is valid, and you accept that the premises are true, you 
need no further empirical information to enable you to recognise that the conclusion is 
true. The premises rationally commit you to the conclusion.  
 
From that point onwards, Edgington will argue that the best way of accommodating both intuitions 
is to understand broadly logical necessity as she understands a priori necessity. Along the way, 
Edgington will take issue with McFetridge’s (1990, pp.135-140), argument. This is because 
Edgington thinks that this argument motivates an unnecessarily complex view, in which L-
necessity is the strongest objective necessity and is a priori necessary. But the debate between 
Edgington and McFetridge isn’t confined to this exchange: in that paper, McFetridge was 
responding to an ancestor of Edgington’s (2004). And then in response to Edgington, Rumfitt 
(2010) enters the fray, on behalf of McFetridge. Ignoring the resultant complexities, I will now 
make a modest contribution to the wider dialectical situation.  
Edgington notices that deductive validity seems to implicate necessity and a priority. In 
Chapter 1, I briefly noted that Edgington (2004, p.6) builds a concept of a priori necessity out of 
ordinary subjective modalizing: P is a priori necessary IFF P is such that, for any subject s, and for 
any state of information i, it is objectively possible for s to recognise that NECSP when in i. Aiming 
to capture both intuitions about deductive validity, Edgington now wants to say that this is the 
notion of L-necessity that we’ve been looking for. Thus, Edgington can say that if Γ entails <P>, 
then it is a priori necessary that ¬(Γ&¬P), where this amounts to <¬(Γ&¬P)>’s being recognisable 
as subjectively necessary, by anybody, in any state of information. 
 But this introduces a difficulty. In Section 3, I will argue that there are compelling reasons 
for thinking that subjective modalizing does not even satisfy Plain Alethicity. These reasons are 
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entirely independent of the matter of Aristotelian Entailment, and so there is no circularity or 
question-beggingness afoot here. And I am right, then NECS¬(Γ&¬P) is compatible with 
(Γ&¬P). But then it looks as though Edgington’s notion of the a priori necessary cannot help us 
to capture the distinctive character of deductive validity. After all, the Edgingtonian a priori 
necessity of ¬(Γ&¬P) cannot even guarantee that if Γ, then P. And speaking quite generally now, 
we should be suspicious of Edgington’s construction of the a priori, if subjective modalizing is not 
alethic.  
If Edgington wishes to stand by her intuition that some notion of necessity pertains to 
deductive validity, then she cannot only appeal to the a priori. Of course, this does not tell us that 
Edgington is wrong about a priority being a component of our (pre)theoretical notion of deductive 
validity. But should we think that this is true? Edgington (2004, p.10) writes: 
 
In my view it is the least departure from traditional, pre-Kripkean thinking, and more 
consonant with the point of distinguishing valid from invalid arguments, to take validity 
to be governed by epistemic necessity, i.e., an argument is valid if and only if there is an a 
priori route from premises to conclusion. 
 
This passage alludes to the question of what we stand to gain from marking arguments as 
deductively valid. Edgington seems to be suggesting that the purpose of deduction-talk is 
functionally similar to our claiming an a priori route from Γ to <P>. Presumably, that function is 
to locate arguments which are, in some sense, maximally persuasive: this much seems implicit in 
Edgington’s (2004, p.9) claim that the premises in a deductively valid argument ‘rationally commit’ 
us to the conclusion. We can grant Edgington this important observation without assimilating 
deductive validity to a priority, however. Many candidate formulations suggest themselves at this 
point, but I think that it will be helpful to opt with something like the following:  
 
Persuasive Entailment – If a set of propositions, Γ, entails some proposition, <P>, 
then for any rational s who accepts that Γ, s must accept that <P>.  
 
Persuasive Entailment allows us to capture a feeling of necessity which pertains to our experiences 
of deductively valid arguments. But if we do find that certain arguments are such that we cannot 
jointly accept their premises and the negation of their conclusions, then if this is an objective modal 
fact, it is about us. Persuasive Entailment therefore cannot capture the idea that if an argument is 
deductively valid, then it is necessarily truth-preserving. It therefore cannot be equivalent to 
Aristotelian Entailment. And, finally, Persuasive Entailment does not settle the issue of whether 
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maximal persuasiveness is a constitutive feature of deductive validity, or one that merely tracks it. 
It nonetheless seems to be an important aspect of our thinking about deductive validity.  
 
5.2.3 Belief in Deductive Validity  
 
I now want to return to Divers and Elstein (2012), who argue for an interesting conception of the 
manifestation conditions of belief in L-necessity. Drawing on Divers and González-Varela (2013), I 
will show how this work might be extended into an account of the proper acquisition and 
manifestation conditions for belief in deductive validity. This account promises to vindicate both 
Persuasive Entailment and Invariance Entailment, without prejudging the debate between the Ascetic 
Modalizer and the orthodoxy. Now, my intention here is only to showcase the potential for some 
such proposal to be developed in detail: it is emphatically not the finished article. I nonetheless 
believe that this brief and incomplete exercise is worth doing, and not least because it allows us to 
see how, exactly, the Ascetic Modalizer may wish to co-opt the intuitions that might appear to 
drive Aristotelian Entailment. 
Divers and Elstein (2012, p.110) aim to capture the importance of Invariance Entailment as 
a component in our thinking about L-necessity, with a view towards extending this project to A-
necessity more broadly. In this way, they wish to capture and generalise McFetridge’s crucial 
insights. To that end, Divers and Elstein make propositions the focal point of their inquiry, rather 
than arguments or inferential rules. But they also take great care to distinguish between the general 
class of A-modalizing and its sub-species in L-modalizing. In particular, according to Divers and 
Elstein (2012, pp.127-128), properly manifesting belief in the L-necessity of P means properly 
manifesting belief in the A-necessity and a priority of P, where the latter’s manifestation condition 
construed is – in a way that is acknowledged to be somewhat revisionary – as follows:  
 
(AP) In aiming at stability-preservation, x is prepared to add <P> as a premise to any 
un-nested A-supposition S.  
 
Bearing in mind Divers and González-Varela’s (2013) subsequent development of the 
manifestation condition for belief in A-necessity, and my own modest revision to this proposal in 
Chapter 3, minimal departure from (AP) therefore suggests the following manifestation condition 
for belief in the L-necessity of P:   
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(LN) (i) x believes that P; and (ii) for all S, such that x finds herself able to C-suppose 
that S, x treats <P> as adducible from within the scope of the C-supposition that 
S; and (iii) for all S, such that x finds herself able to A-suppose that S, x treats <P> 
as adducible from within the scope of the C-supposition that S. 
 
(LN) then inspires the following suggestion about the manifestation of belief in Γ’s entailing <P>:   
 
(MAN-E) (i) x believes that ¬(Γ&¬P); and (ii) for all S, such that x finds herself able 
to C-suppose that S, x treats <¬(Γ&¬P)> as adducible from within the 
scope of the C-supposition that S; and (iii) for all S, such that x finds herself 
able to A-suppose that S, x treats <¬(Γ&¬P)> as adducible from within 
the scope of the A-supposition that S. 
 
Now if (MAN-E) is true, then in circumscribing the domain of deductive validity, one would have 
to be prepared to treat ¬(Γ&¬P) as unrestrictedly counterfactually invariant. One would therefore 
be committed to Invariance Entailment. And so if one accepts Unrestricted Invariance, then 
circumscribing the domain of deductive validity requires commitment to the A-necessity of 
¬(Γ&¬P). But we must at this stage remind ourselves of two important points.  
Firstly, in maintaining our intended neutrality about the Ascetic Modalizer’s position, we 
do well to remain agnostic about Unrestricted Invariance. But secondly, and more importantly still, 
whatever gloss we may wish to put on unrestricted counterfactual invariance, it does not follow 
from (MAN-E) that manifesting belief in Γ’s entailing <P> requires us to view the unrestricted 
counterfactual invariance of ¬(Γ&¬P) as (somehow) grounding or constituting Γ’s entailing <P>. 
And, indeed, there are powerful considerations in favour of not doing so: considerations that stem 
from the controversial but fair-minded suspicion that an explanatory role for unrestricted 
counterfactual invariance seems under-motivated, in light of the problems, recounted in Chapter 
1, for realism about counterfactuality. And although that is certainly only the beginning of the 
conversation, it does suggest a prima facie problem for understanding Invariance Entailment in a 
constitutive sense.  
What does (MAN-E) suggest about the proper acquisition conditions for belief in Γ’s 
entailing <P>? One might be tempted to say that it must be structurally analogous to (MAN-E), 
if acquisition and manifestation are to be rationally harmonious, in the manner of Divers and 
González-Varela (2013) on belief in A-necessity. Thus, one might propose that our rational x must 
already believe that ¬(Γ&¬P), and must find herself unable to develop the A- and C-suppositions 
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that (Γ&¬P). But there is a reason to resist maximal structural similarity, even if it does complicate 
the issue of rational harmony. My issue is with the requirement that x already believe that 
¬(Γ&¬P): for building this into the proposed acquisition condition would make it difficult to see 
how, should our rational x come across Γ & P for the first time, and be uncertain about both, x 
could come to acquire the belief that ¬(Γ&¬P) by coming to believe that Γ entails <P>. I therefore 
want to propose a simple acquisition condition for belief in Γ’s entailing <P>: 
 
(ACQ-E) x finds herself unable to A-suppose that (Γ&¬P) and to C-suppose that (Γ&¬P). 
 
It is this acquisition condition which guarantees that someone who properly acquires belief in Γ’s 
entailing <P> must accept <P>, should she accept Γ: it is what guarantees Persuasive Entailment. 
For given her acceptance of Γ, and upon failing to properly develop the A and C-suppositions that 
(Γ&¬P), our rational x will simply find that she is unable to accept <¬P>. Or so it seems to me, 
although an argument for this conclusion would require a more thorough investigation into the 
inability described in (ACQ-E) than I can give it here. Two points are nonetheless worth making 
at this early stage. 
The first, anticipated by Divers and Elstein (2012, p.116), is that significant difficulties may 
lurk in our evoking the notion of stability preservation in (ACQ-E). For recall that, following Divers 
and Elstein, we have implicitly restricted our acquisition and manifestation conditions to what is 
supposed to be good reasoning, where this has been understood to be, in part, a matter of 
maintaining the stability of the supposed contents. But this norm cannot straightforwardly be 
applied to the present case, for the instability of a set of propositions was defined by Divers and 
Elstein as consisting in its having an arbitrary proposition as consequence. But then if we want to say 
that our x, in aiming at stability preservation, finds herself unable to A-suppose that (Γ&¬P), then we 
presuppose on behalf of our x a belief about what entails what. This is unlikely to make (ACQ-E) 
as satisfying account of properly acquired belief in deductive validity. And for similar reasons, we 
note that the requirement of Maintain Consistency, which may well be intimately connected to the 
norm of stability preservation, also enjoys a complicated status when thinking about (ACQ-E).  
The second is that we may (therefore) wish to lean rather heavily on the norm of good 
reasoning that is introduced in Divers and González-Varela (2013, p.371): the norm of content 
preservation. Thus, in order for our rational x to find herself able to A-suppose that (Γ&¬P), she 
would need to find that, whenever a content that “looks like” <(Γ&¬P)> crops within the scope 
of that supposition, that content really is <(Γ&¬P)>. The suggestion might therefore be that 
acquiring belief in Γ’s entailing <P> is – at least partly – a matter of our x finding that, upon trying 
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to develop the A-supposition that (Γ&¬P), she cannot still think about (Γ&¬P). And this may be 
why, should our x already accept Γ, and upon finding that she cannot develop the A-supposition 
that (Γ&¬P), x finds that she must accept that P. 
There is, therefore, a good deal more work to be done here, before this account can pass 
for a serious contender (and I must emphasise that its shortcomings can all be traced back to my 
somewhat cavalier attitude towards the far more careful approach that is found in the Toulminian 
Programme). Still, there is promise in this embryonic proposal. In the first instance, notice how 
(ACQ-E) may vindicate Persuasive Entailment without making properly acquired belief in deductive 
validity carry a commitment to maximal persuasiveness being constitutive of deductive validity. It 
does, however, require us to think that in circumscribing the domain of deductive validity, one 
must be prepared to accept Persuasive Entailment. And as already noted, the same goes for Invariance 
Entailment. But this neutrality ought to be seen as a positive feature of the account. In this way, 
(ACQ-E) and (MAN-E) can claim to be neutral with respect to the metaphysics of deductive 
validity, a neutrality inherited from the proposals of Divers, Elstein, and González-Varela.  
 More importantly for our purposes, (ACQ-E) and (MAN-E) show us that the Ascetic 
Modalizer is free to accept a great deal of what philosophical modalizers may have wanted to say 
with Aristotelian Entailment. The thought that deductive validity requires objective necessary truth-
preservation can be endorsed by the Ascetic Modalizer, provided that it is ordinary objective 
necessity that we are talking about. The same goes for McFetridge’s (1990) argument that this 
modality’s being the strongest objective modality. And the Ascetic Modalizer also finds that she 
can accommodate the important ideas of Persuasive Entailment and Invariance Entailment. Finally, the 
Ascetic Modalizer can locate, in (ACQ-E), the feeling of necessity that attaches to our experiences 
of deductive arguments.  
All that puts her in a dialectally powerful position: for it is now incumbent upon her 
interlocutor to discern, within the present context, the theoretical value in (say) Unrestricted 
Invariance. What do we stand to gain from putting a modal gloss on Invariance Entailment, when our 
interest is in theorising about (our beliefs about) deductive validity? Quite apart from anything 
else, the Ascetic Modalizer’s challenge can certainly force us to look harder when locating the 
precise source of our various commitments in this area.  
 
5.3  Are Subjective Modals Alethic?  
 
5.3.1  An Uphill Battle 
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At first blush, it may seem obvious that subjective modals are not alethic. Is there not compelling 
linguistic data that suggests that attitudinal necessity cannot satisfy (NEC)? Here is an example, 
from Sherman (2018, p.820). Suppose that you are standing outside in the pouring rain, and that 
your friend phones you, asking what the weather is like. Consider now two possible responses:  
 
(4) It is raining out. 
(5) ?? It must be raining out. 
  
It would be very odd for you to respond with (5), as it seems to connote uncertainty with respect 
to its prejacent, an uncertainty that is inappropriate in this scenario. But then if assenting to 
<NECSP> requires uncertainty about <P>, how could (NEC) be true? 
 Nevertheless, von Fintel and Gillies (2010) have argued that such data needn’t suggest 
non-alethicity. In outline, the thought is that we have misconstrued a connotation of indirect inference 
for a connotation of epistemic uncertainty. On this view, an assertion of <NECSP> communicates 
that <P> has been indirectly inferred, not that one isn’t fully certain about it. As it applies to our 
rainy scenario, the proposed explanation is that (2) is inappropriate because the truth of (1) will 
have been directly perceived, and not inferred.  
 Now, as von Fintel and Gillies (2010, p.368) themselves admit, it isn’t immediately obvious 
why there ought to be this connection between subjective necessity and indirect inference. 
Moreover, the suggestion appears to be descriptively inadequate: as Sherman (2018, pp.822-823) 
argues, their proposal fails to explain some subjective uses of ‘must’, and predicts that ‘must’ would 
be appropriately used in cases where this is plainly not so. This tells me that we should only accept 
the alethicity of subjective modality as a last resort. However, in a later paper, von Fintel and Gillies 
(2020) present some interesting data which appears to square poorly with the non-alethic position. 
In what follows, I review their case for alethicity.  
 
5.3.2  Linguistic Evidence  
 
In our rainy scenario, ‘must’ seems to connote uncertainty. However, there appear to be cases in 
which it does not. Von Fintel and Gillies (2010, p.362) give the following example, in which ‘must’ 
is used in the conclusion of a deductively valid argument. Chris loses here ball, but she knows with 
certainty that it is either in box A or B or C. Reasoning aloud, she argues as follows: 
 
(6) The ball is either in A or B or C; It is not in A or B; So, it must be in C.  
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There are at least two ways in which to respond to such examples. The first is to argue that the 
subjective ‘must’ sometimes connotes weakness even in these contexts. This is basically the line 
taken by Sherman (2018, pp.830-831), who writes: 
 
arguments from elimination are notoriously bad arguments. Perhaps, one thinks, 
considerations of the sort that lead one to eliminate all but one possibility would also 
eliminate the remaining possibility. Or perhaps the considered possibilities were not 
exhaustive. That is, perhaps there is a possibility that has not been considered. 
 
In such a context, a concluding ‘must’ could still connote uncertainty. Of course, von Fintel and 
Gillies’ agent is stipulated to have certain knowledge of her disjunction. But then given the existence 
of contexts in which a concluding ‘must’ connotes uncertainty, one might simply insist that the 
‘must’ in von Fintel and Gillies’ example is infelicitous.  
Von Fintel and Gillies (2010, p.364) provide another example involving deductive validity, 
where ‘must’ finds its way into a premise. Consider the following argument:  
 
(7) If Carl is at the party, then Lenny must be at the party; Carl is at the party; So, Lenny 
is at the party.  
 
Von Fintel and Gillies tell us that this argument instantiates a deductively valid form. Obviously, 
this could not be the case if <NECSP> were not alethic. However, Von Fintel and Gillies  (2010, 
p.364) note that a reviewer did not share in their impression of validity. Moreover, as Daniel 
Lassiter (2016, p.140) has argued in connection with this premisory ‘must’, impressions of validity 
are slippery. Psychological research suggests that our intuitive sense of deductive “validity” doesn’t 
require guaranteed truth-preservation, and is best understood as working on a probabilistic scale: 
the higher the probability of the conclusion conditional on its premises, the more “intuitively valid” 
the argument will tend to be judged. Lassiter suggests that this might explain away the intuition 
felt by von Fintel and Gillies.  
 In a more recent paper, von Fintel and Gillies (2020) respond to Lassiter. They begin by 
considering an analogue of (7), which also boasts a concluding ‘must’ (von Fintel and Gillies, 2020, 
p.4): 
 
(8) If Carl is at the party, then Lenny must be at the party; Carl is at the party; So, Lenny 
must be at the party.  
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Von Fintel and Gillies (2020, p.4) then say that ‘there is no relevant difference’ between these two 
versions of their argument, and that a ‘theory that says there is a difference but explains it away by 
insisting that we are systematically mistaken about it is dispreferred to one that embraces the non-
difference and predicts it.’ But this move is puzzling. When von Fintel and Gillies say ‘we’, who 
do they mean? Surely not those experts who do not share the intuition that their original argument 
is valid. Could it therefore be the folk? Perhaps, although it is debatable that we should rely on the 
intuitions of non-experts, when it comes to circumscribing the realm of deductively valid 
inference.  
The problem is this. On the basis of their intuitive judgments of deductive validity, von 
Fintel and Gillies claim that there is no difference between the two versions of their argument, 
which would imply the alethicity of subjective necessity. But those intuitions are not universally 
shared, and may be unreliable, as Lassiter’s (2018) response suggests. Within this dialectal context, 
it is bizarre to just insist that there is no relevant difference. And there we have it again: some 
people have one intuition about subjective modals, and others do not.  
 
5.3.3 Constructing Subjective Modals 
 
With data that points in so many different directions, it can be difficult to know where to go. Does 
our subjective modalizing indicate alethicity, or does it not? I think that there is a way of seeing 
this data which suggests that alethicity is false. But I also think that when non-alethicity is 
motivated in this way, as a descriptive thesis, the matter of alethicity is not thereby settled as a 
normative thesis. Allow me to explain.   
 There is a real danger that subjective modals are not truth-apt. To see this, consider Crispin 
Wright’s (1992) minimalism about truth-aptness. For Wright (1992, pp.27-29), the declarative 
sentences of an area of discourse are truth-apt only if two conditions are met. The first is that the 
discourse is disciplined: it exhibits well-established norms that govern assent to its declarative 
sentences. The second is that the discourse behaves like paradigmatically truth-apt discourses do: its 
declarative sentences survive embeddings into negations, conjunctions, disjunctions, conditionals, 
and propositional attitude ascriptions. But it is doubtful that subjective modals satisfy either of these 
conditions.  
Judgments about the felicity or correctness conditions of subjective necessity modals seem 
to vary greatly, which challenges the requirement of discipline. Moreover, subjective modals can 
struggle in many embedded contexts. Looking at corpus data, Valentine Hacquard and Alexis 
Wellwood (2012) have observed the following distributions. Firstly, the subjective ‘might’ is hardly 
 150 
ever observed as the compliment of desideratives (‘want’, ‘wish’) or directives (orders, permissions and 
prohibitions). Secondly, almost no subjective ‘must’ is ever seen as the compliment of 
desideratives, directives, or emotives (‘anger’, ‘bother’, ‘hope’, ‘fear’). And finally, the subjective 
‘must’ is hardly ever found in conditional antecedents.  
Now it is a good question whether we could really make sense of (NEC*) being true of 
subjective modals, if these modals are not truth-apt. After all, some may wish to insist on the 
thought that entailment requires truth-preservation. But there is another route from non-
cognitivism about subjective modals to the denial of (NEC*). For if subjective necessity modals 
cannot survive embedding in all conditional antecedents, then (NEC) must be gibberish, and 
(hence) neither true nor false: after all, (NEC) is a schema in which a subjective necessity operator 
is embedded into a conditional antecedent. And if (NEC) is gibberish, then it is not assertable. But 
now recall this prima facie plausible premise in McFetridge’s argument that logical necessity is the 
strongest necessity: If Γ entails <P>, then assertable is any conditional, indicative or counterfactual, 
of the form ‘If Γ, then P’. If that is true, then by reductio, (NEC*) is false.  
 It therefore looks like non-alethicity is motivated by the data, though probably not in the 
way that many would have thought it might be. Notice, however, that there is something very 
uncomfortable about the resultant position. After all, we certainly want to use the truth-predicate when 
subjectively modalizing. Moreover, we quite naturally ascribe beliefs whose objects are subjectively 
modal contents. But non-cognitivism in this domain suggests that we cannot continue to do so in 
good conscience. Perhaps, then, a properly philosophical task is before us: we must stipulate a 
meaning for subjective modals, one which will rescue this discourse from non-cognitivism by 
imposing discipline and syntacticality upon it. This sort of project is familiar from work in conceptual 
engineering, in which the philosopher aims to improve upon a representational device, rather than 
to describe it – see, for instance, Cappelen (2018). In this case, however, there is a twist: for if 
subjective modals are not even truth-apt, then they cannot be representational devices. In the 
present case, we are to improve upon subjective modalizing by making it into a representational 
device.  
 What sorts of constraints are appropriate for this project? Well, to the extent that there is 
widespread agreement in our subjective modalizing, the proposed meaning should be extensionally 
adequate to the non-controversial cases. However, the common divergences in our intuitions will 
make this constraint fairly weak. My suggestion, naturally enough, is therefore that we pay close 
attention to the function of subjective modalizing. We are to construct a meaning for subjective 
modals which (somehow) aligns with whatever it is that these modals are good for.  
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This is why the issue of alethicity about subjective modals is unsettled as a normative thesis, 
even if we think it descriptively true. From the ameliorative point of view, we face a choice: 
between stipulating a meaning for subjective modals that delivers alethicity, and stipulating a 
meaning which does not. And when functional considerations are brought to bear on this issue, 
the question becomes that of whether the function of subjective modalizing requires alethicity, or 
whether it does not.  
In Chapter 4, I argued that the utility of subjective necessity modals lies in their having the 
same effects as the assertion of their prejacents, but at a lower cost. Asserting <NECSP> allows 
us to stop theoretically C-supposing P, and to adduce <P> within the scope of a C-supposition, 
without <P> meeting the norms of psychological and epistemic certainty. It is therefore clear that 
a meaning for subjective necessity modals which committed us to (NEC) or (NEC*) would be 
disastrous, from the point of view of these functions: for then asserting <NECSP> would force us 
to be certain that P. Indeed, it would then become easier to assert that P than to assert that NECSP. 
Functional considerations therefore counsel against alethicity in this domain.  
What, then, should the meaning for these constructions be? Sherman (2018, pp.825-833) 
has argued that we should understand subjective possibilities as complete answers to epistemically 
open questions, and that we should understand subjective necessity operators as universally 
quantifying over subjective possibilities so-defined. In this way, P might be subjectively necessary 
because it is the only complete answer that we have to an epistemically open question. I will not 
comment on this interesting proposal, nor on Sherman’s suggestion that it be generalised to 
modals beyond the subjective. I simply wish to register the thought that in so far as functional 
considerations bear on the project of constructing a meaning for subjective modals, then we must 
(somehow) ensure that alethicity is not thereby generated.  
 
5.4  Are Objective Modals Alethic? 
 
5.4.1 Alethicity and Time: Four Options 
 
Unlike the discourse of subjective modality, objective modals are well-disciplined, and seem to 
behave like other paradigmatically representational modes of discourse.  It might therefore appear 
more than a little misguided to challenge their presumed alethicity. But I hope that it is not. In my 
view, working through the case against alethicity in the objective domain forces some interesting 
reflections.  
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The difficulty here is that objective modal statuses are had at times: before my injury, it was 
possible for me to run up that hill; but it is possible for me no more. I do not believe that we can 
really make sense of a timeless notion of ordinary objective modality, and I certainly do not think 
that the resultant notion, even if intelligible, would be a very useful to us, given the roles that we 
unearthed for objective modals in Chapter 4. But as I now want to show, the functionally de jure 
temporality of objective modals turns out to meddle with the sacrosanct. In what follows, I will 
focus on objective possibility in order to show that whatever we do to build time into the alethicity 
of objective modals, we will run into prima facie problems of some sort. 
 
Option 1: Past Possibility. Our first option is to say that something actual was possible at some point 
in time before it was actual. For any time, t, and any n > 0, (POS) and (POS*) are thereby glossed 
as follows:  
 
(Past-POS)  P (If P-at-t, then at t–n, POSOP).  
(Past-POS*)  <P> (<P-at-t> entails <At t–n, POSOP>) 
 
Now, if Plain Alethicity is wedded to (Past-POS), then it is clear that the alethicist cannot accept 
that there was a first moment in time. For suppose that some P obtains at this first moment in 
time, t. Then it follows from (Past-POS) that it was possible at t–n that P. But that cannot be, 
because t was the first moment in time, so nothing, including the possibility of P, could have 
obtained before then. So, the alethicist who holds (Past-POS) is committed to their being no first 
moment in time. She must then reckon with whatever outstanding difficulties are thought to attach 
to the suggestion that the actual world extends infinitely into the past, if time is discrete, or commit 
herself to a dense conception of time: between any two instants in time, there is another instant. 
 There may not be a safe way out for the present defender of Logical Alethicity, however. 
Consider, for instance, Invariance Entailment, the claim that if Γ entails <P>, then it is unrestrictedly 
counterfactually invariant that ¬(Γ&¬P). If that is accepted, then (Past-POS*) commits us to their 
being no Q such that Q → (P-at-t & ¬(At t–n, POSOP)). But there clearly seems to be some such 
Q: for if P had obtained at t, and t had been the first moment in time, then P would have obtained 
at t, and it would not have been the case that, at t–n, POSOP. I do not see any obvious reason why 
this counterfactual isn’t true.  
 
Option 2: Concurrent Possibility. Our second option is to say that something actual is possible at that 
very moment. For any time, t, (POS) and (POS*) are thereby glossed as follows:  
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(Concurrent-POS)  P (If P-at-t, then at t, POSOP). 
(Concurrent-POS*)   <P> (<P-at-t> entails <At t, POSOP>) 
 
Option 2 faces two difficulties. The first is that it threatens a commitment to an actual infinity of a 
potentially worrisome kind. This problem is discussed by Graham Oppy (2019), in his response to 
Edward Fesser’s (2017) Aristotelian Proof for the existence of God. But we needn’t delve into the 
details of this debate to appreciate Oppy’s concern. 
Oppy’s move can be succinctly put. A premise in Fesser’s argument, as understood by 
Oppy (2019, p.3) is the following: ‘The existence of S at any given moment itself presupposes the 
concurrent actualization of S’s potential for existence.’ Oppy takes this to commit Fesser (2017) 
to the more general thesis that something cannot be F at t unless it is also potentially F at t. But 
then since it would be actually potentially F at t, (Concurrent-POS) implies that F is potentially 
potentially F at t. And Oppy (2019, p5) writes that ‘it would be intolerably arbitrary to halt this 
regress after taking the first step; the obviously better move is not to make the first step.’  
 The defender of Option 2 may at this point protest the charge that she has a regress on 
her hands: for whilst the above certainly looks like an infinite proliferation of modal properties, it 
is not (obviously) an infinite ordered sequence of a potentially regressive sort. The matter, however, 
is not so simple. Fesser’s argument, for instance, assumes that there cannot be any infinitely 
extending hierarchical causal series. If we read Oppy’s challenge within this context, then his move 
looks to be fair-minded: for perhaps the premise that something cannot be F at t unless it is also 
potentially F at t commits Fesser to some such series. For there are many plausible-seeming 
principles that appear to be capable of generating infinite hierarchical series in concert with 
(Concurrent-POS). For example, one might think that any actual P is (partly) caused or explained 
by POSOP; and hence that POSOP is (partly) caused or explained by POSOPOSOP; and so forth. 
To the extent that she is happy with causation or explanation, the defender of Option 2 may well 
accept such a principle. She would therefore appear to have an infinite hierarchical series on her 
hands.70 
 
70 It is of course possible for someone to deny any such principle, so that the concurrency view does not 
generate ordered sequences for them. But unless an independent reason is given for doing so, the move 
will look ad hoc. Moreover, there are reasons to think it independently unmotivated. Although we rarely care 
to make them explicit, removing possibilities from explanations sounds extremely odd. (The plant survived, 
but in no part because it was possible for it to do so.) And we sometimes do appeal to possibilities as parts of our 
explanations. (Why does the coin only ever land heads or tails? Because it can land heads, and it can land tails, 
but it can’t land in any other way.) A better move, I think, is to deny that these modality-involving hierarchical 
sequences are in some way problematic. But it is clear that this is the start, and not the end, of the 
conversation: Fesser and Oppy, for instance, worry about such sequences. 
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 Suppose now that a defender of Plain Alethicity holds (Concurrent-POS). Then in light of 
the above, she must attend to whatever difficulties might threaten whichever actual infinite 
hierarchy she finds herself saddled with. That could be a tall order, though she may have an easier 
job on her hands than whomever holds (Concurrent-POS*) and Invariance Entailment. Indulging in 
a familiar idiom for illustrative purposes, to defend this version of Logical Alethicity would be to 
argue that there are no possible worlds in which there are no infinite hierarchies of the sort that 
the alethicist accepts.  
The second difficulty for Option 2 is, I think, more serious. The problem is that Option 2 
would make the notion of objective modality pretty much useless. In Chapter 4, I argued that 
ordinary contingency modals allow us to circumscribe the domain of future-directed propositions 
about which we should remain epistemically uncertain, and to circumscribe the domain of future-
directed propositions that it is not ipso facto irrational to practically consider. But if the modal status 
of some P is concurrent with P, it is rather difficult to see how this notion could play these roles. 
The reason we can be certain about necessities obtaining was, I suggested, that we have a posteriori 
certain knowledge that some future P is or was necessary, and a priori knowledge that when 
something it necessary, it obtains. But then if Option 2 is correct, having a posteriori certain 
knowledge that P is or was necessary can only ever make us epistemically certain that P has obtained 
or will obtain. Not only could we have found that out without recourse to the modal notion, but we 
obviously cannot use this notion, so construed, as a way of reducing the set of future-directed 
epistemically uncertain propositions. Similarly, in the practical case. We need a posteriori knowledge 
that it is now contingent for us to do F later. If all we can know about future F’s modal status is 
that it either will or won’t be contingent at the time at which it either will or won’t obtain, then we 
cannot now use the notion of contingency to determine whether or not we should practically 
consider whether to F. 
 
Option 3: Future Possibility. Our third option is to say that something actual is possible at some point 
in time after it is actual. For any time, t, and any n > 0, (POS) and (POS*) are thereby glossed as 
follows:  
 
(Future-POS)  P (If P-at-t, then at t + n, POSOP). 
(Future-POS*)   <P> (<P-at-t> entails <At t + n, POSOP>) 
 
This bizarre view is not worth much consideration. For reasons that mirror those concerning 
Option 1, Option 3 commits the alethicist to an actual infinite future. Moreover, actual 
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counterexamples abound: when a cup that once held drink is thrown into the furnace, it is not 
possible for it to hold drink in the future. Since I don’t think that anyone would be much concerned 
to defend alethicity in this form, I will leave the matter at that, and propose to ignore this option 
in the rest of the discussion.  
 
Option 4: The Disjunctive View. The final strategy for building time into the alethicity of objective 
modals begins with the thought that something actual is possible concurrently or before being 
actual. For any time, t, and any n > 0, (POS) and (POS*) are thereby glossed as follows:  
 
(Disjunctive-POS)  P (If P-at-t, then at t–n or t, POSOP). 
(Disjunctive-POS*)  <P> (<P-at-t> entails <At t–n or t, POSOP>) 
 
Of course, if the disjunctive alethicist is to hold a distinctive position here, then she must also deny 
(Past-POS) and (Concurrent-POS), as both imply (Disjunctive-POS). She must also deny (Past-
POS*) and (Concurrent-POS*), as both imply (Disjunctive-POS*). So, Option 4 also includes a 
denial of Option 1 and Option 2.   
Now, since I cannot think of any plausible counterexamples to (Disjunctive-POS*), I am 
inclined to say that this is the only version of Logical Alethicity plus Invariance Entailment which can 
tolerate the addition of time. For this reason, Option 4 might look like the most promising so far. 
It is nonetheless suspiciously ad hoc. The only way of denying (Past-POS) and (Concurrent-POS) 
whilst maintaining (Disjunctive-POS) is to say that some actualities are only concurrently possible, 
and that some actualities were only possible before being actual. But why should this be the case? 
Unless the alethicist can give us some indication of how these discrepancies might be explained, 
then some may suspect that her position amounts to something of a last resort. And whist we can 
perhaps empathise with her situation, it is presumably important to do so whilst maintaining a 
healthy aversion to gerrymandered modal terrains.  
 
5.4.2 A Worrying Possibility  
 
Certain principles enjoy a default status, and this is no doubt true of the presumed alethicity of 
objective modals. I now hope to have shown that anyone who accepts that objective modals are 
alethic has some work on their hands. This old monolith does not come for free. But then where 
do we go from here?  
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If our primary concern is to have a functional notion of objective modality, then it looks 
as though Option 2 is all but ruled out. That leaves us with Options 1 and 4. Option 1 gets us Plain 
Alethicity only, whereas Option 4 looks ad hoc. Between losing a cherished principle and accepting 
suspicious explanatory debts, my preference is for the former. But the matter isn’t so simple, 
because without Logical Alethicity, serious function-related concerns begin to emerge.   
In Chapter 4, I tried to show that one crucial use for ordinary objective modals lies in their 
ability to make us feel comfortable about a posteriori foreknowledge. I claimed that this was rooted 
in two of their features: that we can have a posteriori knowledge that it is presently impossible for 
some future P to obtain, and that the present impossibility of future P entails future P’s not 
obtaining. But suppose that this is, indeed, why these modals have been so good at playing this 
role up to now. What then happens if we lose Logical Alethicity? Well, we seem to be left with our 
knowledge that every present impossibility went on not to obtain. We are left, in other words, with 
an impressive a posteriori generalisation. And it should certainly make us feel confident that present 
impossibilities will continue not to obtain. But do we thereby have the right to be certain that they 
will? Answering ‘yes’ would seemingly commit us to the claim that inductive grounds for belief 
can be just as strong as deductive ones. That is, needless to say, a very controversial idea. But to 
say ‘no’ would be to renounce our right to use objective modals as foundations of our 
foreknowledge, at least in good faith.  
If this puzzle is genuine, then it is very disturbing. On the one hand, the utility of objective 
modals seems to depend upon their being sensitive to time. On the other, working this essential 
temporality into their logic threatens their very utility. It would therefore seem that the utility of 
objective modals depends upon our being insufficiently reflective about their logic: upon our not 
trying to develop A-suppositions in which the actual isn’t possible.  
It will not be automatically helpful to respond to this problem by going for Option 4, for 
obvious reasons: Option 4 does not tell us the ratio of possibilities that predate actuality to 
possibilities that do not. Perhaps, then, we may wish to argue that we were too dismissive of (Past-
POS*). Perhaps it is unrestrictedly counterfactually invariant that ¬(P-at-t & ¬(At t–n, POSOP)). 
Perhaps trying to develop the A-supposition that (P-at-t & ¬(At t–n, POSOP)) is impossible. And 
these are, of course, not the only moves to be made here. But it seems to me that something quite 






In this closing chapter, I have shown the relevance of the Ascetic Modalizer’s function-driven 
stance to two ancient ideas about modality. In so-doing, I hope to have persuaded the reader that 





































My project was to explore the relationship between ordinary and philosophical modalizing, whilst 
advancing our understanding of modal function. In closing, I will highlight some of the more 
original developments and arguments in this thesis. I will then suggest some areas in which this 
project might be extended.  
In Chapter 1, I introduced the figure of the Ascetic Modalizer. This allowed us to uncover 
and question elements of the received view of ordinary and philosophical modalizing, elements 
which easily go unnoticed and unchallenged. Along the way, I had occasion to: 
 
• Argue against Stalnaker’s (1984) theory of ‘might’ counterfactuals. 
• Find reason to resist the linguistic data that could be taken to support 
contextualism about objective possibility ascriptions.  
 
In Chapter 2, I explored the topic of conditionals and suppositions. After motivating and 
defending some functional hypotheses about three types of conditionals, I used those functional 
hypotheses to argue for some new assertability conditions for weak and strong subjunctive 
conditionals. This led me to: 
 
• Argue against Holguín’s (2020) argument for epistemic contextualism.  
• Challenge the view that strong subjunctives are useful for reasoning by Modus 
Ponens and IBE. 
• Argue against Crespo, Karawani, and Veltman’s (2018) suggestion that indicative 
conditionals presuppose antecedent subjective possibility, and that weak 
subjunctives presuppose antecedent unlikeliness.  
 
In Chapter 3, I advocated for an unfairly-neglected research project, the Toulminian Programme. 
I also made some slight adjustments to the Millian Programme, before showing how deliberative 
C-suppositions bridge the gap between these projects. Then, in Chapter 4, I determined some 
deliberative functions for ordinary objective and subjective modalizing, but could not find any for 
A-modalizing. I suggested that this should raise the Ascetic Modalizer’s confidence.  
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 Finally, in Chapter 5, I showed that the Ascetic Modalizer can accept a great deal that has 
been said about deductive validity, without begging the question against modal orthodoxy. I also 
used my functional hypotheses to argue that subjective modals are not alethic (and that this is a 
good thing), and that objective modals may not be alethic (and that this would probably be a bad 
thing).  
But much remains largely unaddressed, if not wholly ignored. For example, a host of 
interesting questions become pertinent once the Ascetic Modalizer’s position is on the table. How 
many further discontinuities, functional or not, might be found to separate ordinary and 
philosophical modalizing – and at what point would these constitute a win for Modal Asceticism? 
And what, exactly, would it be like to modalize in the limited way that the Modal Ascetic 
recommends? Would it afford us a liberating perspective on longstanding philosophical issues – 
such as the alleged possibility of radical scepticism – if we only allowed ourselves ordinary notions? 
Or would reflecting on these problems show us the need to introduce rarefied notions of modality? 
Whatever one’s views about modal unification, the idea of Modal Asceticism certainly appears to 
be a potent catalyst for inquiry.  
 The theory of modal function, too, retains many more secrets. It would be a fascinating 
project to develop the Toulminian-Millian Programme beyond what was achieved here. Of 
obvious importance are the deontic modals. And although there wasn’t the scope to explore these 
matters here, Toulmin’s (1958) contains many an interesting discussion of logic and logical 
modality, but also of probability ascriptions. Those are certainly topics which the theory of modal 
function should aim to encompass or touch upon.  
 Finally, I think that the assertability conditions that I proposed for different conditionals 
have the potential to be developed into a much fuller, more explanatory, more sophisticated 
theory. And despite the numerous improvements that this account undoubtedly needs, I hope to 
have showcased the desirability of a theory of conditionals in which function and semantics are in 
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